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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Stand Up and Be Counted: Race, Religion, and the Eisenhower Administration‘s 
Encounter with Arab Nationalism. (August 2011) 
Rian T. Bobal. B.A., Pennsylvania State University; 
 M.A., Boston College 
Chief of Advisory Committee: Dr. Terry H. Anderson 
 
―Stand Up and be Counted‖ explores how American racial and religious beliefs 
guided the American encounter with Arab nationalism in the 1950s.  It utilizes both 
traditional archival sources and less traditional cultural texts.  Cultural texts, such as, 
movies, novels, travelogues, periodical articles, and folk sayings, are used to elucidate 
how Americans viewed and understood Arab peoples, and also religion.  Archival 
records from the Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, National Archives, and 
John Foster Dulles Papers at Princeton University are used to elucidate how these beliefs 
shaped the Eisenhower administration‘s policy in the Middle East. 
The first chapter provided a brief introductory history of the Arab nationalist 
movement, reviews the literature, and introduces the dissertation‘s argument.  The 
second chapter demonstrates that American culture established a canon of racialized 
beliefs about Arabs.  These beliefs forged a national identity by constructing an Arab, to 
use Edward Said‘s famed term, ―other.‖  Americans to project what they believed they 
were not onto Arabs in an effort to establish what they were.  The third chapter 
iv 
 
demonstrates that historical events caused subtle, yet important, shifts in how Americans 
perceived Arab peoples over the years. By focusing on the 1920s, 1940s, and 1950s 
―Stand Up and Be Counted‖ elucidates that historical events compelled specific 
racialized associations to assume greater prominence during these periods. The fourth 
chapter demonstrates that these racially filtered perceptions guided the Eisenhower 
administration‘s decision to oppose Arab nationalism.  Arab nationalist leaders, such as 
Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, advocated adopting a neutralist stance in the cold war.  
Administration officials, however, reasoned that Arabs‘ innate gullibility and 
irrationality would ultimately allow Soviet leaders to outwit and subjugate them—
perhaps without them knowing it had even occurred.    These racialized assumptions, the 
sixth chapter reveals, compelled the administration to labor to contain Arab nationalism, 
even after the combined British-French invasion of the Suez Canal.  The seventh chapter 
establishes that many considered the United States to be a covenanted nation, a nation 
chosen by God to lead and save humanity.  Beginning in the 1930s, however, many 
Americans came to fear that material secularism at home and abroad were threatening 
this mission.  The monumental nature of these dual secularist threats prompted many to 
advocate for the formation of a united front of the religious.  Among those who 
subscribed to this understanding were President Eisenhower and his Secretary of State 
John Foster Dulles.  The eighth chapter established that this conceptualization of religion 
guided the administration‘s decision to promote King Saud of Saudi Arabia as a regional 
counter weight to Nasser and the Arab nationalist movement.  The ninth chapter reveals 
that this strategy was fraught with peril.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser met for the 
first and only time in September of 1960.  The meeting took place in the President‘s 
suite at the Waldorf Towers in New York City.  Nasser was visiting to attend a session at 
the United Nations.  A photographer captured the encounter.  The photo reveals the two 
leaders seated next to each other on a couch.  President Eisenhower is speaking, intently, 
leaning towards the Egyptian leader, gesticulating with his right arm.  Nasser sits, 
seemingly perfectly at ease, with palms upraised, as if to brush off what the President is 
saying.  Eisenhower meanwhile fixates on Nasser‘s upraised palms, as if he does not 
quite know what to make of the gesture.  All the while, the Egyptian leader looks away, 
directly into the eye of the camera, as if he is more concerned with an audience just out 
of view, one which the President cannot see.   
This scene serves as a metaphor for U.S. relations with Nasser, Egypt, and Arab 
nationalism during the Eisenhower years.  During the eight years he spent in office 
Dwight Eisenhower‘s attention was constantly drawn to the actions of the Egyptian 
government and the Arab nationalist movement.  His administration labored tirelessly to 
convince the Egyptians, and other Arab nationalists, to listen to, and accept, their view 
of the world, and the role they believed that Arabs should play in it.  The Egyptian 
 
__________ 
This dissertation follows the style of Diplomatic History. 
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government, however, continually turned its figurative head away from Washington, 
instead focusing on an audience and on forces that the administration seemed unable, or 
unwilling, to see. 
 When President Eisenhower entered the oval office he, and his Secretary of State 
John Foster Dulles, possessed a meticulously reasoned, and inflexible, understanding of 
world affairs.  The Soviet Union, they believed, constituted a threat, not just to the 
United States and to Western Europe, but to the very existence of freedom and 
independence.  According to the President, the cold war was a war between a side who 
rejected the ―dignity of the human being‖ and who subordinated ―him to the state,‖ and a 
side ―who believe[d] in the dignity of the individual human being.‖1  In containing and 
rolling back the Soviet peril, administration officials believed, they were doing the work 
of the world, protecting the very existence of freedom and individuality.  
 The problem which confronted the administration, however, was that the cold 
war by the early 1950s had become global.  Nearly six hundred million people had 
gained their independence.  New nations—Indonesia, Laos, India, Pakistan, Lebanon, 
Jordan, the Sudan, Ghana, Morocco, Tunisia, and many others—came into being.  The 
roots of this development stretch further back, of course.  Colonial peoples had long 
resented western domination, and with good reason.  Western nations frequently 
employed violence against colonial peoples, persecuted ethnic groups, and robbed them 
                                                 
1
 Notes for Chapel Talk, Pre-Presidential Papers, Principle File, Box 193, folder ―Kansas State, October 
24-25 ‘47,‖ Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library (DDEL hereafter).  Secretary Dulles‘ thinking on 
Soviet communism evolved.  Initially he looked upon the Soviet Union quite empathetically.  But, as the 
cold war solidified in the late 1940s and early 1950s he too began to think like President Eisenhower.  He 
wrote that the Soviet Union preached a ―creed that teaches world domination and that would deny those 
personal freedoms which constitute our most cherished political and religious heritage.‖  John Foster 
Dulles, War or Peace (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1950), 2. 
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of self rule and sovereignty.  The two world wars catalyzed resistance.  The carnage of 
the First World War, one historian has observed, ―undermined any faith‖ colonial 
peoples had in ―European superiority‖ and consequently a worldwide resistance 
movement immerged.  This movement only gained further strength after World War II 
when the European powers‘ senseless slaughter of each other belied their claims that 
they were the most fit to govern.  Japanese successes, meanwhile, undermined the notion 
of western white superiority.
2
 
The new nations of the so-called third world, and the nationalist movements in 
lands still struggling under the yoke of European rule, presented the new administration 
with a bewildering challenge.  In a time when the United States wanted the nations of the 
world to ―stand up and be counted‖ in the cold war, to reflexively, and unquestioningly, 
align with the west, many of these new nations and nationalist movements were reluctant 
to do so.
3
  They desired, as one historian has written, to end ―foreign control of the 
exploitation of raw materials through foreign loans, or thorough development aid.‖4  
They were also leery of entering into military alliances with the west, fearing that doing 
so would only perpetuate western meddling in their sovereign affairs.   
Of all the nationalist movements perhaps none frustrated the Eisenhower 
administration more than the Arab nationalist movement.  The movement emerged just 
                                                 
2
 Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Time (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 79 and chapter 3. 
3
 National Security Council Report, January 24, 1958, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-60, 
vol. 12 (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1993), 22. (Hereafter FRUS) 
4
 Westad, The Global Cold War, 95-6. 
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prior to World War I.  As is so often the case, intellectuals led it.
5
  They rebelled against 
the inept rule of the Ottoman Empire.  Thinkers began to, as one historian has 
summarized, ―outline ideas of unity based on common language, similar cultural outlook 
and shared historical experience.‖6  Secret societies in what would later become Syria 
agitated for the creation of an independent Arab state and throughout the empire 
underground societies proliferated. 
Salvation seemed to arrive with the end of the First World War, when the 
Ottoman Empire, the perennial ―sick man of Europe,‖ expired.  This, however, was not 
to be.  The western powers carved up the Ottoman carcass, created new nations ruled by 
local elites, and ―administered‖ them as western mandates. 
The creation of these new states, even if they lacked true sovereignty, initially 
sapped much the Arab nationalist movement‘s energy.  This, however, would not last 
long.  The conclusion of the Second World War revived the movement.  Despite gaining 
independence, traditional conservative elites, who the western nations had placed into 
power, continued to rule.  This infuriated many.  These elites, they believed, lacked 
legitimacy.  Their loyalty lay with those who had placed them into power, and who 
continued to support them economically and militarily, and not with their people.  The 
war also producing a middle class for the first time in many Middle Eastern states and 
this new class began, as one historian has written, ―criticizing the traditionalist regimes 
for the existing economic stagnation and continued subservience to the imperial 
                                                 
5
 See: Ronald Suny, Revenge of the Past: Nationalism, Revolution, and the Collapse of the Soviet Union 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993). 
6
 Ray Takeyh, The Origins of the Eisenhower Doctrine: The U.S., Britain, and Nasser’s Egypt, 1953-1957 
(New York: St. Martin‘s Press, 2000), 12. 
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powers.‖7  The Arab nationalist movement also gained strength from the creation of the 
state of Israel.  Many Arabs believed that the existence of the Jewish state only divided 
the Arab world and in response many turned to the re-enlivened Arab nationalist 
movement.   
Despite this reinvigoration the entrenched elite remained in power.  They were a 
potent force.  It would take another equally powerful entity to unseat them.  In many 
countries, including in Egypt, the military would serve this function. 
Egypt technically gained its independence from Britain in 1922.  King Farouk 
ruled the country as an independent monarch, but the British continued to wield 
considerable influence.  They supported individual politicians or parties, offered 
―advice‖ to government ministers, and on at least two occasions delivered ultimatums 
demanding changes in the composition of the ruling coalition.  In addition a large 
number of British forces remained in the country—most at the immense base at Suez.8  
 This state of affairs disturbed many, including many officers in the Egyptian 
armed forces.  They soon formed the Free Officers movement, with the objective of 
overthrowing the King and establish meaningful independence for the Egyptian people.  
The Free Officers, however, realized that the King and his supporters constituted a 
powerful force.  So they waited for a precipitous moment. 
Such a moment arrived in July of 1952.  As darkness descended upon Cairo so 
too did Egyptian armored and artillery units.  Elsewhere in the country the military 
                                                 
7
 Ibid, 13. 
8
 James Jankowski, Nasser’s Egypt, Arab Nationalism, and the United Arab Republic (Boulder, Col.: 
Lynne Riemmer Publishers: 2002), 12 ; Joel Gordon, Nasser’s Blessed Movement: Egypt’s Free Officers 
and the July Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 16. 
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arrested much of the high command and as dawn broke on the 23
rd
 a new force wielded 
power in Egypt: the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC). 
Once in power the RCC appointed General Mohammad Naguib to serve as its 
titular leader.  The real force behind the council, however, was its founder Gamal Abdel 
Nasser.  He founded the Free Officers Movement and, as one historian has concluded, 
his opinion, while ―not always prevailing,‖ always ―counted the most.‖9  Naguib was 
chosen to represent the RCC merely because he possessed higher status and visibility.  
He was largely a figurehead.  One, who in less than two years time, Nasser would force 
from power.
10
 
Nasser and the RCC possessed a very different understanding of the world than 
Eisenhower and Dulles.  To them the preeminent threat came not from Soviet 
communism, but from western imperialism.  As Nasser explained ―the Soviet Union is 
more than a thousand miles away and we‘ve never had any trouble with them.  They 
have never attacked us.  They have never occupied our territory.  They have never had a 
base here, but the British have been here for seventy years.‖11 Decades of colonization 
and exploitation at the hands of the British had made Nasser and the RCC conscious of, 
and concerned with, continued western influence in their nation.  They worried that the 
western powers would continue to divest Egypt of meaningful sovereignty and 
independence as long as they exercised any influence over the Egyptian economy or 
over Egyptian foreign policy.  This fear prompted Nasser and the RCC to strive for 
                                                 
9
Jankowski, Nasser’s Egypt, 15.  See also: Gordon, Nasser’s, 13,47, 55. 
10
 See: Jankowski, Nasser’s Egypt, chapter 3. 
11
 Mohammad Heikal, The Cairo Documents: The Inside Story of Nasser and his Relationship with World 
Leaders, Rebels, and Statesmen (New York: Doubleday, 1973), 41. 
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complete independence from the west.  The only way to achieve this, Nasser believed, 
was to utilize Arab nationalism.   
Nasser was no ideologue, nor was he a power hungry megalomaniac, as many in 
the Eisenhower administration believed (the administration went so far as to commission 
a study comparing Nasser to Hitler).
12
  He was first and foremost a military man.  His 
primary goal was to secure meaningful independence for his country.  The west‘s 
economic and military superiority, however, led him to conclude that the only way to 
accomplish this was for Egypt to unite with the other Arab states.  For Nasser, one 
historian has concluded, ―Arab nationalism meant Arab effectiveness,‖ by working 
together the Arab states could obtain a ―‘protective armor …. against both imperialism 
and Israel.‖  Arab nationalism for Nasser was a ―defensive necessity,‖ a ―weapon‖ to be 
used in the ―struggle against foreign domination.‖13 
This was a very different understanding of the world, of security, and of 
sovereignty than the Eisenhower administration possessed.  What complicated matters 
was the administration‘s certainty in the correctness of its view.  The only rational, 
intellectually justifiable position, the administration held, was to view the Soviet Union 
as the preeminent threat, as a threat not just to worldwide stability and security, but to 
the very essence of civilization—individuality.  To meet and defeat this existential 
challenge, the administration believed, the nations of the world needed to sacrifice their 
own individual interests and unite for the common good.  For this reason the 
                                                 
12
 Hitler and Nasser: a Comparison, August 14, 1956,  RG 59, General Records, Subject Files of the 
Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Box 11, folder ―Egypt,‖ National Archives. (Hereafter NA). 
13
 Jankowski, Nasser’s Egypt, 33. 
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administration could not, on any intellectual level, empathize with, or understand, any 
other view of the world.  As a result when confronted with an opposing view, such as the 
one held by Nasser and his fellow Arab nationalists, they, perhaps unknowingly, 
interpreted it through the prism of race. 
Stand Up and Be Counted is a cultural history of the Eisenhower administration‘s 
encounter with Arab nationalism.  Before I proceed, a few words of definition.  By 
culture I mean, as anthropologist Clifford Geertz famously delineated it, an ―interworked 
systems of constructable signs (what, ignoring provincial usages, I would call 
symbols).‖14  These ―constuctable signs‖ collectively form the basis for epistemological 
categories such as race, class, gender, and religion. 
  Cultural histories posit that the symbolically constructed categories of race, 
class, gender, and, religion, give meaning to everyday life and provides the context upon 
which people base their decisions.  Cultural histories like Michel Foucault‘s Madness 
and Civilization and Norbert Elias‘ The Civilizing Process first appeared in the 1970s.15 
Historians of U.S. foreign relations, however, were slow to adopt the approach.  The first 
cultural history of foreign relations, Akira Iriye‘s Power and Culture, did not appear 
until 1981.  In Power and Culture Iriye reveals how American and Japanese cultural and 
intellectual perceptions effected relations between the two countries.
 16
  In the wake of 
Ariye‘s groundbreaking work others followed and explored other aspects of culture and 
its affect on foreign policy.  Kristen Hoganson‘s Fighting for American Manhood, for 
                                                 
14
 Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books: 1973), 14. 
15
 Michel Foucalt, Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1973) ; Elias Norbert, The Civilizing Process (New York: Urizen Books, 1978). 
16
 Akira Iriye, Power and Culture: the Japanese-American War, 1941-1945 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1981). 
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example, elucidated how American gender constructions influenced policy aboard.
17
  
Thomas Borstelman‘s The Cold War and the Color Line demonstrated how domestic 
racial beliefs, and politics, effected U.S. foreign relations.
18
  Despite the recent 
popularity of the cultural approach, however, questions remain.  As Melvyn Leffler has 
cautioned ―emphasis on culture, language, and rhetoric often diverts attention from 
questions of causation and agency.‖19  
Historians who interpret foreign relations through the lens of culture have 
responded, in a, perhaps, less than satisfactory manner to these criticisms.  Andrew 
Rotter has argued that ―cause and affect‖ is ―perhaps not so easy to discern as my 
colleagues would claim.‖  Echoing Clifford Geertz who posited ―that man is animal 
suspended in webs of [cultural] significance he himself has spun,‖ Rotter asserts that 
policymakers ―are influenced and constrained by webs of significance, but,‖ he cautions, 
―they are [also] human beings with agency.‖20  Consequently, instead of demonstrating 
causality, he writes, he labors ―to show‖ in his work ―a correspondence between 
culturally conditioned ways in which selves made others and specific events.‖21 
                                                 
17
 Kristen L. Hoganson, Fighting for American Manhood: How Gender Politics Provoked the Spanish-
American and Philippine-American Wars (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998). 
18
 Thomas Borstelmann, The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in the Global Arena 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003).  See also: Mary L. Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights: 
Race and the Image of American Democracy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000) ; Robert D. 
Dean, Imperial Brotherhood: Gender and the Making of Cold War Foreign Policy (Amherst, MA: 
University of Massachusetts Press, 2001) ; Michael H. Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy ( New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1987). 
19
 Melvyn P. Leffler, ―New Approaches, Old Interpretations, and Prospective Reconfigurations,‖ in 
Michael J Hogan, ed., America in the World: the Historiography of American Foreign Relations Since 
1941 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 72. 
20
 Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures, 5; Andrew Rotter, Comrades at Odds: The United States and 
India, 1947-1964 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000), xxii. 
21
 Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures, 5. 
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I agree with Rotter that policymakers are indeed ―influenced and constrained by 
webs of significance.‖  But as cultural historians of American foreign relations I believe 
that we can and should do more than demonstrate a ―correspondence‖ between culture 
and events.  In his study of race, religion, and U.S. relations with Vietnam Seth Jacobs 
wrote that ―while the roots of American activities in Vietnam were many and complex,‖ 
policymakers‘ ―ideological assumptions,‖ Jacobs concludes ―facilitated‖ their decisions 
―by making them seem logical and necessary and blinding‖ them ―to their 
consequences.‖22  This work follows in the path pioneered by Seth Jacobs.  It upholds 
that culture, while it indeed provides context, does, in certain instances, more than that.  
By providing context it shapes policymakers‘ actions and effects causality.  It, as Seth 
Jacobs has astutely elucidated, makes certain options ―seem logical and necessary.‖  
As this work will demonstrate, this is what occurred when officials in the 
Eisenhower administration were confronted with Arab nationalism.  Ill informed of 
Arabs‘ historical experiences, they filtered the actions of Egypt‘s nationalist government 
through the prism of race.  They relied on racialized assumptions or stereotypes to 
understand, interpret, and give meaning to Egyptian actions.  By racialized assumption 
or stereotype I mean, as historian Janice Terry has defined it, a ―mental package‘ in 
which a collection of traits or characteristics are combined to delineate or identify a 
group or a member of that group without reference to particular individual differences or 
complexities.‖23  It was just such racialized assumptions that allowed policymakers in 
                                                 
22
 Seth Jacobs, America’s Miracle Man in Vietnam: Ngo Dinh Diem, Religion, Race, and U.S. Intervention 
in Southeast Asia (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2004), 7. 
23
 Janice J. Terry, Mistaken Identity: Arab Stereotypes in Popular Writing (Washington DC: American-
Arab Affairs Council, 1985), 8. 
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the Eisenhower administration to interpret Egyptian actions and it was these racially 
filtered perceptions that precipitated the administration‘s decision to oppose Nasser and 
Arab nationalism.  Racialized assumptions made this decision seem ―logical and 
necessary.‖ 
Works written on the American encounter with Arab nationalism during the 
Eisenhower years have largely ignored the importance of race.  Works specifically on 
U.S.-Egyptian relations have failed to probe this nexus all together.  Many early authors 
are content to merely assign blame for the breakdown in U.S.-Egyptian relations.  Peter 
Hahn, in The United States, Great Britain, and Egypt, for example, chooses to fault 
Nasser.  The Egyptian leader, Hahn concludes, ―obstructed the Alpha peace plan, 
assaulted the Baghdad Pact, stirred Arab nationalism against Western interests, and 
practiced positive neutralism.‖24  In other words, Nasser obstructed reasonable American 
policy initiatives at every turn and precipitated the break in relations.  Geoffrey 
Aaronson, in From Side Show to Center Stage, offers a similar interpretation, albeit from 
the opposite end of the spectrum.  Aaronson maintains that ―arrogant assumptions of 
United States cold-war imperialism‖ alienated the ―Egyptian regime‖ and ―the lack of 
U.S. economic or military aid‖ pushed Egypt into the Soviet fold.25  The United States, 
in Aaronson‘s view, caused the break in relations. 
Historians who have examined U.S.-Egyptian relations through the lens of the 
Suez crisis have presented a similar blame-oriented view.  Both Steven Freiberger in 
                                                 
24
 Peter L. Hahn, The United States, Great Britain, and Egypt, 1945-1956: Strategy and Diplomacy in the 
Early Cold War (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1991), 194-5. 
25
 Geoffrey Aaronson, From Sideshow to Centerstage: U.S. Policy Towards Egypt, 1946-1956 (Boulder, 
CO: L. Rienner, 1986), 57-8. 
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Dawn Over Suez and Donald Neff in Warriors at Suez argue that administration officials 
chose to scapegoat Nasser for the failure of their initiatives in the region.  As Freiberg 
concludes, as relations soured the administration ―chose Nasser as a scapegoat for its 
failure.‖ 26  
Matthew Holland takes a more novel approach in his American and Egypt.  He 
argues that the structure of ―the Eastern Question‖ precipitated the U.S.-Egyptian rift.  
The ―nature of the Eastern Question system,‖ he writes, meant that ―friendship between 
big and small nations required common interests, an important one being the idea of 
national sovereignty.‖  The cold war, however, caused ―American policymakers to 
abandon this idea on the pretext of national security.‖27  
Recent works have broadened their focus beyond the more traditional nation-to-
nation approach and in doing so, they have presented a more nuanced interpretation.  
Both Ray Takeyh in The Origins of the Eisenhower Doctrine and Salim Yaqub in 
Containing Arab Nationalism have moved beyond the U.S.-Egypt paradigm to explore 
how the administration responded to the emergence of the larger Arab nationalist 
movement.  Both of these authors conclude that diverging interests produced an 
irreconcilable rift between the United States and Egypt.  As Takeyh writes, ―the inherent 
conflict between a superpower focused on curbing Soviet moves and a local regime 
preoccupied with regional challenges eventually caused a breakdown in US-Egyptian 
                                                 
26
 Steven Freiberger, Dawn over Suez: The Rise of American Power in the Middle East, 1953-1957 
(Chicago, IL: I.R. Dee, 1992), 213 ; Donald Neff, Warriors at Suez: Eisenhower Takes America into the 
Middle East (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1981),  253 ; Diane Kunz also offers a similar 
interpretation.  See: Diane Kunz, The Economic Diplomacy of the Suez Crisis (Chapel Hill, N.C.: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1991), 63. 
27
 Matthew Holland, America and Egypt: From Roosevelt to Eisenhower (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996), 
172. 
13 
 
relations.‖28  Salim Yaqub, perhaps the leading scholar in the field, offers a similar 
interpretation.  ―The two parties,‖ he writes, ―applied their shared values inversely, each 
urging compromise in precisely those areas in which the other demanded 
commitment.‖29  Conflicting interests, not race or culture, both authors conclude, 
precipitated the clash between the United States and Egypt.  Yaqub even argues that 
cultural beliefs ―tell us relatively little‖ about the ―Eisenhower administration‘s policies 
towards the Arab world.‖30 
While works on U.S.-Egyptian relations or American relations with Arab 
nationalism have ignored or slighted the importance of race, several works on U.S. 
relations with the larger Muslim or Arab world have interrogated how racial assumptions 
influenced U.S. policy.  Melani McAlister‘s Epic Encounters reveals how American 
perceptions of Arabs influenced U.S. interactions with the nations and peoples of the 
region.
 31
   Unfortunately, McAlister fails to analyze how cultural productions 
specifically shaped U.S. policy.  Instead she only offers the conclusion that American 
cultural representations ―helped make the Middle East an acceptable area for the 
exercise of American power.‖32  Matthew Jacobs, in his article ―The Perils and Promise 
of Islam,‖ investigates American perceptions of Islam during the late 1940s and 1950s.  
Jacobs asserts that Americans viewed Islam through a bifurcated lens.  Early in the 
period they perceived most Muslims as ―religious conservatives‖ who threatened to 
                                                 
28
 Takeyh, The Origins, ix. 
29
 Salim Yaqub, Containing Arab Nationalism: The Eisenhower Doctrine and the Middle East (Chapel 
Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 271. 
30
Yaqub, Containing Arab Nationalism, 8.   
31
 Melani McAlister, Epic Encounters: Culture, Media, and the U.S. Interests in the Middle East since 
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imperil U.S. policy within the region with their anti-American Arab nationalist or 
communist ideologies.
33
  Later, policymakers came to believe that Islam held promise.  
They believed that a faction of ―Western-educated, upper and middle class intellectuals‖ 
within Islam adhered to ―more secular principles‖ and would support American 
interests.
34
   Jacobs, while he superbly analyzes American perceptions of Islam, does not 
investigate the racial implications of these perceptions.  
Douglas Little broaches the subject in his superb survey of U.S.-Middle Eastern 
relations since 1945, American Orientalism.  Little devotes a chapter to the topic of race.  
In it he dispenses such tantalizing morsels as Eisenhower was ―comfortable with such 
orientalist stereotypes of the Middle East‖ because his ―view of the Muslim world was 
colored by his wartime experiences in North Africa‖ and ―Nasser‘s seizure of the Suez 
Canal during the summer of 1956 reinforced Eisenhower‘s belief that the Arabs were 
irrational, resentful, and dangerous to Western interests.‖35  Unfortunately, however, 
Little, does not explore how the Eisenhower administration‘s racial beliefs affected 
policy, an understandable omission given his work‘s larger purpose.36   
Michael Oren also touches on the subject in his survey Power, Faith, and 
Fantasy.  As part of his ―fantasy‖ section Oren broadly examines American racial 
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perceptions of Arabs.  Muslims, he writes, ―generally called Musselmen, were perceived 
by eighteenth century Americans as the ultimate Other, a colorful garbed but amorphous 
mass, the descendents of once venerable but long decayed civilizations, primitive, 
sordid, and cruel.‖37  Such pejorative beliefs, Oren states, continued into contemporary 
times, when Americans viewed Arabs as cruel, sensual, and ―at once romantic and 
threatening.‖38  Once again, however, Oren does not examine how these beliefs affected 
U.S. policy towards the Middle East during the Eisenhower years. 
A final work, Andrew Rotter‘s Comrades at Odds, however, does.  Rotter is 
primarily interested in exploring how Americans perceived Indians, and vice versa, 
during the early cold war.  In doing so, however, he briefly examines American 
perceptions of India‘s Muslim neighbor Pakistan.  Rotter argues that Americans viewed 
Pakistani Muslims in largely positive terms.  They viewed them as ―fellow monotheists 
who rejected relativism and neutrality in favor of a single received truth and an ardent 
commitment to defend it.‖39  This belief, he argues, influenced the American decision to 
enter into an alliance with Pakistan.  Rotter‘s work offers an intriguing interpretation, 
and one, which unlike the previous works mentioned, demonstrates how American 
perceptions influenced policy.  But Rotter does not investigate how these perceptions 
affected U.S. relations with either Nasser or Arab nationalism.    
―Stand Up and Be Counted‖ will.  It will establish that officials in the 
Eisenhower administration attributed Egypt‘s embrace of a neutralist position in the cold 
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war to Arab irrationality.  It will also demonstrate that they believed Arabs‘ innate 
gullibility would ultimately allow the Soviets to outwit and subjugate them—perhaps 
without them knowing it had even occurred.  As President Eisenhower once remarked 
about Nasser, he is a ―puppet‖ of the Soviets ―even though he probably doesn‘t think 
so.‖40  For these reasons the administration chose to oppose and contain Gamal Abdel 
Nasser and the Arab nationalist movement . 
Race and the Eisenhower administration‘s decision to oppose Nasser and Arab 
nationalism, however, is only half the story.  How the administration chose to combat 
Nasser constitutes the other half.  Ultimately the administration chose to support the 
conservative governments in the region and promote King Saud of Saudi Arabia as a 
regional counterweight.  This decision to wager on King Saud emanated from racialized 
assumptions about Arabs, but also from how administration officials viewed and 
understood religion. 
 Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, President Dwight D. Eisenhower, and 
many other Americans in the 1950s viewed religion as good for the individual, for 
society, and for the world.  They did not believe that the particulars of a person‘s beliefs 
mattered, as long as they believed.  Americans in the 1950s, to paraphrase Secretary of 
Dulles, believed in belief.  They believed that belief, regardless of in which religion, was 
necessary to confront the existential threats of the day, secular materialism at home and 
secular communism abroad. 
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 This understanding of religion prompted the administration to promote King 
Saud as a regional power, as a force to contain and defeat the combined 
communist/Nasserist threat.  The King‘s faith, they believed, imbued him with the 
strength and conviction necessary to confront and defeat these threats.  Saud‘s position 
as protector of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, they also thought, empowered him 
with the authority and respect necessary to command other Muslims in the region to do 
the same. In King Saud the administration saw, to borrow a turn-of-phrase from Seth 
Jacobs, a Miracle Man of sorts, someone who could solve all of their problems in the 
region.   
Most works on U.S.-relations with the Middle East during the Eisenhower years 
do mention the administration‘s plan to promote King Saud as a regional leader.41  They 
also note, usually in passing, that the administration believed that the King‘s religious 
status empowered him for this role. Ray Takeyh, for example, writes that the 
administration attempted to challenge Nasser by ―building up and exploiting‖ King 
Saud‘s ―status as the guardian of Islam‘s most cherished shrines.‖42   
These works, however, fail to explore, in any detail, why the administration 
believed this.  At best, they offer one to two lines on the matter.  Ray Takeyh notes in 
passing that the administration supported King Saud because they misread his ―status‖ in 
the region.
43
  Salim Yaqub posits that the administration‘s faith in Saud sprang from 
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―self-deceiving,‖ but also from ―the realization that no other conservative Arab leader 
could make a more plausible bid for pan-Arab leadership.‖44   
The only work that devotes any significant time to analyzing this decision is 
Nathan Citino‘s From Arab Nationalism to OPEC.  According to Citino, ―the president 
tapped Sa‘ud to lead a pro-Western coalition in the Arab world and hoped that the king 
as keeper of the holy places of Islam, could transmit Western influence to other Arab 
and Muslim countries.‖45  Why?  ―Eisenhower‘s Islamic strategy,‖ Citino concludes, 
―reflected Western scholarly assumptions that religious faith was the essential, defining 
characteristic of Muslims and that a monolithic ‗Islam‘ could somehow be manipulated 
to shape the political future of the Middle East.‖46  The problem with Citino‘s work is 
that it does not relate academics‘ positive views of Islam to Americans‘ larger 
understanding of religion in the 1950s.  Additionally, Citino marginalizes religion‘s 
importance.  U.S. relations with Saudi Arabia, he argues, were primarily animated by a 
desire to obtain ―multilateral free trade among developed economies.‖  To accomplish 
this goal, he writes, the administration needed to ―secure access to the oil of Saudi 
Arabia and other Middle Eastern countries.‖  To do so they appeased ―Arab nationalism‖ 
by relying ―upon private, corporate interests,‖ instead of formal imperial structures.47 
Other works, while they do not specifically address the role of religion in U.S. 
relations with Saudi Arabia, do address the importance of faith in American relations 
with the Islamic world.  Michael Oren in Power, Faith, and Fantasy examines American 
                                                 
44
 Yaqub, Containing Arab Nationalism, 103. 
45
 Nathan J. Citino, From Arab Nationalism to OPEC: Eisenhower, King Saud, and the Making of U.S.-
Saudi Relations (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2002), 87-88, 126. 
46
 Citino, From Arab Nationalism, 95-96. 
47
 Ibid., 2. 
19 
 
religious beliefs as one of his three primary motifs.  He chronicles American missionary 
efforts in the region, describes the schools, clinics, and universities those efforts helped 
produce, and details the rise of Christian restorationism and the affect it had on U.S. 
policy towards the region.  But, he does not explore how religious beliefs influenced 
U.S. policy towards Saudi Arabia under Eisenhower.  Melani McAlister‘s Epic 
Encounters, investigates how American religious beliefs influenced the nation‘s 
interactions with the Middle East.
 48
   In the Eisenhower era she accomplishes this by 
deconstructing 1950s Hollywood biblical epics.   She demonstrates how Americans used 
the Middle East and religiously loaded cultural depictions of it to construct domestic 
―narratives of American national identity.‖49 She does not, however, analyze how these 
cultural productions specifically shaped U.S. policy towards the region.  In his 
Comrades at Odds Andrew Rotter also explores religion in his section on Americans‘ 
perceptions of Islam.  He argues that Americans viewed Pakistani Muslims in largely 
positive terms.  These positive perceptions influenced the American decision to enter 
into an alliance with Pakistan.  Rotter does not, however, investigate how these 
perceptions affected U.S.-Saudi relations. 
Matthew Jacobs‘ article ―The Perils and Promise of Islam,‖ comes closest to 
doing so.  As noted earlier, Jacobs asserts that Americans viewed Islam through a 
bifurcated lens.  Early on they perceived most Muslims negatively.
50
  Later, he 
concludes, they decided that Islam held promise.
51
   This conclusion, Jacobs notes, 
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influenced the administration‘s decision to promote King Saud as a regional leader.  
While Jacob correctly notes that positive American perceptions of Islam contributed to 
this decision, he does not relate these positive views to Americans‘ larger understanding 
of religion and its role in the 1950s.
52
 
This book will demonstrate how American understandings of race and religion 
guided the Eisenhower administration‘s encounter with Gamal Abdel Nasser and Arab 
Nationalism.  Racialized assumptions, it demonstrates, channeled the administration‘s 
confusion and frustration with Nasser and Arab nationalism into a policy of opposition.  
Racialized views and administration officials‘ understanding of religion shaped the 
administration‘s strategy to contain Arab nationalism.  They prompted the administration 
to promote King Saud as a regional alternative to Nasser.  American cultural views, in 
short, led the administration to oppose ―the puppet‖ and support the Miracle Man. 
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CHAPTER II 
 ―SOMETHING THOROUGHLY AND UNCOMPROMISINGLY FOREIGN:‖ 
ARABS IN AMERICAN THOUGHT 
 
In 1890 Chicago‘s Jackson Park was  a ―treacherous morass‖ of uneven, sparsely 
vegetated swamp land.  By May 1, 1893, however, it had been transformed.  Its 660 
acres had been drained.  Its soil removed and stored temporarily off site.  And over 200 
buildings built.  On that day then President Grover Cleveland turned a golden key which 
completed an electronic circuit.  In unison across the grounds fountains spewed, flags 
unfurled, and visitors cheered.  The World‘s Fair, the Columbian Exposition, had come 
to Chicago.
53
 
The fair‘s official purpose was to celebrate the 400th anniversary of Columbus‘ 
discovery of the new world.  Its true purpose, however, was to celebrate ―America‘s 
coming of age.‖  As historian David Burg has noted it was designed to ―inform all 
visitors‖ of America‘s ―momentous achievements.‖  Buildings dedicated to the arts, 
agriculture, horticulture, livestock, fish/fisheries, mining, machinery, transportation, 
manufacturing, electricity, liberal arts, ethnology, and architecture displayed America‘s 
burgeoning greatness.  The manufacturing building, which could comfortably house the 
U.S. Capital, the great pyramid of Giza, Winchester Cathedral, Madison Square Garden, 
and St. Paul‘s Cathedral, with room to spare, presented the latest in American 
manufacturing prowess.  The agricultural building exhibited every fruit and vegetable 
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known to man.  And the World‘s Congress Auxiliaries hosted conferences on every 
important issue of the day, including, women‘s progress, temperance, art, religion, and 
many others.  All of this was unified and elevated by the fair‘s august design.  The 
buildings were uniformly white, pure, crafted in the classical or renaissance style, 
interspersed with flowing canals, waterways, and over 2,000 works of sculpture 
supervised by world renowned sculptor Augustus Saint-Gaudens.
 54
 
Over 28 million Americans visited the fair during its six months of operation.  
While many strolled the grounds taking in the hauteur grandeur of the ―White City,‖ 
most were drawn to and spent the majority of their time on a more modest strip of land 
one mile long and 500 feet wide: the Midway Plaisance.   
The midway had been a last minute addition to the fair, added to attract the 
masses and assure financial solvency.  There visitors experienced something very 
different from the pristine planned perfection of the White City.  They attended the 
Hagenbeck animal show, where on any given day visitors observed lions driving 
chariots, camels on roller skates, and a man boxing a kangaroo (although, they would 
want to attend this last spectacle early, for as one visitor noted, the match often ―ended 
abruptly when the animal kicked his opponent out of the ring.‖) They also rode the 
world‘s first Ferris wheel, a hot air balloon, and an ice rail road.  Or they experienced the 
midway‘s main attraction, what one literary critic called the ―sliding scale of 
humanity.‖55  
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As crowds teemed into the midway they passed reproductions of an Irish village, 
a Javanese village, a German village, an Austrian village, a Cairo Street scene, a 
Algerian village, a Lapland village, and a Dahomay village.  As some noted at the time, 
and more have since, these displays seemed purposefully arranged.  The most ―white‖ or 
―civilized‖ cultures, such as the Irish and German villages, were located at the entrance, 
while the least ―civilized‖ or ―white‖ cultures, such as those from Africa and the Middle 
East, were located at the end of the midway. 
Several of these rear exhibits portrayed Arab or Muslim cultures.   One, the Cairo 
Street scene, was the most popular exhibition at the fair.  There visitors experienced a 
bazaar ―swarming‖ with polyglot peoples, camels, ―boys begging and pulling at the 
clothing of visitors,‖ a ―barbarous‖ wedding procession that ―lacked intelligence and 
civilization,‖ and performers engaged in sword or candle dances.56   
Visitors who ventured beyond the Cairo Street scene took in similar 
representations of Arabs or Muslims.  They beheld Bedouin tribesmen performing a 
―Wild East‖ show, where performers mesmerized visitors with adept knife and lance 
handling and where Arab men continuously ―smoked, preferring to do that rather than 
anything else.‖  They took in the Algerian Village with its Moorish palace, complete 
with a horror chamber, snake charmers, and performers who ingested hot coals, live 
scorpions, and who inserted ice picks through their eyes.  Many saw Fatima the ―queen 
of beauty,‖ who relaxed in a ―room in the Sultan‘s harem,‖ while ―on either side, 
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reclining on an Ottoman, were her waiting maids, and at her feet‖ lay ―her special 
servant.‖57 
Then there was Little Egypt, a dancing girl, who one academic has called the first 
―pre-Hollywood American sex symbol.‖  Men and women, both, flocked to see her, with 
good reason; for as one visitor described it, she began to dance as the orchestra 
accelerated its ―measure‖ she swayed her ―lithesome body in a curious rhythmical 
fashion.  Suddenly‖ she seemed to ―tremble‖ the ―hips and waist of the dancer‖ appeared 
to ―undulate‖ and quivered in ―what might be called an ecstasy of delirious delight.‖  
Such a display shocked, but and also titillated, America‘s Victorian sensibilities.  One 
fair visitor reported that her male companions were left ―deaf and dumb,‖ while it was 
rumored that Little Egypt‘s performance scandalized literary legend Mark Twain into a 
coronary.
58
 
Throughout much of America‘s history most Americans‘ knowledge of and 
contact with Arabs came from experiences similar to those at the Chicago World‘s 
Fair.
59
  They learned about Arabs through culture, not through experience or interaction.  
The reason for this is simple; Arabs were few in number in America.  Moreover, most 
immigrants who did migrate to and settle on American shores during this period did not 
meet American expectations of what an Arab was.  An overwhelming majority, one 
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scholar estimates nearly 90% of early immigrants from Arab lands, were Christian, not 
Muslim, and as such they often did not register with Americans as being Arab at all.  It 
was not until 1948 that a significant number of Muslim Arabs immigrated to the United 
States and even then only in relatively small numbers compared to other immigrant 
groups.
60
  In the absence of direct information about Arabs, Americans relied on cultural 
sources.  
Cultural contacts with Arabs began from the beginning, or actually before the 
beginning.  Before Americans ever became American, settlers to the colonies drew on a 
long history of Western interactions with Arab peoples, many knew of Arabs or Muslims 
from the crusades, Muslim military penetration into Europe, the expulsion of the Moors 
from Spain, and Biblical depictions of Arabs.  Evangelical Protestants carried with them 
a long tradition of incorporating Muslim Arabs into their eschatology (end times 
prophesy).
61
  And the colonies‘ educated elite drew on a rich intellectual tradition of 
associating Arabs with despotism.  Denis Diderot‘s legendary encyclopedia, for 
example, described Turks as ―a herd of animals joined only by habit, prodded by the law 
of the stick, and led by an absolute master according to his whim.‖62  While one of 
Thomas Jefferson‘s early drafts of the Declaration of Independence referred to slavery as 
the ―opprobrium of INFIDEL [Muslim] powers.‖63 
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 Cultural contacts continued after independence.  Early Americans learned about 
Arab peoples through a deluge of ―captivity narratives,‖ which detailed Americans‘ 
enslavement by the Barbary pirates, and also through novels, and biographies.  Later 
Americans drew on travelogues written by American travelers to the region, newspaper 
articles, National Geographic articles, and movies. 
 These cultural contacts established how most Americans, including Dwight D. 
Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles, learned about and formed beliefs about Arabs.  This 
chapter lays the groundwork for this argument by exploring American cultural 
representations of Arabs.  It focuses primarily on the period from 1890 until 1960—the 
years key Eisenhower administration policymakers were exposed to and imbibed in 
cultural representations of Arabs.  Dwight Eisenhower was born in 1890, John Foster 
Dulles was born in 1889 and died in 1959.  But it will also incorporate depictions from 
earlier periods which were decisive in shaping how Arabs were portrayed in the 1890-
1960 period. 
The portrait most Americans gleamed from cultural representations of Arabs 
during these years was perhaps best expressed by a then little know reporter in 1886.  
This young ambitious reporter had learned that a group of prominent Brooklynites were 
planning on embarking upon a whirlwind trip abroad.  Smelling a story, the reporter 
decided to accompany them.  The group spent weeks at sea, on the Canary Islands, and 
in Europe, yet, they failed to find what they were seeking.  ―Everywhere we have‖ gone, 
the reporter mourns, we have ―found foreign-looking things and foreign-looking people, 
but always with things and people intermixed that we were familiar with before.‖  When 
27 
 
the group stepped ashore in Tangiers, however, they finally found what they were 
looking for; ―something thoroughly and uncompromisingly foreign—foreign from top to 
bottom—foreign from center to circumference—foreign inside and outside and all 
around—nothing anywhere about it to dilute its foreignness.‖64  The writer was Samuel 
Clemens, better known by his nom de plume, Mark Twain. 
Early American cultural productions and those since have represented Arabs, as 
Twain writes, as completely foreign.  They were the ultimate, to use Edward Said‘s 
famed term, ―other‖—an oppositional people who held the traits that Americans 
believed were in direct opposition to the ones they believed they possessed.   
Americans like many Europeans during this period viewed themselves and their 
country as ―civilized.‖  As such, they believed, they possessed certain traits: sexual 
restraint, a peaceful nature, the ability to think rationally, a robust work ethic, a 
propensity to treat women ―fairly,‖ morality, and religious moderation.  These were 
traits that had long been associated with civilization in the western tradition.  To this mix 
they added one uniquely American trait: a democratic spirit. 
For Americans to be these things, however, there had to be someone who was the 
opposite.  Words have meaning only if there is something to contrast them with.  The 
word civilized, for example, has no meaning if there is nothing uncivilized to contrast it 
to.   The same applies to the composing traits Americans associated with civilization.  
For Americans to be sexually restrained there had to be someone who was sexually 
lascivious.  For them to be rational there had to be someone who was irrational.  
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American cultural works gave these self labels meaning by projecting the 
oppositional traits onto Arabs. They made Arabs an opposing ―other‖—an other, as 
Edward Said defines it, is a ―contrasting image, idea, personality, experience.‖  
Americans became sexually restrained, peaceful, hard working, educated, rational, 
democratic, moral, and, therefore, civilized by making Arabs sensual, warlike, irrational, 
indolent, repressive to women, immoral, religious fanatics, despotic, and, ―uncivilized.‖ 
The argument in this chapter is deeply indebted to the one first advanced by 
Edward Said, but in several ways it proceeds further than Said.  According to Said, the 
West created a category of people (Orientals) and a geographic space (the Orient) 
through a ―style of thought based on ontological and epistemological distinction‖ 
between ―the Orient‖ and ―the Occident.‖   Doing so ―helped to define Europe as its [the 
Orient‘s] contrasting image, idea, personality, experience.‖  Such self definition, Said 
argues, created ―Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over 
the Orient.‖65   
Said, however, believes that Orientalism as he defines it only truly applies to 
Europe, not to America.  He argues that there was no ―refining and rearticulation 
process‖ in the United States, that no orientalist academic tradition existed to create, 
define, and maintain the construction of ―Orient‖ and ―Orientals.‖  As a result of this no 
―imaginative investment‖ was ever made in the United States perhaps, Said theorizes, 
―because the American frontier, the one that counted, was an eastward one‖ and as a 
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result the Orient became only an ―administrative‖ issue, and even then only after ―World 
War II.‖66   
Much of Said‘s European analysis, however, applies equally well to the United 
States during this period.  America may not have possessed an academic establishment 
to produce the ―imaginative investment‖ necessary to construct Orientalism.  It did, 
however, possess a diverse cultural sphere which filled this role.  American cultural 
productions independently, yet, collaboratively constructed the Arab as the ultimate 
other in order to construct the United States‘ exceptionalist national identity.   
This process was firmly established by America‘s initial contacts with Arabs and 
remained relatively constant throughout the 1890-1960 period.  As later chapters in this 
book will reveal this orientalist process, contrary to Said‘s argument, did serve as an 
American ―style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient.‖ 
Americans used this Orientalist understanding of Arabs to exert hegemony over them.  
In order to establish this, however, we must first explore how Americans perceived 
Arabs.  
First and foremost Americans viewed Arabs as sexually unrestrained.  Early 
recordings of encounters with Arabs often established this by focusing on Arab women‘s 
intoxicating beauty.  For instance in William Prime‘s travelogue of his journey through 
the ―holy land‖ (as most early Americans referred to the lands of the Middle East) the 
author frequently falls transfixed by Arab beauty.  Typical is this description of an Arab 
family he encounters.  The mother, he writes, is ―of splendid beauty.‖  He had ―never,‖ 
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he waxes, seen a ―woman half as beautiful‖ and ―her daughters were like their mother,‖ 
painfully beautiful.
67
  Later in his account Prime comments on another Arab girl‘s 
―Madonna-like beauty.‖68 
American encounters with Arab women in the late nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries continue this captivation with Arab beauty.  The association is particularly 
prevalent in National Geographic articles.  The author of a 1914 article lustily records an 
Arab woman‘s appearance.  Her ―nails, lips, and eyelashes,‖ are all dyed, he notes, ―her 
limbs, tattooed, rings in her nose, and anklets jingling.‖69  Another author in the 1920s 
falls similarly enthralled.  When he encounters a group of young Arab girls he exclaims 
―what eyes!  Lustrous, long-lashed, unlike the eyes of any other woman anywhere.‖70  
The photographs and captions which accompany these National Geographic articles are 
also highly revealing.  The articles often include photographs of Arab dancing girls, who 
often appear scantily clad, provocatively posed, and alluring beautiful (see Figure 1).    
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Figure 1: An Egyptian ―Belly Dancer‖        
(From a photograph in Grant Parr and 
G.E. Janssen, ―War Meets Peace in Egypt,‖ 
    National Geographic Magazine  
(April 1942), 511) 
 
  
 
32 
 
The captions, meanwhile, are also illuminating.  A caption to a 1955 photograph 
of a veiled woman reads ―with eyes like this‖ a ―veil need not be a disadvantage.‖71 
Associating Arab women with intense beauty and sensuality was particularly 
prevalent in motion pictures.  Take for instance Cecil B. Demille‘s Cleopatra.  From the 
very opening of the 1934 epic the title character‘s beauty and sensuality are emphasized.  
In the opening frame Cleopatra (played by Claudette Colbert) is displayed in a sheer 
top—which makes her appear topless—arms up-stretched, supporting two steaming 
camphors.  Throughout the film Colbert is constantly coiffed, heavily accentuated with 
eye makeup, and incased in shockingly revealing ensembles. When her character first 
encounters Julius Caesar, for instance, she sports a flowing skirt with slits sweeping up 
both legs nearly to her midsection, while her upper torso is barely covered by two straps 
(see Figure 2). 
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Later in the film Colbert appears, abdomen exposed, top clothed in what can 
perhaps best be described as a shimmering gold bikini top.
72
   
Similar images surface in 1940‘s The Thief of Baghdad.  In the film, June 
Duprez‘s character, simply referred to as ―the Princess,‖ appears throughout the film in 
clothing which accentuates her sexuality.  When the viewer first encounters her she is 
wearing a bodice that encapsulates her waist, while a slit, loose fitting, blouse descends 
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Figure 2: Claudette 
Colbert as Cleopatra 
(From Cecil B. Demille‘s 
1934 film Cleopatra) 
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from her shoulders.  The slit in the blouse widens as it descends from the neckline, 
leaving an exposed triangle of flesh in the center of her torso, which exposes her 
midsection and the sides of her breasts.
73
   
In American depictions Arab women‘s beauty is often linked to sexual 
promiscuity.  Robert Hichens‘ bestselling 1907 novel The Garden of Allah explicitly 
makes the connection.  Midway through the novel the reader accompanies the story‘s 
two main characters as they stroll down an alleyway as the night cools the lingering heat 
of day in the North African oasis town of Ben Mori.  The characters have just left a night 
club and are lost in conversation when, slowly, they realize, they are being watched.  A 
large number of Arab women peer at them from the houses which abut the alleyway.  As 
Hitchen describes them they are ―thickly painted, covered with barbarous jewels and 
magnificent dresses,‖ with ―hands, tinted with henna, folded in‖ their lap, ―eyes 
watching under eyebrows heavily darkened, and prolonged‖ their ―naked, brown ankles 
decorated with large anklets of gold and silver.‖74  After passing several more of these 
women it gradually dawns on the characters, and the reader, that they are prostitutes.   
Other works, while not directly linking Arab beauty to prostitution, convey the 
idea that Arab women use their beauty and sexuality to entice men.  Mark Twain during 
his travels to the holy land writes of Arab women ―exposing their breasts to the 
public.‖75  While an article in the New York Times cautions that Arabs use ―love potions‖ 
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to ensnare their lovers.
76
   From these representations the message is clear, Arab women, 
use their unrestrained sexuality as a weapon, to entrap others and to bring them down to 
their base carnal level.  To many westerners it seemed in particular that Arab women 
were interested in enticing Westerners with their carnality.  Travelogue writer William 
Prime warns that ―veiled ladies‖ often throw ―up their veils when they met the Franks,‖ 
a generic term for westerners, ―and let the full luster of their fair faces, and large, black 
eyes, flash with bewildering splendor on him.‖77   
Arabs, Americans believed, were not only highly sexual, but also terminally 
violent. Early recordings emphasize this point.  James Riley, for example, in his vastly 
popular 1817 captivity narrative writes that ―every person,‖ he met while in captivity, 
―had a long knife or a scimitar always slung by his side.‖78  Writer Washington Irving, 
best known for his stories about American folk legend Ichabod Crane, declares in his 
biography of Mohammed that the ―Arab of the desert‖ is ―from his infancy‖ familiar 
with the ―exercise of arms‖ and warns of their ―predatory propensities.‖ 79 
Associating Arabs with violence remained a constant theme in the 1890-1960 
period.  Take for instance the lyrics to the  popular 1920s era folk song ―The Desert 
Song:‖ 
Ho! So we sing as we are riding! 
Ho! It‘s the time you‘d best be hiding! 
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Ho! It means the Riffs [North Africans] are abroad! 
Go! Before you‘re bitten by the sword!80 
Many National Geographic articles from the period articulate the same point.  When the 
author of a 1920s article visits a local mosque he reflects that ―through the centuries 
bearded Moslems with the blood of the Unbelievers red on their hands have gathered 
here.‖81  In another article form 1940 the author cautions that the ―warlike temperament 
of the Arabs is proverbial.‖82   
Photographs often expressed the same idea in visual form.  Two pictures from 
1956 are particularly revealing.  The first depicts Omani Bedouin armed with rifles, 
tossing them into the air. (See Figure 3) 
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The other, from the same article, shows an Omani child, obviously posed, with 
dagger menacingly in hand.  (See Figure 4).‖83 
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   Figure 4: An Omani Youth (From  
   Ronald Codrai, ―Desert Sheikdoms of  
   Arabia‘s Pirate Coast,‖ National 
    Geographic Magazine (July 1956), 67) 
 
 
 Fanatically violent Arabs also appear in the 1951 Humphrey Bogart film 
Sirocco.  The film unfurls against the backdrop of the Syrian battle for independence in 
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the 1920s.  In an early scene General LaSalle, who leads the French efforts against the 
resistance in Syria, delivers several revealing lines.  The first occurs as he struggles with 
how to respond to an Arab ambush which has killed several of his men.  He quickly 
decides to execute five Arab hostages for every French soldier killed.  ―This is a 
language,‖ he growls, ―they should understand.‖  Later in the same scene the general 
declares in assured exasperation that ―you can‘t talk to these people,‖ they are ―fanatics, 
they want war.‖84  
Why were Arabs so, seemingly, violent?  Americans often attributed Arabs‘ 
warlike propensity to their religion. As Royall Tyler writes in his exceedingly popular 
1797 captivity narrative Islam is ―promulgated by the sword.‖85  Tyler‘s sentiment was 
shared by many other Americans, who saw Islam as a challenger to Christianity.  George 
Bush wrote in his 1850 biography of Mohammad that he used ―fire and sword to 
propagate‖ Islam ―among mankind‖ and that ―the terrific announcement attending the 
Moslem arms‖ has been, ‗the Koran, death, or tribute!‘‖86  While a National Geographic 
article from 1912 pronounces that the ―spread of Islam was largely due to the sword.‖87 
 Early recordings of American encounters with Arabs gave the impression that 
they were not only violent, but, that they reveled in their violence, that they took 
pleasure from it, that they were, in a word, cruel.  Royall Tyler, for instance, recounts 
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how his slave master ―struck‖ him ―with his whip,‖ knocked him to the ground 
―senseless,‖ and awakened him from his ―stupor by the severe lashes of his whip.‖88  
Another American captive relates that when he asked for water during the course of his 
long slave march across the Sahara he was rebuffed and ―forced to remain in the 
scorching sun for the remainder of‖ the ―long day.‖89 
 These vivid early descriptions forged a connection between Arabs and cruelty 
which persisted.  Proof of this can be seen in the 1924 Douglass Fairbanks silent 
spectacle The Thief of Baghdad.  In the film the title character, played by Fairbanks, 
impersonates a prince.  When his duplicity is uncovered by the Sultan he proceeds to 
devise ―torments‖ for Fairbanks.  He first has Fairbanks flogged and then, deciding that 
this is not cruel enough, orders him to be ―flung to the ape‖ to be eviscerated.90     
The trope of the cruel Arab also appears in Sirocco and the 1936 film version of 
The Garden of Allah.  Near the end of the first film Colonel Faroud meets with the 
leader of the Arab resistance.  Faroud wishes to seek compromise with the resistance 
leader, but is sadly disappointed.  Not only does the resistance leader refuse to 
compromise, he decides to kill and torture the colonel.  ―My soldiers,‖ he delights in 
imparting to the colonel, ―haven‘t had much pleasure lately.‖  They will ―give you the 
attention you deserve.‖  In The Garden of Allah Batouch, the main character‘s Arab 
guide, delights in inflicting pain and humiliation upon his cousin and rival Hadj.  In one 
scene Batouch escorts his client and cousin to a club where he knows a dancer, Elena, 
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will be performing.  Elena, we are informed, ―wants to kill‖ Hadj.  As they enter Hadj is 
noticeable nervous, but Batouch assures him that Elena will not be dancing that night.  
Soon thereafter Elena appears, slithering dangerously, brandishing daggers.  A petrified 
Hadj hurriedly covers himself with his hood.  As her dance proceeds and she moves in 
the group‘s direction Batouch, with a wicked smile, first gestures at Hadj, and then, 
delights in unveiling Hadj‘s face to Elena, who, daggers in hand, pounces.91 
Additionally, Americans believed, Arabs were incapable of rational thought.  
America‘s earliest cultural productions of Arabs, such as The Algerine Spy in 
Pennsylvania, one of many spy narratives which sprouted in the shadow of America‘s 
imbroglio with the Barbary pirates, conveys this belief.  The Algerine Spy in 
Pennsylvania masquerades as a work of non-fiction.  It supposedly contains letters 
written from an Algerian spy back to his superiors.  Most modern scholars, however, 
believe that the book is actually a work of fiction written by an American.  As such it is 
highly revealing, particularly as to how it deals with Arabs, education, and rational 
thought.  The supposed Arab author chastises ―what benefits can be derived from 
societies‖ like America, where ―a young man is fettered by logical rules‖ and ―where the 
mind is, too often disgusted by unsuitable studies.‖  Such an emphasis on education and 
rational thought concludes the author produces nothing but ―much mis-spent application 
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and an irreparable loss of time.‖92  This time and energy, the American author insinuates, 
would not be so squandered if the populace, like Arab populations, was not educated in 
the useless intricacies of rational thought.  Another early work, Royall Tyler‘s captivity 
narrative, also emphasizes Arabs‘ irrationality.  In it Tyler derisively writes, ―if the 
alcoran had declared that the earth was an imminent plain and stood still, while the sun 
performed its revolutions around it, a whole host of Galileos, with a Newton at their 
head, could not have shaken their opinion.‖93 
 The Arab as an uneducated irrational thinker remained a prevalent trope long 
after U.S. Marines stormed the shores of Tripoli and dispatched of the Barbary pirates.  
In a National Geographic article from 1910 the author highlights the inadequacies of an 
Arab education.  The ―education‖ the Arabs receive, she writes, is ―from a mullah‖ who 
―teaches him to read and write, and to recite the Koran in Arabic.‖  The  author attaches 
little importance to this type of education, concluding that such a technique leaves the 
student little better off than a parrot.  The student simply recites the passages from the 
―Mohammedan bible‖ they have been taught to memorize ―probably without 
understanding a world of‖ it.94  Works later in the century continued to make this 
connection.  The famed Lawrence of Arabia, T.E. Lawrence, wrote despairingly of 
Arabs‘ mental abilities in his bestselling memoir of his time in Arabia during WWI.  
According to Lawrence, Arabs are a ―dogmatic people‖ who ―do not understand our [the 
                                                 
92
 Peter Markoe,  The Algerine Spy in Pennsylvania: or, Letters Written by a Native of Algiers on the 
Affairs of the United States of America, from the Close of the Year 1783 to the Meeting of the Convention 
(Philadelphia, PA: Prichard and Hall, 1776) , 79.  Note I have modified the text using current spelling 
conventions in the interest of readability.   
93
 Tyler, The Algerine Captive, 155.  See also Thomas Cook, Ltd., Cook’s Tourist Handbook for Palestine 
and Syria (London: Thomas Cook and Son, 1891), 42 and Thompson, Land and the Book, vol. 2, 379. 
94
 Syke, ―A Talk about Persian Women,‖ National Geographic Magazine XXI, September 1910, 853. 
43 
 
West‘s] metaphysical difficulties, our introspective questioning,‖ and whose thoughts 
are, instead, ―at ease only in the extremes.‖  Arabs he admonishes, irrationally pursue 
―the logic of several incompatible opinions to absurd ends, without perceiving the 
incongruity.‖  Arabs are, Lawrence pronounces, ―limited narrow minded people, whose 
inert intellect lay fallow in incurious resignation.‖95  Arabs were, to summarize 
Lawrence‘s pronouncements, mentally inferior irrational thinkers. 
Instead of rational thought derived from education, Arabs, Americans believed, 
relied on irrational thought, particularly on superstition.  Once again America‘s earliest 
literary contacts with Arabs established this belief.  James Riley informs the reader in his 
captivity narrative that Arabs believe in ―evil eyes.‖ 96 A revealing anecdote from 
travelogue writer William Thompson conveys the same idea.
 
 At one point during his 
nearly decade long trek through the deserts of the holy land Thompson stops and 
refreshes himself at the Fountain of the Virgin Mary.  Soon thereafter he observes that 
the fountain has an ―irregular‖ flow.  Thompson and his companions decide to remove 
some of the rocks from the fountain and ascertain the cause of this irregularity, 
something which the ―natives,‖ he scorns, show no interest in, because they believe that 
the ―agency of the jan, or demons, who are believe to occupy all such place‖ account for 
this irregular water flow.
97
  Washington Irving also comments on Arabs superstitious 
ways in his biography of Mohammed.  ―The vast solitudes of the desert‖ in which Arabs 
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―pass so much of their lives,‖ he writes, engender ―superstitious fancies‖ such as 
believing in ―good and bad geniis‖ and ―tales of enchantment.‖98 
Visitors to the Arab world in the 19
th
 and 20
th
 centuries continued to emphasize 
their alleged irrational superstition.  This can be seen in one particularly revealing 
anecdote from a National Geographic article written in 1935.  During the course of the 
author‘s travels a tragedy occurs.  A man accidentally drowns.  This, however, the 
author writes, does not come as a surprise to the Arabs.  For, several days earlier it had 
rained, filling the Arabs‘ water tanks.  And, as the author informs us, ―the Arabs‖ 
superstitiously ―believe that each time the tanks become full there must be three deaths 
by drowning.‖99  Another article about Persia written in 1910 hammers the same point 
home.  ―Soothsayers and dervishes,‖ the author writes, ―are consulted on every 
occasion.
100
   
As a result of these and other descriptions the superstitious Arab became a stock 
character in American cultural thought.  In the 1904 novel The Garden of Allah, and the 
later film adaptation of it, the reader/viewer encounter a ―sand diviner‖ who reads 
several characters‘ futures in the shifting desert sands.  A sand diviner also appears in 
The Thief of Baghdad, where he foretells that the princess will marry the man who first 
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touches the rose bush in the palace court yard.
101
  And in 1958‘s The 7th Voyage of 
Sinbad the audience is introduced to Sulkura the magician—who turns royal attendants 
into four armed blue serpents, conjures skeletons to life, and shrinks the Princess—along 
with a genii and a Cyclops.
102
 
 Because of their irrationality Arabs were, Americans believed, gullible or easily 
deceived.  Americans believed that since Arabs were willing to believe almost anything, 
such as in superstition, they could be deceived and exploited by anyone who thought 
rationally.  Early recordings press this point home.  Washington Irving‘s biography of 
Mohammed proclaims that Arabs are ―easily aroused by the appeals of eloquence, and 
charmed by the graces of poetry.‖103  In James Riley‘s captivity narrative he and his 
fellow shipmates dupe gullible Arabs they encounter shortly after their ship runs 
aground.  After Riley swims ashore Arabs take him captive and hold him for ransom.  
Riley‘s crew pays the initial ransom.  Soon, however, another of Riley‘s crewmates 
comes ashore and is promptly taken hostage.  Unwilling to pay another ransom Riley 
hastily develops a ruse.  He informs his captors that he and his shipmates have buried a 
treasure a ways down the shore.  When his captors turn their attention to this spot, Riley 
makes his escape, running, then diving, into the breaking waves, swimming to the safety 
of his ship (and also parenthetically, leaving his shipmate behind to be killed).
104
 
 Late nineteenth and early twentieth century cultural productions continued to 
emphasize Arabs ―dupability.‖ For instance, several times in 1924‘s The Thief of 
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Baghdad the noticeably Anglo appearing Fairbanks easily tricks or deceives Arab 
characters.  Near the beginning of the film, for instance, he easily evades Arab pursuers 
by concealing himself in one of several conveniently placed and comically oversized 
vases.  Later he gains entrance to the royal court and impersonates visiting royalty 
simply by wearing clothing he stole from the local bazaar.  And near the end of the film, 
the visiting Prince of the Mongols overruns and conquers the defensive walls of 
Baghdad by hiding his soldiers throughout the city.  The oblivious locals react in 
astonishment as night falls and an entire invading army emerges from plants and 
vases.
105
  Similarly, in the 1938 adventure film Beau Geste, the protagonists quench their 
thirst and avoid death‘s embrace by tricking a group of forty to fifty Arabs who occupy a 
life saving oasis they happen to stumble upon.  One of the main characters, Digby, 
informs the group that he will separate from them and blow his bugle from several dunes 
over.  His companions, meanwhile, are to fire their rifles from their original location.  
This, the character boasts, will cause the hapless Arabs to believe that the entire French 
Foreign Legion is attacking them.  Predictably, the facile ruse works.  The Arabs flee in 
a panic as soon as the shots and bugle call ring out.
106
 
  Arabs, Americans believed, were not only irrational and gullible but indolent.  
Early works such as William Prime‘s travelogue convey this belief.  Prime writes of 
―baths in which the lazy Turks dreamed away the long days‖ 107  Another early 
American visitor to the Arab world notes that Arab ―men lounge about, smoke, sip 
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coffee, play‖ and that they ―will not work unless directed by an overseer, who is himself 
a perfect specimen of laziness.  He does nothing but smoke his pipe.‖108   
Like other associations made by early American encounters, this one too lived in 
American thought long after these particular American travelers left the arid deserts of 
the Arabian peninsula.  A National Geographic written in 1909 describes ―coffee-
houses, wherein sit the turbaned Turk cross-legged, listlessly smoking a nagileh or 
sipping coffee in Oriental indolence.‖109  A New York Times article from 1920 informs 
its readers that ―the French‖ in North Africa have accomplished an exceedingly difficult 
task in ―making an Arab give up his vagabond ways and go to work for a living.‖110  
While another article in the same paper nearly twenty years later speaks of ―indolent 
Arabs.‖111 
Arabs, Americans believed, also unjustly treated their women.  Early writers like 
William Thompson established this connection.  Thompson writes that Arab men 
―tyrannize‖ their women, who are, in fact,‖ their ―slaves.‖112  James Riley echoes this 
view in his captivity narrative.  Arab men, he informs the reader, are ―lords and masters 
of their families.‖  They are ―severe and cruel to their wives, whom they treat as mere 
necessary slaves.‖113  Mark Twain conveys a similar message in his travelogue.   In the 
Arab world, Twain laments, ―there are no valentines, no stolen interviews, no riding out, 
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no courting in dim parlors, no lovers‘ quarrels and reconciliations‖ for Arab women.  
Instead, ―the young man takes the girl his father selects for him, marries her‖ and ―if 
after due acquaintance she suits him, he retains her; if he suspects her purity, he bundles 
her back to her father,‖ like a chattel slave.114 
The belief that Arab men repress their women continued to be a common one in 
the years between 1890 and 1960.  An article written in 1893 underscores this point.  
The article tells the story of an Arab performer who falls in love with an American typist 
at the Chicago World‘s Fair.  The Arab in question proceeds, with the help of several 
friends, to abduct his adored.  Such an occurrence, the paper informs its readers, should 
come as no surprise, for, ―in the land these strange people come from they frequently 
steal one another‘s wives and nothing much is thought about it.‖ 115 A similar portrait 
emerges from 1904‘s The Garden of Allah.  One of the reader‘s first encounters with 
Arabs comes as the main characters pass several Arab women guarded by a ―gigantic 
man‖ who pushes them into the ―train as if they were bales of hay.‖116  A National 
Geographic article from 1911 conveys a similar impression.  It chastises that a 
―plowman‘s wife or female slave (the distinction in the country is often quite fine).‖117  
The connection between Arabs and mistreatment of women, however, is perhaps most 
colorfully captured in the 1920 Rudolph Valentino film The Son of the Shiek.  In the film 
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one of the Arab characters blithely remarks ―I don‘t know her [his wife‘s] name.  When I 
want her, I whistle.‖118 
 Arabs, Americans believed, were also immoral.  As Mark Twain pithily wrote 
―morals and whiskey are scarce‖ in the Arab world.  ―The Koran does not permit 
Muhammadans to drink.  Their natural instincts do not permit them to be moral.‖119  
Twain and other Americans often concluded that Arabs were immoral because, they 
believed, Arabs were duplicitous liars and thieves. 
Initial contacts forged the belief that Arabs were duplicitous.
120
  Mark Twain, not 
surprisingly expressed this sentiment most colorfully.  Arabs ―say of a person they 
admire, ‗Ah, he is a charming swindler and a most exquisite liar!‖  ―Everybody‖ in the 
Arab world, Twain continues, ―lies and cheats.‖  Twain of course was not the only early 
American to make statements of this type.  In one of the supposed ―letters‖ in the 
apochryal spy narrative The Algerine Spy in Pennsylvania the author salivates over the 
―unsuspecting crowd‖ of Americans who are ―busily employed in their affairs or 
pleasure, as if I‖ were ―at home extended on my sofa‖ and not creeping in their midst, 
intriguing doom.
121
 
 By 1890 the connection between duplicity and Arabs had been firmly 
established.  The effect was evident in American depictions of Arabs.    In Cleopatra the 
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title character spends the majority of the movie deceiving, inveigling, and manipulating 
Romans.  The film begins with Cleopatra using her sexuality and Caesar‘s own ambition 
to beguile him into protecting her from Ptolemy.  She first saunters about in a glittering 
bikini top, enticing him.  When she finds that her sexuality is wanting, she plays on 
Caesar‘s ambition to be ―emperor of the world.‖  The ―road to India,‖ she coyly 
intimates, ―lies through Egypt.‖  After this Caesar is putty in her willing hands.  The 
scene repeats itself when Cleopatra encounters Marc Antony.  Cleopatra is to meet him 
in the town square.  When she fails to appear, an infuriated Marc Antony confronts her 
on her boat, decrying that he will force her to meet him in the town square as agreed.  
Soon, however, he too falls victim to her manipulation.  She plays on his ego by 
admitting that she was trying to ―lure him.‖  But that he could ―not to be dazzled.‖  After 
setting him at ease she proceeds to entice him.  She produces dancing girls, wine, and a 
sumptuous diner.  The diner begins with reed birds, then, theatrically, her men raise a net 
from the sea.  From it emerge women, clam shells in hand, which they open to reveal 
glittering gem stones.  After this deceptive and alluring tour de force Antony, like 
Caesar, abandons his original plan and falls prey to her manipulation. 
Later films are also awash in perfidious Arab characters.  For example, in the 
1936 film version of In the Garden of Allah  Batouch desires to leave the desert and 
return to Ben Mori.  Instead of simply informing his employer of his desire he plots and 
manipulates.  He teaches his cousin and rival to say in broken English ―I want to go 
home, I hate the desert.‖  He then shepards him to his employer urging him to impress 
Madame with his English.  When they reach her Batouch tells her that his cousin has 
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something he desperately wants to tell her.  At this point Batouch‘s scheme goes array.  
Instead of telling Madame ―I want to go home, I hate the desert,‖ he sputters out ―I hate 
home, I want to stay in the desert.‖122   The title character of 1940‘s The Thief of 
Baghdad is also a deceptive character.  At one point during the film he and his 
companion inveigle a honey dealer in the local bazaar.  The two desire honey for their 
―pancakes,‖ but they have no money to procure it.  Quickly they scheme a solution.  
They inform the honey merchant that they wish to purchase an entire jar of his nectar.  
But, alas will only do so if it is the best they have ever had.  Predictably, the honey 
merchant falls for the simple subterfuge and provides them with their ―sample,‖ which 
they proceed to slather on their pancakes before quickly departing.
123
 
A 1958 New York Times article makes the connection between Arabs and 
deception bluntly.  ―Intrigue and conspiracy,‖ it opines, ―are the most powerful 
weapons‖ in the Arab world.  ―Throughout history,‖ it continues, ―intrigue, 
Machiavellian finesse, trickery, political lagerdemon, bribery, blackmail and the double 
cross are the real forces that govern Arabs.‖124  
 In addition to being conniving, Arabs, Americans thought, were also thieves.  
Examples of supposed Arab thievery are legion in early writings.  In James Riley‘s 
captivity narrative, the first Arab he encounters immediately begins ―plundering‖ their 
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clothing.
125
  Later in his narrative he writes that his captors depart camp at night 
―seeking for plunder.‖126  Another author of a captivity narrative moralizes that Arabs 
suffer from ―avarice and rapacity‖ and are people ―who live by plunder.‖127 
 Later works continued to make this association.  In 1924‘s The Thief of Baghdad 
we first encounter Ahmed, the title character, asleep on top of a public water fountain.  
When another townsperson approaches the drinking fountain, we quickly, however, 
realize that he is not asleep.  As the parched traveler bends to quench his thirst Ahmed 
opens his eyes and deftly picks his pocket.  After this Ahmed engages in a veritable orgy 
of theft.  He proceeds to steal a magic rope, food from a balcony, and jewelry from a 
woman being transported luxuriously about on a litter.
128
  T.E. Lawrence also 
emphasizes Arabs‘ innate need to plunder in his war memoir.  Arabs, he writes, were 
often more interested in being ―sated with spoils,‖ than winning the battles.129 
 Religious fanaticism is another trait Americans associated with Arabs.  The 
earliest references to Arabs emphasize their fanaticism.  William Thompson makes 
reference to ―fanatical Moslems‖ in his travelogue, while one of the first printed tour 
guides of the Middle East cautions of the area‘s ―Muslim fanaticism.‖130    
 Depictions or references to religious fanaticism remained constant up until 1960.   
When the main character in The Garden of Allah visits a mosque her mind races with 
thoughts that ―there was violence within these courts.‖  She could, she tells herself 
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―imagine the worshippers springing up from their knees to tear to pieces an intruding 
dog of an unbeliever.‖131  A 1958 New York Times article notes that the Arab world is 
―deeply injected with fanaticism.‖132  National Geographic articles throughout the 
period also reference Arabs‘ alleged rabid religiousness.  The author of a 1901 article 
about Morocco writes of ―Mohammedan fanaticism‖ and warns of Muslims ―who 
massacre Europeans as soon as they get the chance.‖133  Two articles written in 1911 
echo this view.  In one the author writes of the ―fanaticism so often exhibited by 
Mohammedans,‖ while in the other, the author warns of the ―barbaric colors of 
Mohammedan fanaticism.‖134  The topic of Arab fanaticism was also popular in the 
pages of the New York Times.  An article written in 1907 speaks of the ―unguided 
fanaticism of the Mohammedans,‖ while another from 1917 references ―fanatical 
Moslems.‖135 
 American commentators on Arab religion often made one other connection.  
They often associated Islam and therefore Arabs with fatalism.  Arabs, they believed, 
were passive peoples.  You can see this in the earliest American writings on Arabs.  
George Bush‘s 1850 biography of Mohammad proclaims that ―Mohammedans are the 
most strenuous sticklers of any people on earth‖ for ―absolute unconditional 
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predestination.‖136  While an early tour guide of the area proclaims that Arabs are 
―resigned to their fate.‖137 
 Future cultural works continued to make this association.  Robert Hichens writes 
in The Garden of Allah that even in even the ―greatest scoundrel that the Prophet‘s robe 
covers there is an abiding and acute sense of necessary surrender.‖  To make the point 
more explicit, Hichens later writes that a character is behaving as ―fatalistic as an 
Arab.‖138  A 1912 National Geographic article informs its readers of Arabs‘ ―deep 
rooted belief in and influence of fatalism.‖139  While another National Geographic 
article from 1927 laments that Arabs are ―fatalistic and irresponsible.‖140  A final New 
York Times article written in 1951 asserts that ―acceptance of the inevitable is a virtue‖ 
in the Arab world.
141
 
 Arabs, Americans believed, possessed one final trait.  They were despotic.  Early 
works such as Mark Twain‘s Innocents Abroad established this link.  Twain 
characterizes the emperor of Morocco as a ―soulless despot‖ and the officials beneath 
him as ―despots on a smaller scale.‖142  Arabs, Americans believed, were despotic, in 
large part, because of their taxation system.  Americans, as a result of their colonial 
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experience, tended to view any taxes suspiciously, especially those levied by 
unrepresentative governments.  Taxes levied by such governments, they believed, were 
by definition excessive and exploitative.  Arab tax systems seemed to fit this definition 
exactly.  William Thompson writes that the ―taxes levied by these oriental governments‖ 
are ―numerous, vexatious, and tyrannical.‖143  And Mark Twain fulminates that the 
―inhuman tyranny‖ of the Ottoman Empire ―grounds down‖ its populace with a ―system 
of taxation that would drive any nation frantic.‖144 
 The belief that Arabs and Arab governments were despotic became a popular one 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.  A 1905 New York Times article about 
the Persian government refers to its ―typical Oriental despotism.‖145  While a New York 
Times article written in 1958 avers that ―authoritarian rule has always prevailed in the 
Middle East.‖146 
A similar portrayal emerges from motion pictures.  In one of the first scenes from 
1940‘s The Thief of Baghdad Prince Ahmed and his Grand Vizier, Jaffar, preside over an 
execution.  When Ahmed asks why this particular criminal was being executed.  Jaffar 
replies: ―he had been thinking.‖  Jaffar goes on to preach that violence and fear are 
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necessary to rule and that any leader who wishes to make his people happy is but a 
fool.
147
 
 By linking Arabs with unrestrained sexuality, warlike behavior, uneducated 
irrationality, indolence, the repression of women, immorality, religious extremism, and 
despotism American cultural works established the Arab as an inferior other, which 
helped Americans throughout this period construct and maintain an exceptionalist 
national identity for themselves.  This identity held that Americans were civilized and 
―good‖ because they possessed all the traits associated with civilization: restrained 
sexuality, a pacific nature, morality, hard work, moderate religion, a rational education, 
and a democratic government. For Americans to be good and civilized, however, there 
had to be someone who was bad or uncivilized.  For in western culture meaning is often 
created through opposition.  There can be no such thing as civilized, if its opposite, 
uncivilized, does not exist.  Likewise, for the composing traits of civilization to have 
meaning they too needed an opposite.  So Americans projected these oppositional traits 
and the meta designation of uncivilized onto Arabs.  Who became the ultimate inferior 
uncivilized ―other‖—although it is important to note there were other such ―others,‖ if 
you will, that helped define American identity during this period. 
 Captivity narratives, biographies of Mohammad, travelogues, and other early 
works erected a canon of oppositional traits that Americans believed Arabs possessed.  
Once established this canon of Arab traits and the overarching designation of uncivilized 
they supported remained relatively stable from 1890 through 1960, the years 
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policymakers such as Dwight Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles matured.  I emphasize 
relatively, however, for two reasons, which the next chapter will now explore in greater 
detail.  
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CHAPTER III  
REVERBERATING NOTES: THE ARAB AS ‗SEX MANIAC‘ AND IRRATIONAL 
MARIONETTE 
 
 In his foundational work, Orientalism, Edward Said argued that a European 
academic tradition defined the ―west‖ by constructing an inferior Arab ―other.‖  
European Orientalists projected negative traits onto Arabs.  Doing so, Said charged, 
allowed Europeans to define themselves as superior by branding Arabs as inferior.
148
  As 
the last chapter revealed something similar occurred in the United States.   American‘s 
initial contacts with Arabs established a canon of cultural beliefs about them.   
This chapter counters one of the major criticisms leveled against the Orientalist 
paradigm.  Kenan Malik has charged that Orientalism is ―ahistoric.‖  It does not allow 
for historical change.  In Orientalism, Malik concludes, Said ―creates a ‗Western 
traditions‘ which runs in an unbroken line from the Ancient Greeks through the 
Renaissance, the Enlightenment to modernism.‖ The tradition  remains almost 
―unchanged through two millennia of European and Western history.‖  This leads Malik 
to conclude that Orientalism mimics ―the very discoursive structures against which‖ Said 
―polemices.‖149 
This chapter, however, establishes that, at least in America, the Orientalist 
paradigm did respond to historical change.  Americans‘ canon of beliefs about Arabs, 
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while stable, did not remain completely static.  At points in American history some traits 
assumed greater prominence in American thought.  Outside events occasionally made 
some of these traits more relevant and increased their prominence.  To understand this it 
is perhaps best to imagine these traits as if they were notes on a piano.  Initial contact 
introduced these notes and set them resonating in the American cultural consciousness.  
Every once and again, however, an outside force intervened to strike one or two of these 
chords again, causing them to reverberate with greater intensity.  This process occurred 
three times in the 1890 to 1960 period.  First, in the 1910s and 20s, when domestic 
events made belief in excessive Arab sexuality more prevalent.   Again, in the late 1930s 
and early 40s when events in the Middle East caused belief in Arab gullibility and 
manipulability to come to the fore.  And lastly, and most important for this book, during 
the late 1940s and 1950s when events in the Middle East made belief in Arab irrationally 
and manipulability resonate again. 
 
* * * 
 
In the 1910s and 20s the first force struck when a gender revolution shook 
America.  During these years women surged into the workplace.  Initially, they coursed 
through the few extant channels for female employment.  Soon, however, they 
overwhelmed these limited opportunities and they began to percolate elsewhere, to new 
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professions.
150
  Women‘s ventures into new professions created new responsibilities, 
new duties, new independence, and, what one author has called a ―‘New Freedom‘ in 
morals.‖  Cumulatively these changes produced the ―New Woman.‖  The new woman 
―smoked, drank,‖ shockingly, ―danced close, became freer with her favors, kept her own 
latchkey … used makeup and bobbied and dyed her hair.‖151 
The appearance of these more independent-minded women precipitated a crisis 
of masculinity in America.  Throughout the nation‘s history American men had exerted 
their power in society by controlling women through patriarchal marriage.  The 
appearance of the new woman, her refusal to marry, her campaign for suffrage, and her 
new-found independence endangered this patriarchal power system.  American men 
came to believe that they needed to bridle this new found, and unsettling, female 
independence.  Cultural productions of Arabs provided them with one way to do so. 
During these years pregnant with change American cultural works continued to 
provide the traditional trope of Arab sexuality.  The Arab woman as a sensual and 
unrestrained temptresses.  Typical of this line of thought is a 1922 National Geographic 
article.  The author lusts over an Arab woman.  ―What eyes!‖ He writes.  ―Lustrous, 
long-lashed, unlike the eyes of any other woman anywhere.‖152  A similar image 
emerges from the 1923 film Salome.  In the film the title character uses her sexuality as a 
weapon.  Sheathed in a short skirt and a sleeveless top she lures the commander of the 
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royal guard into permitting her to enter the cage which imprisons John the Baptist.  Later 
in the film she preys upon King Herod (her step-father) and his infatuation with her.  The 
King yearns to see her dance.  But Salome shows no interest in providing what he 
desires, that is, until, she realizes, she can extract something of value from him (John the 
Baptist‘s head).  Alongside these traditional representations of Arab sexuality, however, 
there emerged a new trope, one directly related to the gender revolution that was 
occurring in American society at the time, the Arab male as a ―sex maniac.‖ 
The most famous example of this phenomenon is Rudolph Valentino‘s The 
Sheik.  In the film Valentino‘s title character falls ―under the lure of the defiant English 
girl,‖ Diana.  From the moment the Sheik first lays eyes upon her he cannot control 
himself.  He gazes dementedly at her.  His eyes look as if they threaten to burst from his 
head in lust.  This unbridled, uncontrollable desire quickly overtakes the sheik.   ―When 
an Arab sees a woman that he wants, he takes her!‖  He confides to the audience.  
Throughout the rest of the film the sheik does all that is within his power to possess her.  
He skulks into her hotel room the night before she is to travel into the desert and 
removes the bullets from her revolver.  Later he arranges for one his subordinates to 
serve as her guide.  The next day as she rides off into the broad desert expanse, with his 
furtive agent in toe, as he follows her, leering at her through binoculars, from behind a 
sea of sand.  When the moment presents itself, he abducts her, and informs her she is to 
be his desert bride.  As such she lives until she attempts to escape and chances upon a 
rival sheik, Omair, in the hot sands of the desert.  He, like the Sheik, conspires to and 
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eventually does seize her for himself, only to lose her as the Sheik storms his camp and 
reclaims her. 
153
   
The ―sex maniac‖ trope was in direct reaction to America‘s domestic gender 
revolution.  As one scholar admonishes, such movies ―must be seen in the context of the 
threat to institutionalized power presented by the women‘s suffrage movements and the 
nascent feminist struggle.‖154 The Sheik and other works like it allowed American men 
to confront the New Woman and the changes she engendered in two ways.   
First it allowed American men to live out their ideal course of action: to force the 
―New Woman‖ into submission.  In The Sheik the female character, Lady Diana, is 
clearly a flapper, the embodiment of the New Woman.  She has short bobbed hair, is 
unmarried, and in fact bridles at the suggestion of marriage, declaring that ―marriage is 
captivity.‖  The first portion of the film allows American men to safely live out their 
ideal solution of forcibly subduing New Women by living vicariously through the Arab 
sheik.  He abducts the Lady, hurries her away to his territory, forces her to dress as he 
pleases, and decrees that she will marry him (A feat they themselves could not 
accomplish because of their ―civilized‖ American identity, which decreed that a civilized 
man respected women and treated them well).  
 Movies like The Sheik also served the American male‘s cause in a second way.  
They delivered a message to women: it is in your best interest to resubmit to white male 
patriarchy.  Towards the end of the film the sheik begins acting in very un-Arab like 
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ways.  He allows Diana to again wear her western clothes and he begins to have 
recriminations.  ―How,‖ he wails, ―I have made her suffer‖ but, he laments, ―it gives me 
so little pleasure.‖  Soon after this occurs Lady Diana is captured by Omair, who is even 
more cruel and demanding than the sheik ever was.  This harsher captivity, however, 
does not last long.  The sheik rescues Diana and dramatically reveals that he is not an 
Arab at all.  He was merely raised as an Arab. His parents are English and Spanish.  
After learning this, the recalcitrant Lady Diana agrees to marry the sheik and they live 
happily ever after.  The message is clear, submit to the embracing fetters of white 
patriarchal marriage or face the primitive barbarity of the ―others,‖ like Omair, alone.155 
 In the late 1930s and early 1940s another force struck which sent beliefs about 
Arabs resonating: the rise of fascism.  In 1922 Benito Musslini ascended to power in 
Italy.  Little over a decade later Adolph Hitler did the same in Germany.  Both fascist 
leaders seemed—at least to Americans—to have interest in the Middle East.  Mussolini 
talked of reviving the Roman Empire and gathering all of its former lands—including 
territory in the Middle East.  He extended a hand of friendship to the Italian Diaspora in 
the Mediterranean basin, include to the nearly 60,000 ethnic Italians in Egypt.  
Mussolini‘s extended hand was often eagerly accepted, because, as one historian has 
written, Mussolini aroused the ―émigré‘s patriotism‖ by building them ―new modern 
schools, hospitals, and clubs in every littoral city from Tunis to Beirut.‖156 
 Mussolini also extended a hand to Arabs in the region.  During a speech in 
Tripoli il duce proclaimed himself ―the protector of Islam.‖  Meanwhile his fascist 
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government in Libya extended religious freedom to its subject Muslims and built new 
mosques throughout the country.
157
 
Europe‘s other major fascist power, Germany, was also suspiciously active in the 
area.  German propaganda flooded the region.  It capitalized on rampant anti-imperialist 
and anti-western sentiments in the area.   The propaganda campaign reached its 
saturation point between the fall of France in June 1940 and the Allied powers‘ 
Mediterranean offensive at end of 1942. 
Meanwhile Nazi diplomatic efforts supplemented their propaganda campaign.  
The German government maintained relations with Iraq and other nations in the region.  
It also dispatched special diplomatic agents like Dr. Fritz Grobba to roam ominously 
about the region.  The Nazi‘s also courted the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, a vocal 
advocate of Arab nationalism and independence.  Germany eventually reached an 
agreement with the Mufti.  The Nazis would recognize the Arab states‘ independence 
and extend to them carte blanche in dealing with Jewish settlers in Palestine in exchange 
for the reestablishment of diplomatic relations between the Arab states and the fascist 
powers, the extension of preferred oil concessions in Iraq, and collaboration on matters 
of ―mutual interest.‖158  
Throughout the period fascist military forces also threatened Egypt.  In 1940 
nearly 200,000 Italian troops invaded Egypt.  While this Italian threat subsequently 
receded as an allied counterattack routed Italian forces back across the border into Libya, 
the respite would not last.  In 1941 famed German general Erwin Rommel arrived in 
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North Africa.  The Desert Fox brought with him German ground forces and soon 
launched a series of successful attacks into Egyptian territory.  The threat became most 
perilous in 1942 when Rommel drove his tanks within 60 miles of Alexandria, 
threatening to take the Suez Canal.
159
  Meanwhile, ominously, these events were met 
with only deafening silence by the country‘s native population.160 
Fascists also—seemingly—menaced other countries in the region.  In April of 
1941 Rashid Ali Kilani and the ―Golden Square‖— a group of four Iraqi army 
generals—overthrew the pro-western Hashemite dynasty in Iraq.  The rebels soon began 
receiving aid from Germany.  Much of this aid arrived on German planes via airbases in 
the Vichy administered governments of the Levant, where Nazi propaganda coursed 
unabated.
161
 
These events raised alarm in America.  They also caused certain beliefs about 
Arabs to take on greater prominence in American thought.  The activity of ―superior‖ 
and hostile Western nations in the region brought belief in Arab gullibility and 
manipulability to the forefront of the American cultural consciousness.   
Newspaper articles on fascist activity in the region emphasized that the fascists 
were manipulating Arabs.  The Arab masses, one author decried, ―are ready to listen to 
every dirty crack at England put at by that Nazi propaganda travelling circus.‖ 162  Other 
writers conveyed a similar point.  One blamed unrest in Palestine on Italy ―fanning the 
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flames of Arab lawlessness.‖163  Another concluded that Anti-Jewish activities were 
―instigated , organized, and financed by Nazi representatives.‖164  While Arab religious 
intolerance and national antipathy were said to have been ―brewed up in Adolf Hitler‘s 
witches‘ cauldron of propaganda.‖165  The common denominator in all of these passages 
was the belief that outside powers, not Arabs, were directing events and Arab actions in 
the region.  Arabs were merely passive vessels through which outside powers operated.   
American concern over Arabs‘ manipulability did not die with the fascist threat.  
If anything these concerns multiplied after fighting in World War II wound to a close.  In 
the post-war period the victorious Allies were left to survey the world they had created.  
The Axis powers were gone.  Old Europe and its powers were a battered shadow of their 
former selves.  In most areas of the world the war had left a power vacuum.  The old 
European Empires had either retreated out of necessity or withered on the vine during 
the war years.  Indigenous people were of course left to fill the vacuum, but to 
policymakers they didn‘t really count.  To them an absence of foreign power in the area 
meant an absence of any power. 
This was particularly true in the Middle East.  As things stabilized in the years 
following the war French influence evaporated from the region, while the British 
presence condensed to a few Gulf Sheikdom on the environs, its mandate in Palestine, 
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and its massive military base at Suez.  Soon, however, even this limited British influence 
waned.  The last British troops left Palestine in 1948 and Suez eight years later.
166
 
While Western presence retreated from the area, Soviet influence appeared ready 
to course into it.  During the war Soviet forces had moved into Northern Iran.  They did 
so in conjuncture with the British to open a supply route for American war material.  
With war‘s close, however, Soviet troops lingered in the area and encouraged separatists 
in the bordering Iranian province of Azerbaijan.  West of Iran, meanwhile, the Soviets 
delivered a ―note‖ to Turkey requesting the revision of the Montreux Straits treaty, 
which regulated entrance to the Bosporus and Dardanelles.  In the note the Soviets 
―requested‖ the right to use the straits and to create a permanent Soviet naval base.  To 
make their point more emphatic the USSR amassed ground forces near Turkey‘s 
borders. 
 While the Soviets would later give way on both of these issues, withdrawing 
from Northern Iran and dropping their ultimatum to Turkey, these actions alarmed 
Americans.  Many came to believe that the Soviets were intent on overrunning the area 
on their way to total world domination.  Loy Henderson, director of the State 
Department‘s Office of Near Eastern Affairs during the Truman administration wrote in 
1946, that the Kremlin ―seems to be determined to break down the structure which Great  
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Britain has maintained so that Russian power and influence can sweep unimpeded across 
Turkey and through the Dardanelles into the Mediterranean, across Iran and through the 
Persian Gulf to the Indian Ocean.‖  Henderson continued, ―during the last five years, two 
great barriers to Russian expansion have disappeared, namely Germany in the West and 
Japan in the East.‖  ―Judging from recent events in the Near East,‖ Henderson 
concluded, ―Russia now appears to be concentrating upon the removal of a third barrier 
in the South.‖167   
Government officials were not the only ones to harbor this concern.  As a 
political cartoon from the time illustrates many in the American public feared the same.  
The cartoon showed a giant soldier with the words ―War Threat‖ emblazoned on his 
armor charging through the Middle East, trampling on counties as he progresses.  The 
soldier‘s sword prominently displays a tag which reads ―Made in Russia.‖  (See Figure 
5). 
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Figure 5: Middle East 
Hopscotch (From ―Editorial 
Cartoon No. 4- No Title,‖ The 
New York Times, December 2, 
1956) 
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As the Soviet threat emerged, so too did another force: Arab Nationalism.  Arab 
nationalism was not new, but it became more pronounced during this period.  Imperial 
retreat allowed it room to breathe.  Advocates became much more vocal and visible. 
The emergence of the Soviet threat and Arab nationalism at the same time caused 
certain beliefs about Arabs took on greater prominence.  Chief among them was belief in 
Arab irrationality.  Assertions of Arab irrationality stained the pages of American reports 
on Arab nationalism.  Riots by nationalist students were due to the irrational 
―persecution complex that is widespread in Middle Eastern countries.‖168  Nationalism, 
proclaimed another, was ―frequently guided along xenophobic lines.‖169  An ―expert‖ on 
Arabs and the ―Arab mind‖ wrote that ―an Eastern mind once stirred to fury in a cause 
which inspires it, will not be deterred by the fastidious [intellectual] niceties of the 
West.‖170 
 The last quotation hints at the specific brand of irrationality Americans attributed 
to Arabs during this period: emotionalism.  To use the previous author‘s words, Arabs 
could not be ―deterred by the fastidious niceties of the West,‖ such as rational thought, 
and were instead ―stirred to a fury.‖  Arabs, many believed, acted on the behest of their 
emotions not because of superior logic or reason, which would lead them to see that 
supporting their repressive autocratic governments was necessary to contain Soviet 
communism and better their lives. 
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 References to Arabs‘ emotionalism are legion in American news reports of the 
time.  Take for instance reports on the rise and actions of Iranian nationalist Prime 
Minster Mohammed Mosadegh.  When Mosadegh came to power 1951 most Americans 
found him and his actions once in office, particularly his decision to nationalize the oil 
industry, mystifying.  It never entered most Americans‘ mind that a people would like to 
control their own economic resources and profit from them, instead of being exploited 
by foreign corporations.  Instead most Americans explained away his actions by falling 
back on the long-held racial stereotype that Arabs are irrational, specifically emotional, 
thinkers.  As one newspaperman wrote ―Iranians speak with their hearts.  They do not 
encumber their thinking with intellectual considerations.‖171 Another author reported 
that the Arab elite‘s decision to embrace nationalism and turn against the West was 
―prompted by emotions that are deep-rooted.‖  And still another author writing on 
politically active Egyptian students wrote that they have a ―tendency to examine 
everything in terms of resentment and emotion.‖172 
Hand in hand with the belief that Arabs were acting irrationally out of emotion 
came the belief that others were manipulating or taking advantage of this irrational 
emotionalism.  Who Americans believed were doing the manipulating, however, varied.  
Some believed that the masters who were pulling the strings resided in the Arab lands 
themselves.  The Arab ruling classes, they believed, were the ones manipulating the 
Arab marionette.  The ―medieval ruling forces,‖ wrote one author, ―aware of their own 
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unpopularity and the misery of the masses, are turning popular discontent against the 
‗heathen‘ and the ‗foreign imperialists‘ to avoid being engulfed in the gathering torrent 
themselves.‖173   The Arab ―ruling class,‖ wrote another, ―has hit upon colonialism and 
Western imperialism as obvious scapegoats to distract the masses from their economic 
misery.‖174  While some believed they spotted the hidden hand of the Arab elite in the 
masses‘ actions, most believed the calculating hand pulling these strings resided further 
away in more frigid climes. 
―Communists‖ screamed one article ―have sought to guide mass [Arab] 
emotions.‖175   Soviet propaganda, another author wrote, has convinced Arabs to fight an 
anti-imperialist ―battle whose main objectives were won a long time ago, blinding 
themselves to the new Communist offensive.‖176  The Arab masses were, many believed, 
unbeknownst to them, being made to dance to the tune of the Communist International.  
They were unwittingly following Soviet directions to bring instability to the region, 
which would only benefit the Soviet Union.  Two political cartoons from the era perhaps 
best express this view.  In the first cartoon a Soviet soldier ominously attired in a 
military uniform is carrying away a stereotypically sexualized Arab maiden as a rifle 
toting Uncle Sam sheepishly asks President Eisenhower ―Say, what if she doesn‘t want 
her honor protected?‖  In the second cartoon Joseph Stalin appears garbed in traditional 
Arab attire beckoning an Arab male with the words ―Middle Eastern Countries‖ written 
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on his robe to walk under a dangling iron prison in the shape of a tent.  The caption reads 
―I‘m An Old Arab Tentmaker.  Slip This On For Size.‖ (See Figures 6 and 7) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Arab Governments and 
Soviet Influence (From Herbert 
Block, Herblock’s Special Report 
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 
1958), 124) 
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Figure 7: Untitled Political 
Cartoon (From Herbert Block, 
The Herblock Book (Boston, 
Mass.: The Beacon Press, 
1952), 179) 
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The point of both cartoons is explicit.  The Soviets are beguiling the Arabs, 
verbally inducing them into voluntarily entering a bleak communist captivity, taking 
advantage of what one article proclaimed was  Arabs‘ ―susceptible to oratory.‖177 
It was not just the masses who, many Americans feared, the Soviets were 
beguiling, but also the ruling elite.  ―What the governing classes from Cairo to Tehran do 
not seem to realize,‖ wrote one journalist, ―is that Moscow‘s aims are dual.  First the 
Russians wish to destroy all lingering friendships between the Middle East and the 
West‖ and ―then, in the resulting and inevitable economic chaos, they wish to destroy 
the governing classes themselves.  The pashas,‖ he concludes, are ―sharpening the long 
knives that are to be used against them.‖178 
The fear that the Soviets were exploiting Arab emotionalism and nationalism 
only increased after Abdul Gamal Nasser rose to power in Egypt in 1952.  It began as 
night descended on Cairo on a warm July day.  As darkness embraced the city so too did 
Egyptian armored and artillery units.  Elsewhere in the country military units arrested 
much of the high command.  As dawn broke on the 23
rd
 a new force was in power in 
Egypt: the Revolutionary Command Council. 
The Revolutionary Command Council or the RCC was a group of likeminded 
officers in the Egyptian armed forces who opposed continued British meddling in their 
country.  Egypt had technically become independent in 1922.  The government had a 
constitutional monarch and parliament.  But the British still wielded considerable power.  
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They supported individual politicians or parties, offered ―advice‖ to government 
ministers, and on at least two occasions delivered ultimatums demanding changes in the 
composition of the ruling coalition.  In addition a large number of British military forces 
remained in the country—most at the United Kingdom‘s immense airbase in the Suez 
area. 
Once in power the RCC appointed General Mohammad Naguib as their titular 
leader.  The real force behind the RCC, however, was its founder Gamal Abdel Nasser.  
Naguib was chosen to represent the movement because of his higher status and visibility.  
But, he was largely a figurehead.  One, who in less than two years, Nasser forced from 
power.
179
 
Once in power Nasser slowly moved towards a embracing a neutralist position.  
By the time he decided to nationalize the Suez Canal in 1956 he had firmly adopted a 
neutralist stance.  He tried to steer a course between the two superpowers, to align with 
neither, but to play the two off of each other in competition, to extract more for Egypt.  
He also vied for leadership of the region wide Arab nationalist movement.  The 
emergence of a leader in Egypt and in the wider Middle Eastern world who bucked 
Western ―protection,‖ who tried to make it on his own, only further enflamed American 
concerns over Arab irrationality, emotionalism, and dupability. 
American descriptions of Nasser stressed his irrationality.  According to one 
writer Nasser ―himself doesn‘t know what he wishes to do‖ his ―desk is piled with books 
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whose ideas are not yet digested.‖180  The point is blunt.  Nasser was intellectually 
unstable, irrational; he meshed together pieces of ideas and others‘ writings without 
thinking them through, thoroughly and rationally. 
 Americans not only saw Nasser as irrational, but also the entire Arab population 
that was listening to his ideas.  In attempting to explain the appeal of Nasser and Arab 
nationalism one writer relied on the supposed fact that ―the Arabs are imaginative, high-
flown people.‖181  Another article proffered a similar explanation.  Nasserism‘s success 
was due to the ―mercurial Arab temperament.‖182 
 As the last quotation hints at Americans continued to perceive Arab irrationality 
as resulting primarily from their emotionalism.  Arabs were ―mercurial,‖ erratic, volatile, 
emotional.  One article proclaimed that the ―Storm‖ of Arab nationalism that is ―blowing 
is far more emotional than ideological.‖183  Another decreed that ―deep emotions lie very 
close under brown Arab skin.‖184  A final writer when describing the situation in Iraq 
asserted that the Arab nationalist movement is a ―cauldron of passion.‖185 
Americans were convinced that the Soviets would, and indeed were, having little 
difficulty manipulating irrational emotional regimes like Nasser‘s.  As one writer wrote 
―Communists have been successful in the Middle East‖ because they ―support the 
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Arabs,‖ in their irrationality, in their ―twin phobias of Anti-Zionism and 
Anticolonialism.‖186  Americans believed the neutralist policy Arabs‘ emotionalism and 
irrationality had lead them to adopt could have no possible outcome except for eventual 
Soviet domination over the Middle East.  Arabs may have thought they could open the 
door to Soviet aid and assistance without risking domination, but they were dead wrong.  
Arab nationalist regimes like Nasser‘s, wrote one frenzied observer, ―would open the 
way for the establishment, overt or concealed, of Russian suzerainty in the Arab 
world.‖187  Nasser and other likeminded Arabs, wrote another, may think they can stand 
alone ―but neither Arab nationalism or Pan-Arabism stands alone.  Behind them trying to 
use them for its own ends, stands the Russian colossus.‖188  Once Arabs opened the flap 
to the tent, Americans believed, it was only a matter of time until the Soviets would 
barge in and take over.  A political cartoon from the day perfectly expresses this belief.  
In the cartoon Soviet soldiers disguise themselves under a sheet designed to look like a 
camel.  The worlds ―Military Aid‖ appear on the side of the Soviet camel.  In the cartoon 
the camel has stuck its head into a tent pitched at the foot of the great pyramids of Giza.  
The caption reads ―Once he gets his head in the tent.‖  The message is clear.  Arab states 
like Nasser may think they are just receiving aid, military or otherwise, from the Soviets, 
but what they are really getting is underneath, Soviet domination. (see Figure 8) 
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The rise of Nasser and Nasserism sent one final note oscillating in the American 
cultural consciousness.  The emergence of a strong independent-minded Arab leader, 
who failed to follow conventional Western wisdom, and who labored to increase his own 
Figure 8:  Soviet Military Aid to the 
Arab World (From ―Editorial 
Cartoon 2 –No Title,‖ The New York 
Times, July 22, 1956) 
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influence in the region enlivened the long held belief that Arabs were cunning, 
duplicitous, and untrustworthy.  One author pronounced that ―conspiracy is the way of 
life in the Middle East.‖189  Another wrote ―Plot and counterplot are a way of life in 
Arab lands.‖190   
This one dimensional stereotype truly flourished in the movies of the day.  Take 
for example the 1951 Humphrey Bogart film Sirocco.  In a scene midway through the 
film the viewer is transported to a Syrian cabaret.  Despite the ongoing struggle for 
independence the mood is light and jovial.  French soldiers and the local populace 
coexist in an alcohol nurtured accord. In the midst of the relaxed joviality meanders a 
seemingly innocent Arab flower merchant.  The florist, warm in smile, convinces some 
carefree French soldiers at a table to purchase some flowers.  As he collects their money 
he slips an unnoticed addition, a bomb, to the underside of their table.  The Arab slinks 
off and the bomb soon explodes, shattering the soldiers‘ bodies and the room‘s affability.   
A similar stock character appears in 1953s The Robe.  The movie follows the spiritual 
transformation of Marcellus Gallio.  Roman soldier Gallio begins the film a cold hearted 
man who plays dice while Christ anguishes on the cross. By the end of the film he is a 
Christian martyr.  At one point during his transformation a wracked Gallio returns to 
Palestine.  While there he is escorted by a Syrian merchant.  As Gallio‘s stay lengthens, 
and profits dwindle, the Syrian threatens to inform the locals that Gallio was responsible 
for Christ‘s death.  Eventually, the duplicitous Syrian follows through on his threat and 
aligns himself with a group of Roman soldiers Gallio has come into conflict with.  
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Duplicitous, irrational, gullible, and highly sexual, Americans, since the time of 
independence, associated these traits with Arabs.  During the periods discussed in this 
chapter, however, they took on greater prominence as outside forces intervened to make 
them more relevant.  In the 1910s and 20s, the late 1930s and early 1940s, and in the late 
1940s and early 1950s outside forces struck and made these beliefs about Arabs more 
relevant and thus resonate with greater intensity in American thought.  Of particular 
importance to the argument yet to come is the intensification that occurred in associating 
Arabs with irrationality and gullibility.  Americans came to believe that inferior Arabs 
simply could not be trusted to implement an independent neutralist foreign policy in the 
face of the Soviet threat.  The Soviets, Americans believed, would find a way to pull the 
strings of the Arab marionette.  This belief was not limited to the American public.  
Policymakers within the Eisenhower administration matured in American culture, 
internalized its beliefs about Arabs, and similarly deployed them to rationalize events in 
the Arab world.  This would have a profound effect on the Eisenhower administration‘s 
policy towards Gamal Abdel Nasser and Arab nationalism.   
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CHAPTER IV 
―A TOOL OF THE RUSSIANS:‖ RACE AND THE EISENHOWER 
ADMINISTRATION‘S INTRODUCTION TO GAMAL ABDEL NASSER 
 
November 13, 1942, found General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme 
Commander Allied Expeditionary Force, North Africa, ―in bed with a runny nose, a 
terrible cough, an intermittent headache, and a pain in the stomach.‖  The General and 
future President passed the miserable hours composing letters to his friends and family 
in the United States.  In one he described his interactions with the local population.  
―The Arab‖ he wrote ―typifies filth, squalor, rags, and laziness.‖ He wears a ―dirt-stained 
imitation of a circus tent‖ and ―stalks along in his stately filthiness,‖ seemingly 
―perfectly content with his lot.‖191  
Later that month, the future President confided to his wife Mamie that ―millions 
of Arabs are a very uncertain quantity.  Explosive and full of prejudices.  Many things 
done here that look queer are just to keep the Arabs from blazing up in revolt.‖192 
 Laziness, fatalism, irrationality, violence, the traits the future President 
associated with North Africans are some of the very same traits American cultural works 
had long ascribed to Arabs.  This should not be surprising.  Dwight Eisenhower, his 
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, and other key policymakers in the administration 
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matured in a domestic culture suffused with such racial depictions of Arabs and they 
often relied on these beliefs to understand Arabs and their actions.   
This was particularly true once Eisenhower and Dulles entered the Oval Office.  
Their years in Washington coincided with the ascension of Arab nationalism and 
neutralism.  These phenomenon were difficult for many Americans to comprehend.  
Many times the administration managed to understand and empathize with Arab 
concerns, at other times, however, Arab actions left them perplexed.  It was at these 
crucial junctures that administration officials, like the common Americans presented in 
the previous chapter, relied upon racial associations to explain Arab actions and 
motivations.  This had a profound effect on the administration‘s policy towards Gamal 
Abdel Nasser, Egypt, and Arab neutralism. 
When Dwight Eisenhower took the oath of office in January 1953 the United 
States was already deeply enmeshed in Middle East affairs.  Soviet actions beckoned 
American eyes to the region after World War II.  The Kremlin moved suspiciously 
towards Iran and Turkey.  This alarmed policymakers in the Truman administration.  
They believed the USSR was bent on world domination.  To prevent this from occurring, 
the administration implemented its doctrine of containment.  The United States would 
use every resource at its disposal to contain the communist menace. 
The Middle East, located adjacent to the Soviet Union‘s southernmost expanses, 
seemed particularly vulnerable to creeping Soviet influence.  Communist activity half a 
world away only increased these concerns.  As communist North Korean forces plunged 
south, policymakers in the White House became increasingly concerned that similar 
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communist offensives might occur in other areas of the globe, particularly in the Middle 
East.  President Truman estimated at the time that the Soviets were ―figuring on an 
attack‖ towards the ―Persian Gulf.‖193 
President Truman could not allow this to happen.  Holding a majority of the 
world‘s petroleum reserves made the area especially important.  While at that time the 
United States only obtained a fraction of its oil from the Middle East, America‘s allies in 
Western Europe obtained most of their petroleum from the region.  If the Middle East 
and its vast oil reserves fell to communism, Western Europe and its industry and military 
would grind to a halt, leaving Europe exposed. 
Strategic considerations also lent importance to the area.  American war plans, 
such as plan Makefast, envisioned using the British base at Suez in Egypt as a 
―springboard‖ to launch crippling air assaults against the Soviet Union‘s oil fields in the 
Caucuses.  The Suez base was particularly valuable because it could be, military 
planners estimated, defended for four to six months, while air fields in Europe could 
only hold out for two months.
194
 
 For these reasons the Truman administration developed a plan to protect the 
Middle East from Soviet aggression: the MEC, or the Middle Eastern Command.  The 
command was an integrated command structure centered around Egypt.   Policymakers 
chose Egypt as the focal point because its large population and economy made it 
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―unquestionably the senior partner of the Arab States.‖195  If the United States could 
convince this ―senior partner‖ to join MEC, U.S. officials believed, other Middle Eastern 
nations would fall into line. 
 Soon the Truman administration began trying to convince Egypt‘s King Farouk 
to join MEC.   All did not, however, go according to plan, because two issues 
complicated the matter.  When Britain granted Egypt its independence in 1922 it forced 
a defense treaty upon it.  The Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of Alliance bound the nation and 
its foreign policy to Britain for twenty years.  Consequently, Egypt, while technically 
sovereign, exercised little control over its own foreign policy.  Many Egyptians wanted 
this treaty abrogated, and they also wanted Britain to withdraw the last of its forces from 
the kingdom.  
The Truman administration proved unable to resolve these issues.  Instead the 
administration changed the organization‘s name from the Middle East Command to the 
Middle East Defense Organization or MEDO, hoping that the problem lay in the term 
command, which held imperial connotations.  This semantic change, however, made 
little difference, King Farouk remained noncommittal and American strategy for the 
region languished.
196
 
 The winds of change seemed to reveal fresh promise in July 1952.   The Free 
Officers, a group of approximately 100 military personnel, seized power and exiled King 
Farouk.  The Free Officers, the administration believed, were a ―military regime of 
                                                 
195
 Background Information, RG 59, Lot File 59 D 654, Box 41, folder ―Background Information 1953,‖ 
NA. 
196
 Peter L. Hahn, The United States, 144. 
86 
 
unusual disinterestedness and clear strategic perception,‖ who, they hoped, would see 
the wisdom of joining MEDO.
197
  
  The administration tried to convince the group‘s titular leader General 
Muhammad Naguib to join MEDO.  American efforts, however, ran into several 
difficulties.  First and foremost the new military government, the Revolutionary 
Command Council, or RCC, longed for American military equipment.  It needed a 
substantial influx to assure that its power base in the military stayed loyal.
198
  The new 
government also needed military equipment to confront its regional enemy, Israel.
199
   
In October of 1952 the RCC submitted a request for seventy three tanks, six 
hundred and sixty four Armored Personnel Carriers, three hundred jeeps, seven 
squadrons of aircraft, eighteen destroyers, twelve minesweepers, and a myriad of other 
smaller items to Washington.
200
  Truman declined to provide this much coveted material.  
He worried that it would precipitate a regional arms race with Israel.
201
 
The British base at Suez complicated America‘s relations with the new Egyptian 
government.  The base was immense.  It enveloped an area sixty miles wide by ninety 
miles long.  During the Second World War it supported fifteen British divisions, sixty 
five air squadrons, and a fleet.  The Suez base, the United Kingdom believed, was 
indispensible, both in maintaining its influence in the region and in—possibly—waging 
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war against the Soviet Union.
202
  For these reasons London adamantly refused to 
abandon it.  This position caused the Truman administration much headache.  As 
General Naguib informed Ambassador Robert McClintock ―under no circumstances,‖ 
would Egypt ―enter a Western organized MEDO unless the British have evacuated the 
canal zone.‖203  
Obtaining a British evacuation of Suez was extremely important to Egypt.    
Great Britain exerted significant control over the nation‘s domestic affairs.  The U.K. 
supported politicians and political parties who promoted continued cooperation with the 
metropole, frequently gave ―advice‖ to ministers, and on at least two occasions 
presented governments it found wanting with ultimatums, in both instances these 
recalcitrant coalition governments quickly collapsed.
204
  To Egyptians the continued 
existence of the base at Suez, with its 80,000 military personnel, allowed Britain to 
intervene, or threaten to intervene, in Egyptian affairs.  Until the last of these forces were 
gone, many believed, their nation would never be truly independent. 
 Dwight Eisenhower‘s ascension to the Presidency in 1953 seemed to offer fresh 
promise of resolving these issues.  The new administration seemed to recognize the 
importance of Third World nationalist movements, such as the Free Officers movement.  
Nationalism, the National Security Council believed, ―should be channeled not 
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opposed.‖205  While President Eisenhower confided in his diary that ―nationalism is on 
the march and world communism is taking advantage of that spirit.‖206 
The administration may have believed it understood the importance of third 
world nationalist movements and desired to work with them, in reality, it failed to 
appreciate them and their goals.  Policymakers wanted Egypt to join MEDO, a western 
organized and dominated defense pact.
207
  The nations of the Middle East, however, 
particularly Egypt, wanted to free themselves from all foreign influence.  The RCC not 
only wanted formal independence, but also independence from Western economic and 
foreign policy.  They did not wish to enter into a Western dominated defense 
organization.
 
  Instead they wished to unite and form an indigenous independent defense 
grouping, which would, as one historian has written, serve as ―‗the protective armor‘ of 
each Arab state against both western imperialism and Israel.‖208 
  Such absolute freedom, the administration believed, was impossible.  As 
Secretary Dulles bluntly stated, ―times have changed.‖   The cold war demanded certain 
sacrifices.  ―No nation exercises total independence.‖209   
Administration officials could not understand why Egypt‘s leaders failed to 
appreciate this.  In the absence of any other explanation for Egypt‘s embrace of, 
supposedly, archaic definitions of sovereignty and security they relied on racial 
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explanations.  Arab nationalism‘s inflexibility, they believed, sprang from Arabs‘ innate 
irrationality.  It, Elbert Matthews of the State Department‘s Policy Planning Staff wrote, 
was ―hypersensitive and xenophobic.‖210   A ―peculiar regional malady variously 
referred to as nationalism, anti-Westernism, xenophobia, or simply as a mass inferiority 
complex‖ wrote the American Ambassador in Egypt, afflicted the region.211   
Instead of recognizing Egypt‘s interests, the administration wrote them off as the 
product of Arab irrationality and Soviet intrigue and attempted to force Egypt to join 
MEDO, subordinate its sovereignty, and accept American definitions of nationalism and 
security for the region. 
 MEDO essentially institutionalized the administration‘s racial views.  Arabs, it 
was thought, were an inferior other.  As such they were expected to assume a deferential 
position to racially superior Westerners.  With MEDO, the believed to be, inferior 
Egyptians would voluntarily submit to superior American ―protection‖ and tutelage in 
the cold war. 
 Such thinking can be seen in the multiple references to a ―vacuum‖ in the region.  
―The decline and weakness of the UK and France in various sections of‖ the Middle East 
―have left a growing vacuum,‖ the administration‘s Regional Planning Advisor for the 
Middle East stated.  This vacuum, he continued, ―should, from a US point of view, be 
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filled.‖ 212  The logic was simple and brutal, Arab states were so inferior they simply 
ceased to exist.  The only time a power or a force existed in the region was when a 
Western power did. 
 Some may argue that strategic realities not racialized thinking, account for talk of 
a vacuum.  There is some merit to this contention.  The administration believed that most 
Arab states, if invaded by the Soviet Union, held little hope of prevailing, a National 
Intelligence Estimate concluded that ―except for Turkey, and possibly Israel, the states 
of the Middle East still have almost no ability to withstand a Soviet attack.‖213  The point 
is counter factual and thus impossible to prove, but, probably correct.  Indigenous Arab 
forces stood little chance of repelling a full-scale Soviet invasion of the region, but this 
did not mean that a ―vacuum‖ existed.  Arab states and Arab forces existed and could 
have been augmented to withstand potential Soviet aggression.  The administration 
could have provided the RCC with the military equipment it desired.  American belief in 
Arab inferiority, however, precluded them from implementing such a policy.  Instead the 
administration continued to advance MEDO, believing that it could convince the RCC to 
appreciate the inaccuracy of their irrational thinking and acquiesce to the American 
understanding of nationalism and security.  As long as this seemed possible the 
administration swept these racial concerns out of sight, but never completely out of 
mind. 
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 Events in the region seemed to offer hope that this was possible.  During the first 
months of 1953 Egypt and Britain concluded an agreement on the status of the Sudan.  
For years Egypt had claimed the Sudan as Egyptian territory.   In early 1953, however, 
the RCC accepted Sudanese self-determination.
214
   
The RCC also accepted U.S. aid.  In early 1953 it welcomed ten million dollars 
in agricultural aid and 11.7 million dollars in aid for rural revitalization, public health, 
public works, and industrial improvement.
215
 
The recommencement of negotiations on the status of the base at Suez in April 
also offered promise.  Egypt and the United Kingdom had been intermittently 
negotiating the status of the Suez base since 1945, with little success.
216
  The likelihood 
of reaching an agreement, however, seemed to improve in 1953. The previous year 
British military officials concluded that the base was no longer ―indispensible.‖  The 
proliferation of atomic weapons and the means to deliver them long distances made large 
bases such as the one at Suez exceedingly vulnerable to nuclear annihilation.
217
 
This finding made the British more amenable to settling the dispute, but only on 
their terms.   The United Kingdom continued to believe that the base could prove 
valuable in the event of war with the Soviet Union.  Consequently they refused to 
unilaterally withdraw their personnel.  Instead they wished to remove the bulk of their 
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forces, but leave behind sufficient personnel and equipment to reactivate the base in the 
event of war. 
 British planners formulated three potential outcomes to negotiations, scenarios A, 
B, and C.  Under A the United Kingdom would relinquish control of the base, remove 
the majority of its 80,000 personnel, but leave behind 7,000 personnel to administer and 
maintain the base.  Under scenario B it would remove all of its forces and leave behind a 
skeleton crew of technicians to supervise Egyptian personnel, maintain the base, and, if 
needed, reactivate it in sixty days.  In the third and final scenario Great Britain would 
withdraw all of its forces, but, periodically inspect the base to ensure that it could be 
reactivated in sixty to ninety days. 
 With negotiations set to resume the British sought U.S. participation, hoping that 
a united front would force the RCC to compromise.  Eisenhower initially agreed to 
participate, but only if Egypt requested United States participation.  President 
Eisenhower wanted to help settle the dispute, but he did not want to ―gate crash.‖218  
When Egypt balked at U.S. participation, however, and the administration honored these 
wishes.  Negotiations soon resumed without American participation.   
Spurred by American entreaties the two sides made progress towards reaching an 
agreement along the lines of B.  In May, however, negotiations collapsed over how 
London would transmit its orders to the technicians.  The U.K. maintained that it needed 
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to convey all orders directly to them, while Egypt insisted that all orders go through 
Egyptian officials.
219
   
 Deadlocked, the two sides turned to the United States.  Caught between a 
steadfast partner and a coveted ally, the administration eventually sided with Britain.   
While the administration desperately wanted to resolve the base dilemma and secure 
Egyptian participation in MEDO it could not, it believed, afford to deny its European 
ally.  As Undersecretary of State Bedell Smith noted U.S.-U.K. relations were worse 
than ―at any time since Pearl Harbor.‖ If the administration did not side with Britain the 
Conservative government there might fall and be replaced by a Labor government which 
―might cost us our bases.‖ 220 
   Relations with the RCC only worsened after this decision.    Eisenhower soon 
bowed to British pressure and withdrew an offer of nearly eleven million dollars in 
military aid.  The British feared the RCC would use this aid against their forces at Suez.  
The RCC had sanctioned a guerilla campaign against British forces at Suez and between 
October 1951 and June 1954 guerillas killed 47 British soldiers and committed 3,267 
acts of theft or vandalism.
221
   
The administration tried to soften the blow.  It offered to provide Egypt with 
flight training for fifty pilots.
222
  The RCC, however, turned down this offer.  Flight 
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training for fifty pilots did little to offset Israel‘s perceived military advantage and did 
not eject British forces from their country. 
 Disappointed, the Eisenhower administration continued to try to convince the 
RCC to accept its understanding of nationalism and regional security.  The man charged 
with accomplishing this feat was no less than the Secretary of State himself.  In May 
Secretary Dulles left for a three week fact finding trip to the region. 
The Secretary‘s most important stop came in Cairo.  He landed ready to 
reconciliation.  This, however, was complicated by the administration‘s beliefs about 
Arabs, Arab nationalism, and the RCC.  Just weeks before Dulles departed President 
Eisenhower complained to British Prime Minister Winston Churchill that Naguib must 
―satisfy the population‘s intense emotionalism with respect to national prestige.‖223  A 
State Department briefing paper prepared for Dulles‘ trip stated that it is currently in 
―fashion in the Arab world is to blame colonial exploitation for all ills‖ and that an 
―important current motivation‖ in Egypt is ―intense emotionalism.‖224  Arab, and 
particularly Egyptian actions, the administration believed, were being driven by 
irrationality, specifically by emotionalism, not by rational thought. 
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 The whole purpose of the Secretary of State‘s trip was to replace these 
―excessive emotional outbursts with presentations which hew closer to the facts.‖225  The 
sober rational westerner was visiting the region to talk some sense into the irrational 
emotional Arabs.     
These beliefs caused problems from the start.  During his first meeting with the 
Egyptian government the Secretary presented General Naguib with a .32 caliber pistol 
from President Eisenhower‘s personal collection.  The act was designed to demonstrate 
to Egypt that the United States understood its desire for arms and could, and would, 
fulfill it.  But the way in which the Secretary presented this symbol sent a very different 
message.  As the Secretary placed the pistol in the General‘s hands he lectured him that 
―this is for keeping peace, not for war.‖ 226   The sober Westerner had to assure that the 
irrational Arab did not misconstrue the message. 
 Further friction ensued as the two sides sat down for a series of meetings.  The 
Secretary tried to convince the Egyptian representatives to accept a settlement on Suez 
along the lines of Britain‘s scenario B.  The Egyptian foreign minister, however, 
informed Dulles that Egypt ―would never accept non-Egyptian experts here ‗in control 
of anything.‘‖227  British technicians, Egyptian representatives believed, were 
unnecessary.  Egyptian technicians could maintain the base‘s stores and equipment.  The 
Secretary of State, however, dismissed this assertion as ―unreasonable and 
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unfortunate.‖228  Instead the Secretary tried to convince Egypt that the presence of 
British technicians at Suez did not violate the country‘s sovereignty.  The technicians, 
Dulles rationalized, were no different than Ford motor company supervisors who 
oversaw production at the company‘s factories in the country.  Needless to say Egyptian 
officials found this argument less than compelling.
229
 
Dulles also had difficulty convincing Egypt to accept the American definition of 
regional security.  Egyptian officials indicated that they would not join MEDO 
regardless of how Suez negotiations turned out.  Egypt, the Prime Minister stated, ―has 
had bitter experience with many agreements with the UK which have not been kept.‖  In 
a 1926 treaty the United Kingdom had promised Egypt a modern army, but instead 
delivered one ―fit only for funeral celebrations.‖230  These past experiences, he informed 
Dulles, had taught them that ―agreements made on the basis of a master-slave 
relationship are of no use.‖231  Egypt would not subordinate itself and its interests to the 
West.  It had its own definition of sovereignty and security and was not about to accept 
the American view.   
Additionally, the new government would not join MEDO because, as the 
American Ambassador in Egypt wrote, ―acceptance of any type of MEDO would be 
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‗suicide‘‖ for it.232  As one historian has written by this point in time ―the junta‘s star 
appeared to be in decline.  It had failed to resolve the base dispute.  It had also 
implemented unpopular price controls, which produced severe shortages of basic 
foodstuffs.  The officers could not enter into a defense pact with the west at this time.
233
  
As Nasser, the real power behind the scenes, informed Dulles the people ―think of 
MEDO as a ‗perpetuation of occupation‖ and the ―people‘s will would have to be 
respected.‖234 
Such Egyptian intransience left Dulles perplexed.  He simply could not 
understand why they could not see the bigger picture: the Soviet threat to the region.  
The ―great difficulty‖ Dulles informed the National Security Council was the ―complete 
preoccupation of the Arab states with their own local problems and their lack of 
understanding and interest in the threat posed by the Soviet Union.‖235    
The Arab character, the administration believed, prompted this lack of 
understanding.  ―Intense xenophobia and distrust of the West,‖ Dulles complained, are 
rampant in the region.
236
  ―Almost entire area,‖ he grumbled, is ―caught in fanatical 
revolutionary spirit that causes‖ them ―to magnify their immediate problems and 
depreciate the Soviet threat.‖237   
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Convinced that the Egyptians were acting irrationally the administration began to 
question the value of MEDO.  After returning to Washington the Secretary came to 
believe that ―we must abandon our‖ efforts to make ―Egypt the key country‖ in MEDO.  
Later he concluded that the ―old MEDO concept‖ is ―certainly finished.‖238 
The administration‘s old strategy in ruins, it began to search for a replacement.  
Syria, Secretary Dulles believed, ―was a state that offered real possibilities, thanks to‖ its 
pro-Western leader General Shishakli.
239
  Syria also had the benefit of not being 
involved in the Suez muddle, it was cheaper to improve economically, could absorb 
Palestinians refugees and therefore help defuse Arab-Israeli tensions, and was ―more 
aware of Soviet threat, because of [the] proximity of Soviet frontier.‖240    
Ultimately, however, plans to anchor area defense around Syria fizzled.  Military 
advisors believed that an alliance with Syria offered little value.  The Levant state, they 
concluded, was ―very unpopular with neighbors‖ and not an ―adequate substitute for 
Egypt,‖ they concluded.241 
Instead the administration came to champion the Northern Tier.  The Northern 
Tier proposed building an alliance of northern Middle Eastern states (initially Pakistan 
and Turkey) to contain Communist aggression at the region‘s edge.  These states, the 
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administration believed, were rational, they perceived the Soviet threat, because they, as 
Dulles stated, felt ―the hot breath of the Soviet Union on their necks.‖242 Perhaps not 
coincidentally, these two states were also not Arab.
 
 
While the administration shifted its focus to the Northern Tier it continued to 
keep Egypt in view.  The Northern Tier was not a perfect solution.  President 
Eisenhower worried that the grouping did not possess sufficient ―defense in depth.‖  As 
insurance he wanted to ―link‖ it to Egypt.243  Given time, the administration hoped, the 
Egyptians might cool down, start thinking rationally, perceive the Soviet threat, and 
accept the American plan for the region. 
Egypt, however, had no intention of joining the Northern Tier.  Instead Nasser 
and the RCC proposed building a defense pact around the pre-existing Arab League 
Collective Security Pact.  This, unlike the Northern Tier, was an indigenous defense 
grouping.  It provided for defense of the area, but did not provide western powers with 
control over Arab foreign policy.
244
 
The administration found this option wanting.  The pact, Dulles complained, 
would ultimately be ―responsible to the Arab League Council,‖ not to the American 
government.  U.S. adherence would also produce ―sweeping commitments‖ to Arab 
states and their security.  This might commit the U.S. to side with the Arab states in a 
war against Israel.  The pact would also have likely excluded Pakistan, a staunch 
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American ally and a military power viewed as critical to area defense.  Finally the 
―general character of the treaty and the organization,‖ Dulles believed, would not 
produce a ―workable‖ defense.245 
Instead the administration continued to labor to convince the Egyptians to rethink 
and consider supporting the Northern Tier.
246
  To help accomplish this it continued its 
efforts to resolve the Anglo-Egyptian base dispute.  In July 1953 it forwarded a proposal 
to Cairo.   The British would retain technical control over the base, but Egypt would 
make the base available in the event of war.  The administration hoped that Egypt would 
forward this proposal onto London as if it were its own.  As an inducement the 
administration offered to provide a ―substantial amount‖ of aid, 25 million dollars in 
economic aid and another 25 million dollars in military aid, if the two sides reached an 
agreement.
247
 
Unable to resist the lure of military aid the RCC passed the proposal onto 
London.  On this basis negotiations resumed in August.  In a pattern that soon became 
familiar, however, negotiations promptly collapsed.  The two sides could not agree on 
how long British forces would remain.  The British insisted their technicians needed to 
remain on the base as long as British equipment resided there, while Egypt insisted that 
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they should remain only as long as it took for them to train Egyptian technicians how to 
maintain the base and its equipment.
248
 
In September the two sides reached a compromise on this issue only to see 
negotiations derail again, this time over base availability.  Under what conditions could 
Great Britain reactivate the base?  Both sides agreed they could reactive the base if the 
United Kingdom went to war with the Soviet Union or if the USSR invaded an Arab 
country.  But, what if the Soviet Union invaded a non-Arab state in the region?  London 
wanted to reactivate the base if the Soviets invaded Turkey or Iran.   Britain eventually, 
however, agreed to merely ―consult‖ with Egypt in this eventuality after Bedell Smith 
informed them that if ―America thought the base necessary‖ it would ―walk in and take 
it-whatever the agreement said.‖249  
 Soon, however, another problem arose: uniforms.  The British insisted that their 
technicians wear military uniforms.  The Egyptians maintained that for public relations 
reasons they not.  Unable to resolve this seemingly minor issue talks again collapsed in 
October. 
Angered by the lack of progress, the United States‘ unwillingness to provide it 
with the arms it so desperately needed, and the U.S. decision to provide its foe Israel 
with 26 million dollars in aid the RCC began considering implementing a neutralist 
policy.  In January it officially embraced what the RCC called ―positive neutrality.‖  
Minster of National Guidance Salah Salim defined positive neutrality as ―hostility and 
non-cooperation toward any nation which infringed [on] Egypt‘s dignity and freedom, 
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but cooperation with all counties both east and west which extend a hand of 
friendship.‖250 
 In retaliation, and under pressure from the British, the Eisenhower 
administration denied Egypt the aid it had previously offered.  According to the Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, supplying the aid ―would make it 
appear that US was acting under threat‖ and this would only ―encourage extremists and 
neutralists tendencies in other counties in the area.‖251 
Angered, the administration still wanted to try to pull Egypt back from its 
neutralist course, but how?  The Secretary of State thought he arrived upon an answer, ―a 
general solution of the quarrel between the Israelis and the Arabs.‖252  For far too long, 
the administration believed, the USSR has been able ―to capitalize on the discord 
between the Arab states and Israel and between the Arab states and the West.‖  If, 
however, the administration settled the Arab-Israeli dispute, it ―would remove the main 
block to Arab willingness to cooperate with the West.‖253   Once the Arab-Israeli issue 
was settled, the administration hoped, Egypt would start acting rationally and support, or 
at least not oppose, the Northern Tier. 
Time for such a settlement seemed precipitous.  In April General Gamal Abdel 
Nasser replaced Naguib.  American officials were initially high on Nasser.  The 
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American ambassador in Cairo wrote that ―my appraisal of Nasser personally rise with 
each meeting.‖  He is ―basically pro-West and certainly anti-Communist‖ and ―is not 
hostile to northern tier approach nor Turk-Iraqi pact in itself.‖ While Salah Salem 
engaged in ―ravings,‖ Nasser knew that he was ―now very much in a box.‖  Nasser, he 
concluded, represents ―basically the best that Egypt has had in our lifetime.‖ 254  Nasser, 
in short, seemed to offer fresh promise of Arab rationality. 
Promise also sprang from another source.  The long drawn out Suez affair was 
finally winding to a close.  After resuming negotiations in July negotiators resolved the 
lone outstanding issue: how long would British technicians remain at the base.  The 
British proposed they stay for ten years, the Egyptians seven.  Eventually the two sides 
reached a compromise.  The technicians would remain for seven years, but all other 
British forces would evacuate in twenty months.  This last hurdle cleared the two sides 
signed an agreement on July 27
th
. 
With the atmosphere in the region improving the administration launched 
Operation ALPHA, its solution to the Arab-Israeli dispute, in late 1954.  ALPHA took 
an ambitious comprehensive approach to the dilemma.  It tried to solve all the region‘s 
problems with a single agreement.  ALPHA proposed that Israel settle 75,000 
Palestinian refugees in its territory.  All remaining refugees, meanwhile, would remain in 
the Arab countries in which they resided and receive compensation from international 
authorities for their lost land.  Additionally border adjustments would be made and the 
holy sites in Jerusalem would be internationalized.  The plan also called for the Arab 
                                                 
254
 Telegram from Embassy in Egypt, March 20, 1955, FRUS, 1955-57, vol. 12, 43. 
104 
 
states to end their economic embargo of Israel, for Egypt to reopen the Suez Canal to 
Israeli shipping, for an America sponsored development of the Jordan River Valley, and 
for the Western powers to guarantee Israel‘s borders.255 
To induce Egyptian participation the administration offered to provide it with 20 
million dollars in economic aid, another 20 million in military aid, to increase the 
number of Egyptian students allowed to attend U.S. universities, to give Egyptian arms 
purchases higher priority, to provide 100 million dollars in aid for the construction of the 
Aswan dam, to provide an atomic energy project and U.S. food surpluses, and to use 
American economic leverage to improve Egyptian cotton markets.
256
 
To convince Nasser to accept this proposal President Eisenhower dispatched 
Texas oil man, former Deputy Secretary of Defense, and trusted confidant Robert 
Anderson to Egypt.  This proved an inauspicious selection.  From the start Anderson had 
difficulty communicating with Nasser.  According to one participant, Anderson‘s ―Texas 
drawl was so thick that Nasser couldn‘t understand a thing he said.‖  When the first 
meeting concluded the Egyptian leader pulled the CIA‘s Kim Roosevelt, a trusted friend 
of Nasser and an advisor to Anderson, aside and asked him ―Kim, what did he say?‖  
The CIA operative proceeded to translate Anderson‘s Texan into English.   To avoid any 
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further complications at the next meeting Nasser bluntly informed Anderson ―You speak 
English to Kim and he will speak English to me.‖257   
Unfortunately for Anderson, things did not improve once Nasser understood 
what he was proposing.  For obvious domestic reasons the new Egyptian leader was 
reluctant to make any concessions to Israel.  As for the administration‘s offer of twenty 
million dollars in military aid, it under whelmed the Egyptian leader.  Nasser was under 
the impression, apparently the result of a visit by President Truman‘s Deputy Secretary 
of Defense in 1952, that the United States would provide Egypt with 100 million dollars 
in aid.
258
  To be offered only twenty million dollars after years of waiting and after 
making many politically painful concessions to the hated British came as an insult.    
If this was not bad enough the offer contained conditions which were completely 
unacceptable to Nasser.  U.S. law required that an American military mission supervise 
how Egypt used the aid.  Nasser and the RCC had just expelled British military 
personnel after years of difficult negotiation; they had no interest in inviting in the 
military personnel of another foreign power.                
  Cognizant of this the Eisenhower administration offered a compromise; 
American military personnel would wear civilian clothes.  This sartorial change, 
however, missed the point.  It was not the uniforms that Nasser found objectionable, but 
the presence of any foreign military personnel in the country.  Nasser accepted the 
economic aid, but turned down the military aid, and Anderson left Cairo empty-handed. 
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Unwilling to take no for an answer the administration reportedly made one last 
effort to convince the new Egyptian leader to accept the aid and ALPHA.  According to 
the CIA‘s Wilbur Eveland, President Eisenhower dispatched Kim Roosevelt to 
personally deliver 3 million dollars in bribe money to Nasser.  The effort, however, 
backfired.  Nasser took the money, but was so insulted, that he used it to build a radio 
tower in Cairo, a tower which would later fill Arab air waves with anti-American 
invectives.  As an added insult Egyptians took to calling the tower ―Roosevelt‘s 
erection.‖259 
U.S.-Egyptian relations only cooled further as the administration accelerated its 
Northern Tier strategy.  In April the United States signed a military aid agreement with 
Iraq.  This action infuriated Egypt.  The civilizations of the Mesopotamian and Nile 
valleys had long competed for power in the Middle East.  Each civilization thought its 
rightful place to lead the region.
260
  The U.S. decision to give aid to Egypt‘s historic rival 
provoked consternation in Cairo.  It was particularly galling because Egypt had to suffer 
through years of delay and painful concessions to Britain in order to receive an aid offer 
much lower than expected. 
In February activity on the Northern Tier quickened.  Acting under American 
encouragement Turkey and Iraq signed the Turko-Iraq Pact, or the Baghdad Pact.  The 
pact served as the structural foundation for the Northern Tier.  It bound the two nations 
together in a military alliance.   
                                                 
259
 Wilbur Crane Eveland, Ropes of Sand: America’s Failure in the Middle East (New York: W.W. 
Norton, 1980), 91 ; Holland, America and Egypt, 60. 
260
 See Elie Podeh, The Quest for Hegemony in the Arab World: the Struggle Over the Baghdad Pact 
(Leiden, NY: E.J. Brill, 1995), 1. 
107 
 
Cairo viewed this act as overtly threatening.  As historian James Jankowski has 
written, the Baghdad Pact threatened to ―simultaneously consolidate Western hegemony 
in the area‖ and ―threaten Egyptian regional influence.‖261 
To make matters worse these American moves could not have come at a worse 
time for Nasser and the RCC.  On February 28
th
 Israeli forces raided a military camp in 
Gaza, killing 38 Egyptians and Palestinians.  This put tremendous pressure on Nasser 
since a major reason for the public‘s support of the RCC was their belief that a military 
government would be a more effective in protecting Egyptian interests.  The raid on 
Gaza, the RCC‘s inability to acquire arms, and the American aid offer to Iraq struck at 
the very core of this assumption.  Nasser and the RCC found themselves in a precarious 
position.  If they wanted to stay in power they needed to do something to strengthen 
Egypt‘s position in the region and to rekindle the public‘s faith in them.262    
One way the RCC tried to strengthen its position was with Radio Cairo.  
Broadcasts from the station flooded the region‘s airwaves with invectives against Iraq, 
the U.S., and the Baghdad Pact.  The goal: convince other Arab states not to join the 
Northern Tier.  In March the regime took another step towards solidifying its position in 
the region. It signed a mutual security agreement, the ESS Pact, with Syria and Saudi 
Arabia. 
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These actions left American policymakers once again perplexed.  Administration 
officials were unable to appreciate the position their actions had put Nasser and the RCC 
into, so they once again fell back on the only remaining explanation for Egyptian 
behavior: Arab irrationality.  The RCC was attacking American interests in the region, 
Dulles believed, because it was irrationally ―jealousy‖ of its historic rival in Iraq.263  The 
U.S. ambassador in Egypt described the Egyptian reaction as a going ―into tantrums.‖264 
Despite this the administration continued to exercise restraint.  While it could not 
give the ESS Pact its ―blessing and support,‖ it decided not to oppose it.  Any attempt to 
oppose the pact, they rationalized, ―would be counter-productive.‖  It would only arouse 
―an all-out counter-attack on‖ the ―US in much of‖ the ―Arab world.‖265 
The administration also showed restraint because it had yet to completely give up 
on Nasser.  He may have been acting irrationally, but the administration continued to 
believe that ―rehabilitating‖ him was possible.266  As late as July Eisenhower spoke of 
continuing to ―woo‖ the Egyptian leader.267  They found the fact that he had asked their 
―assistance in finding a solution‖ to the current difficulties reassuring.268   
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Good intentions aside, relations only worsened.  In April of 1955 Britain joined 
the Baghdad Pact.  Later that year Pakistan and Iran joined.  These actions only further 
aggravated Nasser.  By joining the pact Britain, Egypt‘s former imperial master, had 
found a way to perpetuate its influence in the region.  Even worst, it had done so by 
aligning itself with Egypt‘s historic rival.   
In April Nasser flew to Bandung, Indonesia.  There a conference was taking 
place.  The Asian-Afro Conference organized by the leaders of Indonesia, Pakistan, 
Burma, India, and Sri Lanka.   While the conference addressed other issues such as 
ending the last vestiges of colonialism and racial discrimination its primary objective 
was to formulate a common policy for Third World nations in the cold war.  For many 
leaders this was both a moral and a practical issue.  As Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal 
Nehru stated in his closing remarks ―if all the world were to be divided up between these 
two big blocs,‖ as Soviet and American leaders wished.  ―The inevitable result would be 
war.‖  Non-alignment was, he believed, the best way to prevent that from occurring.  
Non-aligned nations would exercise ―objectivity‖ and ―balance‖ and prevent the cold 
war from turning hot.
269
  Non-alignment had another benefit of course.  It allowed these 
nations to stop subordinating their nations‘ national interests to the larger cold war 
cause. 
Reinvigorated and now connected to a larger movement Nasser returned to Egypt 
and took drastic action.  In September he signed a massive armaments deal with the 
Soviet satellite state of Czechoslovakia.   Egypt received approximately 86 million 
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dollars in arms from Czechoslovakia (the Defense Department estimated the 
agreement‘s real value at closer to 200 million dollars given the sharp discounts the 
Soviets gave Egypt).  In exchange for roughly 200 aircraft, 100 heavy tanks, six torpedo 
boats, two submarines, and countless other smaller items Egypt agreed to provide the 
Soviet bloc with a majority of its cotton export crop.  Nasser and the RCC had finally 
received the military aid it had been seeking since 1953. Nasser preferred to receive the 
aid from the U.S., but as he warned the administration in August, Egypt ―could not 
continue in a position obviously inferior to Israel.  If Egypt was unable to obtain arms 
from her friends she would be obliged to turn to her enemies.‖270  
Despite this warning, news of the deal shocked many in the White House.  
Secretary Dulles concluded, in a typically racially loaded fashion, the deal was ―as 
irresponsible as giving a lethal weapon to children to play with.‖271 
Treasury Secretary George Humphrey cried that the Aswan package would allow 
the Soviets to ―send in her people in large numbers,‖ to ―run all over Egypt‖ and 
―ultimately Communize it‖272  The Secretary of State held similar thoughts.  The offer, 
he believed, constituted a ―new cold war front in the Near East,‖ which would prove 
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―almost catastrophic for the West.‖  It would imperil Western Europe‘s access to oil and 
allow Soviet influence to jump the Northern Tier and spill into Africa.
273
 
Frustrated, the administration initially decided to ―temporize‖ relations with 
Egypt.  The U.S. would not actively oppose Egypt, but neither would it support the 
RCC.  The only reason the administration did not break completely with Egypt was 
because, as Secretary Dulles rationalized, ―Egypt as a neutralist‖ was ―more tolerable 
than as a Communist satellite‖274  Frustrated and abhorred as the administration was by 
Egyptian intransience and its petitions of neutralism the administration could not risk 
pushing the country into the communist camp. 
This did not last long, soon the administration spoke of isolating ―Egypt from 
other Arab states.‖275  The administration planned to isolate Egypt by undermining its 
influence in Libya and the Sudan, by erecting an armament embargo against the 
recalcitrant regime, by withholding future economic or technical assistance, by 
pressuring the International Reconstruction Development Bank (IRDB, later known as 
the World Bank) to cancel its aid package for the Aswan dam, by canceling any U.S. 
navy port calls in the country, and by using the United States Information Agency to 
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conduct a propaganda campaign to erode support for the agreement among Arabs 
region-wide.
276
   
In addition to these sticks, the administration proposed dangled a carrot, although 
a rather paltry one.  The administration would inform Egypt that the United States would 
convince the IRBD to approve its aid package for the Aswan dam (which had been 
languishing in limbo since 1953) if it rejected the Czech offer.  The administration also 
offered to dispense any aid already approved by Congress.  Needless to say these meager 
inducements paled in comparison to the 86 million dollars in desperately needed 
armaments the RCC was about to receive from the Soviet bloc.
277
 
Incensed Secretary Dulles railed in a National Security Council Meeting that the 
―Soviet Union had in effect opened up a new front in the Middle East.‖278  The purpose 
of this new front, a National Intelligence Estimate predicted, was for the USSR to 
exclude ―Western military bases from the relatively exposed south-western flank of the 
USSR‖ and to extend ―Soviet influence‖ in the region.279 
Nasser‘s race, the administration believed, made this possibility highly likely.  
The Egyptian leader‘s irrational ―conspiracy-born suspicion,‖ stated one State 
Department memorandum, had already ―prevented Nasser from reposing full faith in the 
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good intentions of the West.‖280  Now the Soviets, stated the Operations Coordinating 
Board, were using ―irrational Arab nationalism,‖ to increase their influence.281    
Nasser‘s irrationality, the White House believed, was causing him to fall into a 
carefully laid Soviet trap.  The Soviets, concluded the National Security Council, were 
―promoting neutralism and fostering a false sense of security‖ in the region.282  By 
assuming a neutralist position Nasser was allowing the Soviets to achieve their ―ultimate 
goal‖ of surrounding the ―USSR with a broad belt of neutralized states from which 
American military forces would be withdrawn.‖283   Nasser, the President feared, might 
be ―in the Communist pocket.‖284 
Once in the trap, the administration believed, domination was inevitable.  Nasser 
may have believed that he could accept Soviet aid and maintain his freedom of action, 
but the rational Westerner knew better.  According to a National Intelligence Estimate, 
the Egyptian government ―overestimates its ability to cope with the long-range political 
risks involved in accepting Bloc support.‖285  Nasser, Dulles chastised, ―is toying with 
forces far greater than he knows anything about.  In the face of Communist methods of 
penetration he is a babe in the woods‖ he does not have the ―capacity to control the 
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situation he is getting into.‖286  The wily communists would ultimately, the 
administration believed, take advantage of, and dominate, the gullible Arab. 
Despite this bleak racial thinking the administration decided to launch one last 
effort to instill rationality into the Egyptian leader.  According to Dulles ―we must seek a 
modus Vivendi with the Nasser regime in Egypt.‖  Why?  Because, as Dulles, continued, 
―our course of action in the Near East depend[s] upon the success or failure of our 
efforts.‖287 If Egypt fell to Soviet intrigue it would imperil all American interests in the 
region.  The Soviet deluge would jump the banks of the Northern Tier.  So in December 
the administration made one last attempt to woo Nasser—the White House offered to 
finance the construction of the Aswan dam.  The United States and Great Britain would 
each provide Egypt with 200 million dollars while the IRBD would provide the 
remaining 200 million necessary to complete the project.
288
 
In addition the administration launched Operation GAMMA.  An American 
envoy would conduct separate negotiations with both Nasser and Israel‘s David Ben 
Gurion in an effort to resolve the Arab-Israeli dispute.
289
  To head this effort President 
Eisenhower once again turned to his good friend Robert Anderson.  Anderson shuttled 
back and forth between Tel Aviv and Cairo.  He was unable, however, to resolve two 
crucial issues.  What to do with the Palestinian refugees?  And what about Israeli 
                                                 
286
 Memorandum of Conversation Between the United Kingdom and the United States, October 26, 1955, 
RG 59, Miscellaneous Lot Files, Lot 59 D518 (box 4 of 12), Documents on Projects Alpha, Mask, and 
Omega, Box 31, folder ―Geneva Conference Oct 27 – Nov 17 1955,‖ NA.  
287
 Memorandum from Elbert G. Mathews of the Policy Planning Staff to the Director, December 13, 
1955, FRUS, 1955-57, vol. 12, 212. 
288
 Discussion at the 268
th
 Meeting of the National Security Council, Ann Whitman File, Papers as 
President, NSC Series, Box 7, folder ―268th,‖ DDEL. 
289
 Discussion at the 261
st
 Meeting of the National Security Council, Ann Whitman File, Papers as 
President, NSC Series, Box 7, folder ―261st,‖ DDEL. 
115 
 
territorial concessions?  Nasser wanted land in the Negev to unite the Arab lands; Israel 
did not want to make such a concession.  As a compromise the United States proposed 
the creation of ―converging triangles.‖ The Jewish state would concede land in the 
Negev to Jordan and Egypt.  This would divide it into four triangles; Israel would 
control those in the north and south, while the Arab states would possess those in the 
east and west.  Where these triangles ―overlapped‖ two highways would cross, one 
running north-south connecting Israeli territory, another, a raised highway, running east-
west connecting Arab territory.  This was far from an ideal solution.  As Nasser chided 
―suppose an Arab was on the overpass one day and felt the call of nature and it landed 
on an Israeli car on the underpass.‖  If this happened, ―there would be a war!‖290  Not 
surprisingly Anderson left empty handed.  Neither Nasser nor Ben Gurion were willing 
to make significant concessions. 
 In March a series of events began in Jordan which precipitated the 
administration‘s final break with Nasser.  It began when the British launched an effort to 
convince the Jordanians to join the Baghdad Pact, which produced a backlash among 
Jordanian nationalists.  To quell these critics the newly enthroned King Hussein 
dismissed Lieutenant General John Bagot Glubb, the British commanding officer of the 
Arab legion, a force established while the nation was still a British colony.
291
   
Around this time Nasser and the ESS Pact also began courting the young 
Jordanian King.  They wished to conclude a bilateral alliance with Jordan to help further 
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marginalize Iraq and the Northern Tier.  To obtain the king‘s cooperation they offered to 
assume the 20 million pound a year stipend the British provided the insolvent Jordanian 
government. 
 These actions enraged the British.  They believed Nasser had instigated Glubb‘s 
dismissal and was now attacking their position in Jordan.  Prime Minster Anthony Eden 
raged ―I want him [Nasser] destroyed‖ (Minister of State Anthony Nutting‘s biography 
asserts that Eden actually fumed ―I want him murdered‖).292   
Soon London began pressuring the United States to join the Baghdad Pact.  The 
administration, while worried by events in Jordan, was not convinced this was good 
policy. American participation would drag the U.S. into ―intra-area politics,‖ poison 
relations with the USSR, and raise Israeli insecurities, prompting them to—possibly—
demand a security guarantee.
293
  The British, Secretary Dulles also worried, ―have 
taken‖ the Baghdad Pact ―over and run it as an instrument of British policy.‖294  Joining 
would only suit their interests, not American. 
To make matters worse in June of 1956 Soviet Foreign Minister Dimitri Shepilov 
visited Egypt.  While there he conveyed another offer.  The USSR would loan Egypt the 
funds necessary to build the long cherished Egyptian plan of building a new dam on the 
Nile River at Aswan.  Many Egyptians considered the project a panacea for the country‘s 
problems.  It promised to push Egypt and its economy into the twentieth century.  
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Building it would reclaim 1.3 million acres of agricultural land, generate electricity, and 
encourage industry.  The Soviet offer would make this possible, and on generous terms.   
It volunteered to loan Egypt four hundred million dollars to be repaid over sixty years at 
zero percent interest.  Additionally the Kremlin offered to write off all existing Egyptian 
debt to the Soviet Union and its satellite states in Eastern European, to purchase all 
Egyptian cotton exports, and to build a steel mill in the country.
295
 
The RCC declined the offer.  Regardless, news that the Soviets had made it 
incensed Eisenhower administration officials.  Initially administration officials tried to 
place the news in a positive light.  Secretary Dulles reasoned that financing the Aswan 
dam was a ―terrible headache‖ for any country that attempted it.  ―The building of the 
dam was bound to place a heavy burden on the Egyptian economy and standard of 
living, and the Egyptians would blame the austerities they suffered on the nation which‖ 
was financing the construction of the dam.
296
 
 Soon the administration decided to upgrade its participation in the Baghdad Pact 
from observer to liaison.  It also took the important step of establishing a joint working 
group with the British to reformulate American policy.  The group‘s objective was to 
create a ―situation which would lead to the unseating of Nasser as soon as possible 
through actions of an economic and political character rather than by force.‖297  With 
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this statement administration policy had come full circle, from courting the new 
Egyptian government to actively trying to destroy it. 
Why did the administration turn against Nasser and the RCC in 1956?   ―Arabs,‖ 
President Eisenhower fumed, like Nasser who accepted ―major consignment of arms 
from the Soviets‖ are ―daily growing more arrogant and disrespectful of Western Europe 
and of the United States.‖298  Nasser he charged ―embodied the emotional demands of 
the people of the area for independence‖ and was now irrationally ―‗slapping the white 
Man down.‘‖299  The inferior was no longer accepting his subordinate position.   
The irrational Arab‘s actions, whether ―intentional or not,‖ wrote the State 
Department‘s Francis Russell, were ―aiding the USSR.‖300  ―Soviet penetration is 
facilitated,‖ charged the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, by 
―the ambitions of Nasser and the willingness of Nasser‖ to ―work with the Soviets, 
especially to obtain arms.‖301  Nasser, Secretary Dulles concluded, had ―become a tool 
of the Russians.‖302 
Such thinking, of course, was not new.  The administration had long believed 
that the RCC and Nasser were irrational, emotional, and that this benefitted the Soviets.  
Something, however, had changed.  ―Nasser‘s tidal wave,‖ distressed the Operations 
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Coordinating Board, is ―engulfing the area.‖303  Nasser, the Secretary of State believed 
was trying to ―create a core uniting the Arab world from the Atlantic to the Persian 
Gulf.‖304 
As long as the stakes were limited to Egypt the administration had been willing 
to take a risk.  They were willing to gamble that they could talk rationality into the 
irrational Arab, that they could convince Nasser and the RCC to subordinate their 
irrational understanding of nationalism and regional security to the rational American 
understanding.  By 1956, however, they were no longer willing to take this risk.  The 
stakes were too high.  Nasser, they believed, was working to extend his influence 
throughout the region.  They could not allow this to occur.  As a ―tool of the Russians,‖ 
any expansion of Nasser‘s power was now an extension of Soviet power.  Nasser needed 
to be contained.  And as we shall see the administration spent the majority of the rest of 
its time in office trying to accomplish just this. 
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CHAPTER V 
 EVEN THE BEST LAID PLANS: OPERATION OMEGA, THE SUEZ CRISIS, AND 
CONTAINING NASSER, 1956-57 
 
Having made the decision to contain Nasser, the question that now confronted 
the administration was how?   Policymakers had no difficulty developing, and even 
implementing, strategies to accomplish this, successfully executing these strategies, 
however, proved more difficult.  Throughout 1956 and 1957 events intervened to cause 
even the best laid of these plans to go awry.   
 Administration efforts to contain Nasser commenced in late 1956.  Planners at 
the State Department developed a program to ―reduce Nasser‘s power,‖ eliminate him 
―as a force in the Middle East and Africa,‖ and to ―undermine‖ his ―regime at home.‖305  
This plan was Operation OMEGA. 
OMEGA would apply progressively escalating amounts of political, diplomatic, 
and economic pressure on Nasser and his government.  Why a gradual approach?  
Secretary Dulles wanted to keep the possibility of bringing ―Nasser around‖ open.306  
While he thought that the likelihood of ―swinging‖ the Egyptian leader ―away from the 
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present course of action‖ was ―slight.‖  He did not want to foreclose the possibility 
entirely.
307
 
Consequently phase one of OMEGA would begin by embargoing all military 
exports to Egypt, delaying funding of the Aswan dam, delaying PL 480 and CARE aid, 
jamming Radio Cairo broadcasts, dispatching U.S. military officials to Baghdad Pact 
meetings, impeding Egyptian cotton exports, lending U.S. support to Egypt‘s rival in the 
Sudan, and combating Nasserist influence in Libya, Yemen, and Ethiopia.
308
  
Once the administration implemented all of these measures it planned to pause 
and observe whether Nasser had, as Secretary Dulles phrased it, learned that ―it was just 
not lucky to flirt and cooperate with the Russians.‖309  If he did, the administration 
would welcome him back into the Western fold, but only if he paid the price for his 
penance.  The Secretary wanted Nasser to prove that he realized the error of his ways.  
To do so he would have to either issue a radio statement proclaiming that he desired 
friendly relations with the United States, put an end to anti-Western Radio Cairo 
broadcasts, cooperate with the United Nations on the Arab-Israeli settlement, or use his 
influence in other Arab capitals to convince these states to participate in the 
administration‘s plan to develop the Jordan River Valley.310   
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 If the Egyptian leader remained obstinate the administration would proceed on to 
phase two of OMEGA.  In phase two the administration would cancel all economic aid 
to Egypt, encourage other states in the region to join the Baghdad Pact, expand U.S. 
military aid to Iran, and detach Saudi Arabia from the ESS Pact.
311
 
If these heightened measures still produced no results, the administration would 
proceed on to the third and final phase of OMEGA.  It would deny import-export loans 
to private Egyptian companies, freeze Egyptian sterling assets, discourage Western 
tourists from visiting the Nile state, manipulate U.S. cotton exports to Egypt‘s detriment, 
cease selling spare parts to the Egyptian military, enforce the Battle Act (which allowed 
the administration to cut off aid or economic assistance to any nation which traded 
strategic materials with the Soviet Union or its allies), and side with Sudan in its dispute 
with Cairo over the Nile waters.
312
 
The administration began implementing phase one of OMEGA in late 1956.  It 
delayed CARE and PL 480 aid.  It also dispatched military advisors to participate in 
Baghdad Pact meetings and let its offer to finance the Aswan dam ―wither on the vine.‖ 
313
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Some have claimed that the administration proceeded further during this period.  
The CIA‘s Wilbur Eveland claims that Secretary Dulles instructed the CIA to work with 
the British to directly ―bring down Nasser.‖314  Declassified documentation does not 
support this contention.  This does not mean, however, that the claim is untrue.  As many 
historians have shown President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles were willing to use 
the CIA to forcible overthrow regimes they found wanting.  The President approved 
covert agency efforts in Iran and Guatemala.  He also ordered the CIA to develop a plan 
to overthrow the Castro government in Cuba.  Eisenhower left office before the plan 
could be implemented.  But his successor, John F. Kennedy, eventually approved the 
operation: the ill begotten Bay of Pigs Invasion.
315
  This author, however, finds 
Eveland‘s contention unlikely.  The administration labored tirelessly throughout this 
period to avoid taking any action which would alienate the Arab world and push it into 
the Soviet camp.  Assassinating Nasser would surely have done just that. 
  Regardless, administration pressure seemed to have begun producing results.  In 
January Nasser intimated to the British that he would stop opposing the Baghdad Pact if 
they admitted no other Arab states to join the pact.
316
  The next month Egypt‘s foreign 
minister Mahmoud Fawzi conveyed a similar message to London.
317
  In March Egyptian 
representatives informed British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd that they would end 
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their propaganda attacks on the Baghdad Pact if the West halted further expansion of the 
pact.
318
  In good faith Egypt followed through on its end of the proposal.  British 
intelligence noted that references to the Baghdad Pact were ―markedly absent‖ from 
Radio Cairo broadcast following the meeting.
319
  
Nasser‘s cooperative mood, however, soon dissipated.  The Egyptian leader 
learned of Operation OMEGA.  According to journalist, and Nasser confidant 
Mohammad Heikal, he learned from Iraqi sympathizers attending a Baghdad Pact 
meeting in Tehran that the U.S. planned to withdraw its pledge to finance the 
construction of the Aswan Dam.
320
  Soon after learning of this the Egyptian leader found 
himself in an argument with Ahmad Hussein, his American leaning ambassador to the 
United States.  The Ambassador tried to convince Nasser that the administration wanted 
to fund the construction of the dam, but that the U.S Congress was blocking its efforts.  
In order to demonstrate to Hussein that he was mistaken Nasser told him to ―go and tell 
Dulles that you accepted all his conditions and watch his reaction.‖321  An exuberant 
Ambassador Hussein departed for Washington.  This set in motion a chain of events 
which would interrupt Operation OMEGA and which would strain Egyptian-Western 
relations to the breaking point. 
 After a stopover in London the Ambassador arrived in Washington.  This turn of 
events left the administration in a precarious position.  It no longer wished to finance the 
Aswan dam.  They were letting it ―wither on the vine‖ before they officially retracted the 
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offer.    Providing the funding at this point, without having secured any change in 
Nasser‘s behavior, would jeopardize OMEGA‘s future success.   
Funding the dam at this point would also raise other difficulties.  Southern 
Senators, fearful that construction of the dam would undermine southern cotton 
production, were blocking efforts to finance the dam.  They passed a resolution in the 
Senate appropriations committee which declared that ―none of the funds provided‖ in 
appropriations bills ―shall be used for assistance in conjunction with the construction of 
Aswan Dam.‖  The committee also decreed that the White House could not use funds 
from the Mutual Security Act to fund the construction of ―this dam without prior 
approval of Congress.‖322   
Backed into a corner of its own making, the administration decided to disclose to 
Ambassador Hussein that the United States was officially rescinding its offer.   Secretary 
Dulles informed Hussein at a meeting held at the State Department.  The Secretary listed 
several reasons for the administration‘s decision: Egypt‘s dispute with Sudan over the 
Nile waters, the U.S. Senate‘s opposition to the proposal, Egypt‘s less than friendly 
attitude towards the United States in recent months, and the belief that the project would 
place a ―heavy burden‖ on ―the Egyptian economy.‖ (Even with American, British, and 
IRDB aid Egypt would have had to raise nearly 90,000,000 dollars in order to complete 
the project)
323
 
In addition to informing the Egyptian Ambassador in person the administration 
released a press statement.  The release included the administration‘s contention that 
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Egypt‘s economy was incapable of supporting the project.  As Hugo Black, chairman of 
the IRBD later stated, this was as ―if a bank, in refusing a perspective borrower,‖ 
broadcast ―that he has a poor credit rating.‖  If a bank were to do this, Black continued, 
―the customer is likely to become angry.‖324  And Nasser did.  After reading the press 
release Nasser raged ―this is not a withdrawal‖ this ―is an attack on the regime and an 
invitation to the people of Egypt to bring it down.‖325  
Now it was Nasser who found himself in an awkward position.  He, like many 
Egyptians, believed that the dam was crucial to Egypt‘s future.  It promised to propel the 
nation and its economy into prosperity.  If the United States was no longer willing to 
provide the funds necessary to build the dam, however, there seemed to be no other way 
to finance it.  Under normal circumstances Nasser could have turned to the IRBD.  But 
the Eisenhower administration was using its influence to block any such efforts.  
Normally Nasser could also have turned to the Soviet Union.  But this too proved 
problematic.  Shortly after the Eisenhower administration announced it was rescinding 
its offer the Soviet Union‘s foreign minister, Dimitri Shepilov, revealed that the Soviet 
Union would not consider funding the dam.  Heartened by the improvement in relations 
which followed the Geneva Summit the Soviet government had decided to avoid any act 
which might antagonize the West.  Nasser was, seemingly, out of options. 
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 Yet there was one option that few had foreseen.  Instead of obtaining the funds 
from an outside source, Nasser could procure the funds from a source which lie within 
Egypt‘s own borders:  the Suez Canal.   
The Suez Canal has a long history.  Napoleon first dreamed of cutting a canal 
between the African mainland and the Sinai desert in the 1790s.  Building a canal at this 
strategic location promised to slash the time and distance between Europe and Asia.  
Once built, the journey from Liverpool to Calcutta would shrink from 11,600 miles to 
7,900 miles.  As a result the cost of goods travelling from Asia to Europe would 
plummet.  Early efforts to build the canal, however, ran into difficulties.  French politics 
during this period were highly unstable; these years saw the rise and fall of the 
Directory.  Additionally, the British did everything within their power to complicate 
French administration of Egypt.  Consequently it would not be until 1869 that the Suez 
Canal would become a reality. 
The man most responsible for this was Ferdinand De Lesseps.  De Lesseps was a 
French diplomat stationed in Cairo.  There he befriended the Egyptian monarch and 
convinced him to grant the French a concession to build a canal at Suez.   
The terms of the concession established the Compagnie Universelle du Canal 
Maritime de Suez.  The company was jointly owned.  The Egyptian government owned 
forty four percent.  De Lesseps and other French investors owned the remainder.   
Egypt‘s stake in the company, however, did not last long.  The Egyptian monarch 
fell into debt.  To pay off his creditors he sold his nation‘s share to a British government 
that was desirous to link the metropole with its vast global network of colonies.  Egypt 
128 
 
did, however, continue to receive fifteen percent of the canal‘s net profit.  This too, 
however, quickly slipped from Egyptian hands.  In 1880 a destitute Egyptian 
government sold its share of the canals profits to a conglomerate of French investors.
326
 
By the 1950s the Suez Canal had become one of the world‘s most important 
transportation routes and also one of the most profitable.  It generated a large and stable 
revenue stream.  In 1955 alone it produced a 100 million dollar profit.  This sort of 
revenue stream, Nasser realized, could easily finance the construction of the Aswan dam.  
Regaining control of the canal of course also brought with it another benefit:  it would 
undo what many Egyptians considered a historical wrong, the fact that the Egyptian 
government exercised no control over an artery which slashed through its territory. 
Nasser officially nationalized the Suez Canal in July of 1956.  He did so in 
dramatic fashion.  On the 26th he traveled to Alexandria to deliver a speech to 
commemorate the anniversary of King Farouk‘s abdication.  The speech, like many of 
Nasser‘s was long (nearly three hours), critical of the West, and enthralling.  Nasser‘s 
rhetorical style, as one historian has written, ―blended classical with colloquial Egyptian 
Arabic, humor with vitriol, and candor with sloganeering.‖327  The affect of this complex 
linguistic brew was a speech which proved intoxicating to the ear. 
 A rapt crowd grew jubilant as the speech reached its climax shortly after the two 
hour mark.  It was at this point that Nasser first mentioned the name of the canal‘s patron 
Ferdinand De Lesseps.  Eleven more such references followed.  This was no rhetorical 
flourish.  Unbeknownst to the crowd De Lesseps was a codeword.  As Nasser delivered 
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the speech Egyptian officers listened in anticipation.  Upon hearing the name De Lesseps 
they unsealed their orders and Egyptian troops descended upon the Suez Canal and its 
facilities.  After sufficient time had passed Nasser informed the crowd, and the world, 
that Egypt had nationalized the canal.  Cheers erupted in Alexandria and across Egypt. 
An equally heated reaction emanated from Paris and London over the course of 
the next several days.  An irate French Foreign Minister likened the seizure of the canal 
―to the seizure of Rhineland by Hitler.‖328  British Prime Minister Anthony Eden called 
it ―another Munich.‖329  Nasser‘s nationalization, the British Chancellor of the 
Exchequer Harold Macmillan predicted, threatened ―the destruction of Great Britain as a 
first-class power and its reduction to a status similar to that of Holland.‖  This, he 
vowed, he would never allow to occur.  He would rather Britain ―be destroyed by 
Russian bombs,‖ than be ―reduced to impotence by the disintegration of its entire 
position abroad.‖330 
Nasser‘s action provoked a similarly visceral response from Washington.   
Commander of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Arthur Radford proclaimed that Nasser 
is ―trying to be another Hitler.‖  ―Nasser‘s aggressive statements,‖ President Eisenhower 
stated, ―seemed much like Hitler‘s in ‗Mein Kampf,‖ and he worriedly questioned how 
could Europe ―be expected to remain at the mercy of a whim of a dictator?‖331   
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The western leaders had cause for concern.  Two thirds of Britain and France‘s 
oil passed through the canal.  A nationalized Suez Canal, as the French Foreign Minister 
elucidated, would have left them ―totally dependent on the goodwill of the Arab 
powers.‖332  This was unacceptable to the European Allies.  Nasser could, at will, 
interrupt Western Europe‘s oil supply and most of its trade with the East.  This would 
weaken Western Europe‘s economy and leave it vulnerable to the Soviet Union. 
Nasser‘s decision also raised other potential problems.  Secretary Dulles feared 
that nationalization of the canal threatened the American economy.  If, Dulles 
rationalized, Nasser closed the canal the U.S. government would need to ration oil, this 
could, he feared, cripple American car production.  The administration also feared that 
Nasser‘s action might set a precedent for the Panamanians, through whose territory the 
American administered Panama Canal ran.
333
  The French, meanwhile, worried that 
Nasser‘s action might further inspire dissidents in its African colonies of Tunisia and 
Morocco, who were already in revolt.
334
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To guard against these eventualities the Western allies immediately began 
formulating a response.  Britain and France planned for military action.
335
  They also 
froze all of Egypt‘s sterling assets and decreed that all canal tolls must be paid to banks 
in Britain and France and not to the canal authority. 
While the administration supported these later actions, it did not support the use 
of military force.  Secretary Dulles believed that ―Nasser must be made to disgorge his 
theft,‖ but he did not believe that using force was the best way to accomplish this.336  
President Eisenhower believed there was ―unwisdom‖ in even ―contemplating the use of 
military forces at this moment.‖337 
There were practical reasons for this concern.  If the U.S. decided to use force 
President Eisenhower would have to obtain a declaration of war from Congress.  The 
President did not think he would be able to obtain such a declaration.
338
  Using force 
would also bring with it serious economic risk.   Any military action would wreak havoc 
on canal traffic, which might, the Secretary of State feared, weaken the economies of 
Western Europe ―virtually beyond repair.‖339  Moreover, the President worried that 
military intervention would cause oil to ―dry up‖ in Europe.  If this occurred the 
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administration would have to divert Western hemisphere oil, the lifeblood of the 
American economy, to its European allies.
340
   
The most important reason why the administration opposed using force, 
however, was because it feared that doing so would turn the other states in the region 
against the West.  Using military force, Secretary Dulles believed, threatened to embitter 
the entire Middle East and much of Africa against the West.
341
  The President feared that 
using force ―might well array the world from Dakar to the Philippine Islands against 
us.‖342  Such an outcome was unacceptable.  It would cause, Dulles estimated, the 
―influence of the West in the Middle East and most of Africa‖ to be ―lost for a 
generation, if not a century.‖  If this was not troubling enough, the Soviet Union, he 
predicted, would ultimately ―reap the benefit.‖343   
The White House‘s reticence, however, did not mean that they had changed their 
mind about Nasser.  In September Eisenhower wrote to Anthony Eden that the United 
States still wanted to ―isolate Nasser and gain a victory.‖344  Later he stated that he 
believed that ―Nasser had indicated dangerous tendencies that needed to be curbed.‖345  
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And they still wanted to do so for racial reasons.  Nasser‘s decision to nationalize 
the canal, if anything, only intensified these concerns.  Policymakers believed that the 
Egyptian leader‘s decision to nationalize the canal was part of his larger plan to expand 
his power and to challenge the West.  The Secretary of State prophesized that Nasser‘s 
decision to seize the canal was an ―integral part‖ of his ―long-term program‖ to ―reduce 
Western Europe to subservience to Arab control.‖346  ―The canal seizure,‖ he stated, 
―was one of a series of steps towards‖ Nasser‘s ultimate dream ―of a great build-up of 
Arab power and a corresponding diminution in the power of the West.‖347  
Nasser, the administration believed, could only accomplish this by preying upon 
his fellow Arabs‘ irrational emotionalism.  He, Francis Russell stated, was a ―leader of 
the Hitlerian type‖ who wanted to ―merge the emotions and resources of the entire 
Middle East and Africa into a single onslaught against Western civilization.‖348  While 
the American Ambassador in Egypt warned of Nasser‘s ―emotional hold over the Middle 
East.‖349 
This was completely unacceptable to the West.  Because Nasser, like the people 
he was preying upon, they believed, was an irrational emotional Arab.  Undersecretary 
of State Herbert Hoover Jr. proclaimed that ―Nasser‘s actions are not based on reasoning 
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but are irrational and emotional.‖350  While Dulles charged that the Egyptian leader 
exercised ―fanatical Egyptian control of the waterways.‖351   
The Soviets, the administration believed, would exploit this irrational 
emotionalism.  Elbert Matthews of the Policy Planning Staff wrote ―whether or not by 
deliberate intent‖ Nasser ―is the advanced agent of Communist influence in the Middle 
East.‖352  A Special National Intelligence Estimate estimated that Nasser ―probably 
believes that he can pursue indefinitely an ‗independent foreign policy‘‖ and accept 
―heavy economic commitments‖ from the Soviet Bloc ―if he takes reasonable 
precautions.‖  But ―in so doing, he probably overestimates his own unaided ability to 
retain genuine freedom of action.‖353   
Nasser could not, the administration believed, be allowed to nationalize the 
canal. ―The whole situation,‖ Dulles concluded, ―was made to order for the USSR to 
move in on.‖354  If the West did not undo Nasser‘s action it would only embolden him.  
He would expand his reach further and this, the administration believed, would prove 
disastrous for the West.  The Egyptian leader was a ―tool of the Russians,‖ any territory 
he gained the Soviets gained as well.   
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But using force simply raised too many difficulties.  It might push the entire 
region into the Soviet camp.  This realization led Eisenhower to conclude that ―he did 
not think that the Canal issue was the one on which to seek to undermine Nasser,‖ but 
―he felt there was promise‖ in other strategies which ―offered greater hope than a frontal 
attack on Nasser on the Canal issue.‖355  Even the Secretary of State conceded that as 
―regrettable as it might be to see Nasser‘s prestige enhanced even temporarily,‖ it was 
better to let Nasser have a temporary victory than to make ―bitter enemies of the entire 
population of the Middle East and much of Africa‖ and possibly lose the region to the 
Soviets.
356
   
And a temporary victory was all that the administration believed it would be.  
The West would regain control of the canal, but they would do so, as President 
Eisenhower confided to Eden, in a ―bloodless‖ way.   Such a solution, the President 
believed, was preferable.   It, he estimated, would be ―more far reaching in its ultimate 
consequences than…anything brought about by force of arms.‖  An acceptable solution, 
he continued, was, ―best assured by slower and less dramatic processes than military 
force.‖357   
The slower and less dramatic process the administration had in mind was to 
convene an international conference.  This, the administration believed, was a win-win 
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proposition.  If the convention succeeded it would resolve the crisis without bloodshed 
and without pushing the Middle East into the Soviet camp.  If it did not work, it would 
provide the administration with time and cover.  It would provide time to formulate a 
peaceful solution and, if they could not devise a peaceful solution, it would provide 
cover for later military action.  As the Secretary of State rationalized, if a conference 
could garner ―unanimous backing for an international regime to operate the Canal,‖ and 
Nasser rejected it ―it would then be possible to take armed action if it became necessary 
with a good chance of retaining a large measure of world support.‖358 
 This approach, however, failed to satisfy either the British or the French.  They 
agreed to participate, but only because, as British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs 
Selwyn Lloyd noted, the conference ―was a virtual ultimatum.‖  If Colonel Nasser 
refused to accept it, Harold Macmillan stated, ―military operations could then 
proceed.‖359   
London made no secret of its ulterior motives. Throughout the conference 
process it labored to convince the administration to support its use of force.  In late July 
Anthony Eden informed President Eisenhower that in six weeks the United Kingdom 
planned to ―use force‖ to ―break Nasser‖ and  install a ―regime less hostile to the 
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West.‖360   At a National Security Council meeting in August Secretary Dulles disclosed 
that the British and the French were ―continuing their military preparations to deal with 
the Suez Crisis‖ and that by the ―10th of September, the British government would have 
to make‖ an ―irrevocable‖ decision.361 
Under these less than promising conditions the conference opened in London on 
August 16th.  The representatives of twenty four nations attended.  Present were the 
representatives of the top sixteen users of the canal and the signatories of the 1888 
convention which regulated use of the canal.  Noticeably absent, however, was Egypt.  
Nasser had initially expressed interest in sending a representative.  He had previously 
proposed a similar solution.  But, his cooperation evaporated after Anthony Eden made a 
statement declaring that ―Colonel Nasser is the enemy, we have no quarrel with the 
Egyptian people.‖  This was the last straw for Nasser.  It seemed as if Eden was reaching 
above him, appealing directly to the Egyptian people, which he was.
362
 
 Despite this, or perhaps because of it, Secretary Dulles achieved some success at 
the conference.  He convinced eighteen participants to agree to establish an international 
company to operate the canal.  Four nations opposed Dulles‘ proposal: the Soviet Union 
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and three members of Nasser‘s unaligned bloc, India, Indonesia, and Ceylon.  The 
proposal passed despite their opposition.   
This did not, however, mean that the situation had been resolved, far from it.  
The proposal was non-binding; Nasser did not have to accept it.  To overcome this 
hurdle Secretary Dulles arranged for a group of representatives, led by Australian Prime 
Minister Robert Menzies, to travel to Cairo to ―explain the purposes and objectives‖ of 
the compromise to Nasser.
363
   
The mission did not go well.  Menzies was hardly an impartial arbiter.  After 
explaining the proposal to Nasser he ominously intimating that ―it would be a mistake 
for you to exclude the possibility of force from your reckoning.‖364  After being 
threatened, Nasser refused to accept the conference‘s solution, calling it ―collective 
colonialism in a regulated form.‖365 
 The conference a failure, the British wasted no time resuming military planning.  
They informed Washington that they intended to retake the canal militarily.
366
  The 
administration, however, continued to oppose the use of force.  Instead Secretary Dulles 
proposed convening a second conference which would establish a User‘s Association.  
The eighteen nations who had voted with the United States in the first convention would 
attend a second conference, also in London, and establish an international body to collect 
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tolls.  The international body would also employ pilots to guide ships through the canal.  
The pilots would be stationed on vessels at each end of the waterway.   
With this proposal the administration was again stalling for time.  Few believed a 
User‘s Association would solve the crisis.  Instead, as Eisenhower stated, they hoped 
that it would allow ―the United States ―to ―just keep the lid on a little longer,‖ and allow 
―some kind of compromise plan‖ to ―be worked out.‖367   
The British continued to have a different understanding, however.  As Harold 
MacMillian explained the ―user‘s organization is a step toward the ultimate use of 
force.‖368  The conference‘s chances of success plummeted further after Nasser refused 
to participate.   
 Given the Western nations‘ differing understandings of the conference and its 
objectives and Nasser‘s refusal to attend, it should come as no surprise that the second 
conference, like the first, failed to resolve the crisis.  The participants, comically, had a 
difficult time even settling upon a name for the User‘s Association.  Secretary Dulles 
proposed calling it the Cooperative Association of Suez Canal Users or CASU.  The 
Secretary hoped the name would prove auspicious.  It sounded similar to casu belli, 
Latin for the cause of war now far removed.  The Dutch delegate, however, objected.  
―It,‖ he complained, is ―an easy and not so funny joke.‖  He instead proposed CASCU.  
The Portuguese delegate, however, objected to this, noting that in Portuguese CASCU 
―is something which really is not mentioned,‖ a testicle.  French President Pineau raised 
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a similar concern.  In French CASCU roughly translated to ―ass breaker.‖ 369  Eventually 
the delegates settled upon the Suez Canal User‘s Association or SCUA.   
SCUA went into operation in October, but as one historian has concluded, it was 
―impotent‖ from the start.370  The participating parties failed to establish how it would 
collect tolls or how or to whom ships using the canal should pay them to. 
 With the second peaceful attempt to resolve the crisis a failure, Washington‘s 
European allies again resumed military planning.  This time the French spearheaded the 
effort and they brought in a new partner: Israel.  Paris had begun selling jet aircraft to the 
Jewish state several months earlier.  In mid-September future Israeli President and Prime 
Minister, and then member of the Israeli Defense Ministry, Simon Perez arrived in Paris 
to arrange for further purchases.  While there the French presented him with a 
proposition: Israel join the French and the British in their effort to retake the canal.  
Intrigued, discussions continued at Sevres outside of Paris.  On October 22
nd
 British 
representatives arrived.  All sides soon agreed upon a plan.  The Israelis would launch an 
attack against Egypt in the Sinai and the French and British would use this attack as 
pretext to intervene and ―protect‖ the canal. 
 As its European allies conspired the Eisenhower administration worried.  U-2 
flights uncovered large troop movements, an Israeli call up.  They also detected an 
                                                 
369
Transcript of Suez Canal Users‘ Association, John Foster Dulles Papers, MC016, Duplicate 
Correspondence, Stuart Campbell to Suez Canal Users‘ Association – 1956, box 110, folder ―Re: 
September 17-22, 1956 Suez Canal Second Conference – London,‖ John Foster Dulles Papers Princeton 
University (Hereafter JFD). 
370
 Hahn, The U.S., 221. 
141 
 
Israeli air force alert.
371
  This activity concerned the administration, but policymakers 
failed to connect the dots.  Instead they came to the conclusion that the Israelis were 
mobilizing for an attack on Jordan.
372
 
Other U-2 flights revealed British convoys bound for Malta and Cyprus.  This 
was worrying, as the CIA‘s Richard Bissel sarcastically noted at the time, these ships 
were not ―gathering in the Mediterranean for a regatta.‖373  Other equally disturbing 
reports arrived.  The French, the CIA discovered, had sold several Mystere fighter 
aircraft to Israel and the British were amassing bombers and troop transports on 
Cyprus.
374
  The Secretary of State began to fret that the British and the French were 
―deliberately keeping us in the dark.‖375  Despite this he did not panic.  He believed that 
he still had time to devise another peaceful solution to the crisis.  He was ―confident that 
the British and the French would not resort to any of these measures before‖ the 
upcoming Presidential election.  The Secretary did not believe America‘s allies would 
blindside the administration before an American Presidential election.
376
  He was 
mistaken. 
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On October 30
th
 Israeli forces invaded the Sinai.  Soon after the French and 
British issued an ultimatum to both sides—all belligerents must withdraw at least ten 
miles from the canal and allow British and French forces to enter and secure it.  They 
had twelve hours to comply.   If they did not, British and French would invade.  The 
ultimatum shocked Washington.  Dulles called it ―as crude & brutal‖ as anything he had 
ever seen.
377
  The President was particularly upset.  When asked if the administration 
should begin making arrangements to provide its European allies with oil from the 
Western hemisphere he barked that the Europeans ―should be left to work out their own 
oil problems—to boil their own oil.‖378 
 Eisenhower and the rest of the administration were upset for several reasons.  
First and foremost the administration continued to believe that using force was a 
mistake. The invasion, Dulles believed, would cause the United States to be ―forever tied 
to British and French colonialist policies.‖  And it would prompt ―all of these newly 
independent countries‖ to ―turn from us to the USSR.‖379  Administration officials were 
also infuriated that their allies had deceived them.  Most of all they were incensed by the 
timing.  The British and French action occurred just as American voters headed to the 
polls to vote for President.  The timing of the ultimatum also robbed the administration 
of, what it believed, was a golden opportunity.  As British and French forces prepared to 
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invade Egypt Soviet tanks rolled through the streets of Budapest brutally suppressing a 
nationalist rebellion.  Eisenhower had wanted to exploit this opportunity.  The U.S. 
government managed to obtain film of ―Soviet tanks killing Hungarians in the streets of 
Budapest‖ and the United States Information Agency (USIA) planned to disseminate 
these pictures throughout the world, particularly in the Middle East.
380
  President 
Eisenhower believed that the film would conclusively demonstrate to the Arab world 
―what can be in store for it once it falls under the domination of the Soviets.‖381  The 
actions of his allies, however, deprived the President of the moral high necessary to do 
this.
382
 
 For all these reasons the administration took the unprecedented step of opposing 
its cold war allies.  On October 30
th
 the White House introduced a United Nations 
Resolution calling for a cease fire.  The British and French managed to frustrate this 
effort.  They used their veto power in the Security Council to block the resolution.  The 
administration countered by introducing the proposal to the General Assembly, where 
the French and the British had no such veto power.  The administration also offered to 
provide Egypt with fifteen million dollars in IMF aid if it agreed to enter into 
negotiations with the French, British, and Israelis.  It also supported a Canadian proposal 
to create and deploy a United Nations Peacekeeping Force (UNEF) to the region.
383
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The administration did not relish having to take these actions.  Administration 
officials did not want to, seemingly, reward Nasser, but as President Eisenhower stated, 
the United Stated needed to ―redeem our word about supporting any victim of 
aggression.‖  If the United States did not come to the aid of Egypt, a clear victim of 
aggression, ―Russia is likely to enter the situation in the Middle East.‖384 
 These administration efforts, however, failed to prevent a European invasion.  
When Egypt, predictably, rejected the British and French ultimatum more than 200 
British and French ships descended upon the Egyptian coastline.  U.S. naval forces in the 
area were at a loss as to what to do.  U.S. Fleet Commander Vice Admiral Charles R. 
Brown contacted the Commander of Naval Operations, Arleigh Burke, and asked ―who‘s 
the enemy?‖  Admiral Burke opaquely replied ―Don‘t take any guff from anyone.‖  The 
truth was, Burke later admitted, ―I didn‘t know who the damn enemy was.‖385 
 The invasion commenced as 13,500 British paratroopers descended upon Port 
Said and 8,500 French soldiers landed at Port Faud.  Surprised, the Egyptians scrambled 
to respond.  They scuttled several ships loaded with cement, beer bottles, and iron at 
narrow points in the canal to deprive the invaders of their prize: a usable canal.
386
  The 
Egyptians also accepted the UN ceasefire, as did the Israelis.  This placed the European 
allies in a difficult position.  With a ceasefire in place, their forces no longer had a 
reason to be there.  There was nothing left to ―protect.‖  In the end the Europeans‘ desire 
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to retake the canal outweighed their need for a plausible cover story.  The operation 
continued. 
 The situation grew tenser as the Soviet Union inserted itself into the situation.  
Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev offered to send Soviet ―volunteers‖ to Egypt to 
protect the canal and in a letter to the leaders of France and Great Britain Soviet Prime 
Minister Nicolai Bulganin threatened to ―rain‖ nuclear missiles down on Paris and 
London. 
 Washington‘s worst fears seemed to be coming true.  Their allies‘ actions had 
given the Soviet Union an opportunity to interject itself and its forces into the region.  
This explains how the administration reacted to what happened next. 
 There was a run on the pound.  Britain and France‘s actions had alarmed 
investors worldwide, especially in the currency markets.    British gold reserves 
plummeted by 50 million dollars in the first two days of November.
387
  Soon they 
threatened to settle below the 2,000 million pound mark.  If this occurred the British 
government would no longer be able to maintain the pound at the preferred 2.78 
exchange rate, nor could it meet its upcoming debt service payment of nearly 180 
million pounds on the Anglo-American Financial Aid Agreement of 1945.
388
 
 A desperate London soon turned to its ally in Washington.  The administration, 
however, had little sympathy.  Not only did it turn a deaf ear to British pleas, it also 
blocked their efforts to withdraw funds from the International Monetary Fund.  The 
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Eisenhower administration, however, did offer to provide London with a 1.5 billion 
dollars loan.  But only if it accepted a ceasefire.  The administration was using economic 
blackmail against its ally.
389
 
 With little choice, but complete economic collapse, Britain acquiesced to 
Washington‘s demands.  On November 6th London accepted a United Nations ceasefire, 
but only on its terms.  It would withdraw its forces, but only after the United Nations 
deployed a peacekeeping force to protect and administer the canal and only after the 
canal had been cleared of all blockages.   
This solved one problem, but, seemingly, created another.  The withdrawal of 
British, French, and Israeli forces, the administration believed, left a ―vacuum‖ in the 
region.
390
  A vacuum which, they feared, the Soviets would fill.  Khrushchev‘s offer to 
provide Egypt with 250,000 Soviet ―volunteers‖ haunted administration officials.  The 
offer, Secretary Herbert Hoover feared, was part of a Soviet plan ―to put themselves in 
the position of liberators.‖391  To guard against this possibility the administration focused 
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its attention on efforts to deploy United Nations peacekeepers as soon as possible.
392
  
The peacekeepers finally began arriving on November 15
th
. 
With the crisis over and UN peacekeepers in place the administration could 
finally return its attention to Nasser.  The Suez crisis had interrupted Operation 
OMEGA, but it had not fundamentally changed the administration‘s thinking.  As before 
the crisis, the administration wished to ―utilize all appropriate opportunities‖ to ―reduce 
Nasser‘s prestige and influence.‖  The Secretary of State even rued from his hospital bed 
that ―the British having gone in should not have stopped until they had toppled 
Nasser.‖393 
  But such drastic action, the administration came to believe, might no longer be 
necessary.  In the aftermath of the crisis it appeared as if Nasser would have no choice 
but to do as the United States wished.  American officials believed that their evenhanded 
approach to the combined British, French, and Israeli invasion had earned it goodwill in 
Cairo and throughout the Arab world.  Moreover, they believed that the Soviet Union‘s 
brutal crushing of the Hungarian uprising had ―served throughout most of the world to 
convict the Soviet of brutal imperialism.‖394   
  Nasser‘s actions in the immediate aftermath of the crisis seemed to support this 
reading of the situation.  The Egyptian leader sought a reapproachment with the U.S.  He 
                                                 
392
 Memorandum by the Director of the Executive Secretariat, November 7, 1956 , FRUS ,1955-57, vol. 
16, 1047-8 ; Memorandum of a Conversation, November 7, 1956, ibid., 1069-70 ; Discussion at the 303rd 
Meeting of the National Security Council, August 9, 1956, Ann Whitman File, NSC Series, Box 8, folder 
―303rd,‖ DDEL ; Memorandum of Conversation Between the President and the Secretary of State, 
November 12, 1956, FRUS ,1955-57, vol. 16, 1112-4. 
393
 Memorandum form the Acting Secretary of State to the President, November 21, 1956, FRUS, 1955-
57, vol. 12, 350 ; Memorandum of Conversation Between the President and the Secretary of State, 
November 12, 1956, FRUS ,1955-57, vol. 16, 1114. 
394
 Bipartisan Legislative Meeting, November 9, 1956, Ann Whitman File, Dwight David Eisenhower 
Diary Series, Box 20, folder ―November 1956 Miscellaneous (3),‖ DDEL. 
148 
 
went so far as to apologize through back channels.  He informed the administration that 
he ―realizes that he must make a choice‖ between the USSR and U.S. and that he ―has 
chosen the course of full cooperation with the United States.‖395 
Sources of friction, however, soon reappeared.   Radio Cairo continued to blast 
Iraq.  Nasser, the administration believed, also stepped up subversion activities in Libya 
and Lebanon.
396
  He also negotiated to buy additional arms from the Soviet bloc.  In 
addition he impeded U.S. efforts to reopen the canal and deploy UN peacekeepers.  He 
had valid reasons for doing so.  The UN initially wished to use British and French ships, 
which were part of the invasion armada, to clear the canal.  For obvious reasons the 
Egyptian leader found this objectionable.   The UN peacekeeping force, meanwhile, was 
to have initially included Canadian forces.  Canada was still a member of the British 
Commonwealth and Nasser stated that he would not allow the peacekeepers into the 
country if they contained Canadian forces.
397
    All these actions caused the Secretary to 
grumble that Nasser ―was still playing both sides against the middle.‖  Soon the Director 
of the Policy Planning Staff and Director of the CIA Allen Dulles advocated that the 
administration should turn ―all possible heat‖ on the Egyptian leader.398 
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The question was how to apply the ―heat?‖  The Suez crisis had interrupted the 
carefully orchestrated choreography of OMEGA.  Reimplementing it seemed 
impossible.  Instead the administration began formulating new strategies to undermine 
Nasser.   
They developed three new approaches.  Under the first the United States would 
officially join the Baghdad Pact.   With the second the administration would ―submerge‖ 
the Baghdad Pact into a larger defense grouping.  This new and expanded security pact 
would link Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, Britain, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Libya, Sudan, 
Ethiopia, Yemen, and Jordan together to, as the Policy Planning Staff elucidated, 
―circumscribe Nasser‘s power and influence.‖399  The United States itself would not join 
the new pact.  But it would ―consult with them‖ in the event of ―any threat by 
international Communism against the independence or territorial integrity of the 
participating states.‖  The United States would also provide pact members with 
―substantially increased‖ economic and military assistance.400   
It is important to note that the authors of this strategy recommended that the 
administration invite Egypt to participate in the new pact.  This did not mean, however, 
that its target was not Nasser.  Administration officials did not believe that Nasser would 
participate in the pact.  In a Machiavellian stroke, they believed, that his rejection would 
―serve to isolate‖ Egypt ―from the rest of the area and to emphasize‖ its ―close ties with 
the Soviet bloc.‖ And ―in the unlikely event‖ that Egypt ―accepted the invitation,‖ they 
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consoled the White House, ―this in itself would constitute a rebuff for the USSR.‖  As 
far as planners at the State Department were concerned the second option was a can‘t 
lose proposition.
 401
 
The third and final option proposed adopting a bilateral approach.  Instead of 
creating a formal multilateral defense organization the administration would conclude 
agreements with individual states in the area.  As Eisenhower later stated it would 
provide these states with economic and military assistance of up to 400 million dollars to 
help them maintain their ―national independence.‖ 402  The U.S. would also provide 
participating nations with a security guarantee.  As the President later vowed he would 
use the military to ―secure and protect the territorial integrity and political independence 
of‖ participating states ―against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by 
International Communism.‖403   
The third strategy‘s official goal was to protect the region from Soviet influence, 
but its true target was Nasser and his influence.   The phrase ―controlled by International 
Communism‖ was purposefully chosen to allow the United States to intervene if Nasser, 
the ―tool of the Russians,‖ or Syria (another state the administration believed was 
controlled by the USSR) attacked any nations in the region.  As a National Security 
Council document stated one of the strategy‘s main goals was to ―counterbalance 
Egypt‘s preponderant position.‖404 
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Settling on one of these strategies proved difficult.  The first option had powerful 
advocates within the administration.  The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral 
Radford, the Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson, and the American ambassadors in 
the Baghdad Pact countries all supported it, as did the British government.
405
   
While it had powerful proponents, it also had powerful opponents.  Secretary 
Dulles in particular worried that it could be ―interpreted as being anti some of the anti-
communist Arab countries, notably Saudi Arabia.‖406  Dulles did not want to alienate 
Saudi Arabia, an important American ally, and opponent of the pact.
407
   
Administration officials opposed it for other reasons as well.  U.S. membership 
in the pact would require Senate ratification.  Obtaining this threatened to raise 
difficulties for the administration.   Eisenhower and Dulles feared that the pro-Israel 
wing of the Senate would demand that the administration either include Israel in the 
alliance or provide the Jewish state with a security guarantee.  The White House wanted 
to avoid either eventuality.  Israeli involvement would kill the pact.  No Arab state 
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would voluntarily remain in a defense pact with Israel.408  Providing the Jewish state with 
a security guarantee would have much the same affect.  The administration also worried 
that the pact had come to be ―regarded by the non-member states of the area as in large 
part UK-dominated.‖409  If the U.S. joined such an organization, the President predicted, 
it would lose its ―influence with the Arabs,‖ particularly with King Saud in Saudi 
Arabia.
410
 
Many of the same concerns also beset the second option.  Administration 
officials worried that it would also alienate Saudi Arabia.  King Saud, the 
Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs fretted, along with ―other Muslims,‖ might 
―well regard the proposal as a projection of American power politics.‖411  Opponents 
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also worried that this option, like the first, might precipitate congressional calls for a 
U.S. security guarantee for the Jewish state.  This, once again, would be 
counterproductive to administration interests in the area.
412
  Administration officials also 
had one final concern.  Secretary Dulles ―did not have much faith in the ability of the 
Arabs to unite for any constructive purpose.‖  They, he believed, ―were only unified‖ in 
―their hatred of Israel and, temporarily, their opposition to France and the UK.‖413  He 
could not see them unifying into such a large and productive pact. 
For all these reasons the administration ultimately settled on the third and final 
option, what came to be known as the Eisenhower Doctrine.  Before the administration 
could implement its new policy, however, it needed to obtain Congressional approval.  
This proved more difficult than expected.  Congressional Democrats were in no mood to 
cooperate.  Their defeat in the 1956 Presidential election had left wounds that still had 
not healed.   The doctrine reopened these wounds.  Many Democrats believed that 
President Eisenhower‘s handling of the Suez Crisis had cost them the election. Senator 
Hubert Humphrey charged that the President had made ―every attempt‖ to keep 
Congress ―deceived about the critical situation there.‖  Consequently when news of the 
crisis broke Democrats were blindsided and a stunned electorate rallied around the flag 
and the sitting President.
 414
  Adlai Stevenson expressed a similar sentiment.  The 
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Democratic candidate in that election, scorned that voters had displayed a ―sudden rush 
of support for the author of their anxiety.‖415  
Now, Humphrey believed, once the ―peace slogans‖ had begun ―to die out a bit,‖ 
the President had presented Congress ―with an ‗urgent‘ proposal—to address what the 
administration had suddenly decided was a grave crisis in the region.‖416  This seemed 
like proof to Humphrey that Eisenhower had know that the Middle East situation was 
grave all along and that he withheld this information from Congress in order to reap 
electoral victory. 
Despite this rancor the house quickly approved the President‘s new policy in 
January of 1957.  Eisenhower and the doctrine proved too popular with voters to oppose.  
According to a poll in the Wall Street Journal the American people supported the 
Eisenhower Doctrine by a three to one ratio.
417
 
Obtaining passage in the Senate proved more challenging.  The Senate eventually 
passed the bill in March of 1957, but only after heated debate and the addition of several 
amendments.  The most important of these amendments was the Mansfield amendment.  
The text the White House originally submitted to Congress authorized the President to 
―employ the Armed Forces of the United States‖ against ―overt armed aggression from 
any nation controlled by International Communism.‖  Senator Mike Mansfeld from 
Montana, however, worried that this language suggested that the President needed 
congressional approval to employ military force.  Mansfield also worried that by only 
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authorizing the President to use armed force in the Middle East the U.S. was sending the 
message that the President did not have the authority to use military force elsewhere.  
Mansfeld‘s amendment changed the bill to address these two issues.  The doctrine now 
stated that ―the United States is prepared to use armed forces‖ to protect the region from 
International Communism.  The amendment also made one other, seemingly, superficial 
change.  It changed the first line to read that ―the United States regards as vital to the 
national interest and world peace the preservation of the independence and integrity of 
the nations of the Middle East.‖418  This seemingly innocuous line would later justify 
U.S. involvement in Lebanon. 
The Eisenhower Doctrine was now official U.S. policy.  But it was meaningless 
unless the administration convinced Middle Eastern states to participate in it.  To assure 
their participation President Eisenhower dispatched former Senator James P. Richards, 
who Newsweek dubbed ―the traveling salesman‖ of the doctrine, to the region.419   
Richards‘ mission produced mixed results.  Syria publically denounced the new 
policy.  It took offense to a passage which proclaimed that a ―vacuum‖ existed in the 
region, but did not officially reject it.  Other nations, including Israel and Morocco, 
expressed interest in the doctrine, but failed to unconditionally endorse it.  Richards did, 
however, manage to convince Lebanon, Libya, Ethiopia, Tunisia, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, 
and Turkey to unconditionally accept the doctrine.  But only after plying them with 
American aid.  In exchange for their support Lebanon received 10 million dollars in 
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economic aid and another 2.2 million in military equipment, Libya received 4.5 million 
in aid, Iran received 13 million in military aid and 6 million in aid for railroad and 
telecommunication projects, Iraq received more than 14 million in military aid and 
roughly 2.5 million in aid for police, telecommunications, and railroad projects.
420
   
Finally there was Saudi Arabia.  The Saudi government‘s stance on the doctrine 
remained more cryptic.  Before unveiling the doctrine King Saud had indicated that he 
had ―high hope‖ for the proposal.421  But later, under pressure from other Arab states, he 
signed a memorandum highly critical of the doctrine while attending conference in 
Cairo.  While Saud privately assured the administration that he supported the plan, the 
best he could offer in public was as opaque reassurance that he believed that the doctrine 
was a ―good one which is entitled to reconsideration and appreciation.‖422 
Nevertheless the administration had garnered enough support to proceed.  It now 
had a new strategy to contain and undermine the combined Soviet, Nasserist, Arab 
Nationalist onslaught.  It would protect and defend those states who openly aligned with 
the United States in the cold war. All of these states, however, were not created equal in 
the administration‘s eyes.  Saudi Arabia reigned first among equals.  The administration 
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believed, as the Secretary of State stated, that ―Saud is the only figure in the area‖ who 
could ―serve as a counterweight to Nasser.‖423 If the administration could, the President 
predicted, ―build him up as an individual to capture the imagination of the Arab World, 
Nasser would not last long,‖424  To understand why they believed this we must now turn 
to religion and American beliefs about it in the 1950s. 
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CHAPTER VI 
BELIEF IN BELIEF: AMERICAN VIEWS OF RELIGION AT MID-CENTURY 
 
It was late January 1952 on the campus of the University of Oregon.  In many 
ways it was quite an ordinary day in Eugene.  The crush of students returning from 
winter break had passed.  Textbooks had been purchased, dorm rooms filled, and the 
spring semester was still alive with promise.   
In other ways, however, this winter day was extraordinary.  The university was 
celebrating its seventy-fifth year of existence.  Commemoration of this took many forms, 
including the convening of a weeklong Parliament of World Religions.  Present at the 
Parliament were representatives of the Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, Buddhist, Hindu, 
Muslim, and Eastern Orthodox faiths.   
Religious weeks such as this had occurred before in Eugene, but never quite like 
this.  Students cut classes to attend.  They inundated the proceedings.  Some meetings 
drew nearly a thousand undergraduates.  Sessions, in some instances, ambled on for two 
to three hours and could, by all accounts, have lasted longer.   
 These proceedings had a unique quality to them.  This quality was perhaps best 
expressed by Bashir Ahmad Minto, president of the Moslem Society of the U.S.A., at the 
conference‘s closing remarks.  ―Whether He is Allah, Jehovah, or God,‖ Bashir 
exhorted, ―He is the same God.  To reach Him the paths are different, but they are all the 
paths of truth for those who believe in them.‖425 
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Religion boomed in the 1950s.  In 1953, 55% of Americans belonged to a 
specific church, 
 that number climbed to 62% in 1956, and by decade‘s close 69%.  
Denominations also registered impressive growth rates.
 426
  The Methodist Church 
recorded its largest gain in decades, membership in the Southern Presbyterian Church 
increased by nearly a third, the United Presbyterian Church recorded a 23% rise in 
membership, and the Seven Day Adventists expanded by 33% during these years.
427
  
These increases in membership doubled the nation‘s population growth. 428  
The distribution of scripture also increased exponentially.  In a four year period 
scripture sales rose by 140%, while bible sales reached an all time high.
429
  The new 
Revised Standard edition of the bible alone sold over 26 million copies in its first year in 
print.
430
   
Polls revealed a similar ubiquity of belief.  One poll disclosed that 90% of 
Americans prayed, 86% believed that the bible was the divinely inspired word of God, 
75% believed in life after death, 87% were ―absolutely certain of God‘ existence,‖ and 
80% believed in the divinity of Christ.
431
  Another poll revealed that an astonishing 99% 
of Americans believed in God.
432
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 Religious construction also boomed.  In 1946 religious organizations spent a 
mere 68 million dollars on new buildings.  By 1950 that sum had skyrocketed to 336 
million and the figure continued to rise throughout the decade.
433
  The Catholic Church 
alone built 125 new hospitals, 1,000 schools, and 3,000 parishes.
434
  All told, churches 
and temples spent between 700 and 800 million dollars a year on construction during the 
1950s, a sum nearly as large as the entire British budget before the First World War.
435
  
The church pipe organ industry even enjoyed its greatest success in over a hundred 
years.  Production more than doubled.
436
 
Across the country colleges held religious emphasis weeks and college 
administrators added religiously themed courses to their catalogs.  The University of 
Oregon introduced a course entitled ―The Psychology of Religion.‖ The University of 
Texas added a course on ―The Life and Teachings of Jesus.‖437   
In several local communities thousands called daily into ―dial-a-prayer‖ services 
to receive spiritual guidance.
438
  The Ideal Toy Company even marked a doll with 
flexible knees, so that it could be made to ―kneel in a praying position.‖439   
Religious symbols and themes inundated popular culture.  On the radio listeners 
turned up the volume to ―I Believe,‖ ―It is No Secret What God Can Do,‖ ―The Man 
Upstairs,‖ ―Counting Your Blessings,‖ ―Open Your Heart,‖ ―Vaya Con Dios,‖ and ―Big 
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Fellow in the Sky.‖440  In darkened movie theaters Americans sat entranced by biblically 
themed blockbusters like The Robe, The Ten Commandments, and Quo Vadis.  
Moviegoers also flocked to religiously themed films such as A Man Called Peter, The 
Next Voice You Hear, and Red Planet Mars.   
At home millions tuned in each week to watch Bishop Fulton Sheen and his 
program Life is Worth Living.   Sheen‘s program became the most popular television 
show during its run, regularly beating out Milton Berle‘s immensely popular Texaco 
Comedy Hour in its timeslot.
441
   
In print Norman Vincent Peale‘s religiously themed self-help book The Power of 
Positive Thinking dominated the bestsellers‘ list for 112 weeks.  In 1954 alone it sold 
more copies than any other book, except, of course, the bible.  Eventually it went on to 
sell nearly 10 million copies.
442
  Peale‘s success was not exceptional.  A Popular History 
of the Catholic Church sold over a 100,000 copies.
443
  A book publishers‘ audit revealed 
that four out of the five best-selling non-fiction titles in the 1950s were religious 
books.
444
  Religious themes also surfaced in the decade‘s novels.  There was Fulton 
Ourler‘s The Greatest Story Ever Told, Henry Morton Robinson‘s The Cardinal, and 
Thomas Costain‘s The Chalice.445 
It was also during these years that a young evangelist named Billy Graham first 
captivated audiences.  Tens of thousands flocked to attend his revivals, not just in the 
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deep south, but in places like California and New York City.  Over 1.5 million people 
attended his series of ―Crusades‖ at Madison Square Garden.  Nearly a 100,000 packed 
Yankee Stadium to hear him preach.
446
  During these years Graham also hosted a weekly 
television show and wrote a column, which appeared in 152 newspapers.
447
  Faith healer 
Oral Roberts achieved similar success.  His services were broadcast on over a hundred 
television stations and over four hundred radio stations in the fifties.
448
 
 Religion also crept into public life.  In President Dwight D. Eisenhower‘s 
inauguration parade the lead float was entitled ―God‘s Float.‖  It contained a churchlike 
building bejeweled with pictures of American churches.   Script reading ―In God We 
Trust‖ and ―Freedom of Worship‖ surrounded the pictures.  Dozens of states banned 
atheists and agnostics from serving as notary republics.  Other states made it illegal for 
agnostics to adopt children.
449
  The Supreme Court ruled it constitutional for local school 
districts to provide students with ―released time‖ for private religious instruction during 
school hours.
450
  Congress, meanwhile, passed legislation which added ―under God‖ to 
the pledge of allegiance and which emblazoned ―In God We Trust‖ on all of the nation‘s 
currency.
451
  A Senator even—unsuccessfully—attempted to amend the constitution to 
read that America ―devoutly recognizes the authority and law of Jesus Christ Savior and 
Ruler of Nations, through whom are bestowed the blessing of Almighty God.‖452    
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Historians, and other commentators, have offered numerous explanations for this 
burst of religiosity.  Church construction, many argue, boomed due to pent up demand.  
Churches, like all other individuals and institutions faced lean times during the Great 
Depression.  They also endured rationing during the Second World War.  After the war 
ended, the argument goes, this pent up demand spilled forth.
453
  According to others, the 
atomization of suburban existence encouraged churchgoing.  New suburbanites recently 
separated from their extended families felt isolated in the fifties and many joined a 
church to find a ―sense of belonging‖ and to establish an ―identity in a secular, troubled, 
impersonal, and increasingly homogenized world.‖454  Americans, others argue, equated 
―faith with individual success and prosperity‖ during these years.  The 50s were a time 
of great prosperity and many Americans came to assume ―that national well-being was a 
sign of divine approval.‖455   Sociologist William Herberg argued that religion exploded 
in the 1950s because it allowed assimilating ethnic groups to retain an aspect of their 
ancestors‘ culture.  Americanization, Herberg posited, forced second and third 
generation Southern and Eastern European immigrants to turn their backs on their 
ancestors‘ language, culture, and way of life.  America‘s long history of religious 
freedom, however, guaranteed that no such sacrifice would be required when it came to 
their religion.  Maintaining, or in many cases, reconnecting, with the religion of their 
ancestors, Herberg asserted, provided these immigrants with a method of maintaining a 
sense of connection to their pasts and to their families.
456
  Americans also turned to 
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religion, some have argued, in order to secure a sense of national unity.  As one historian 
has noted ―the need for national unity and harmony during World War II became 
obvious; religious forces supplied much of this.‖457  This need for unity only intensified 
―from 1945 to 1952,‖ as ―the Cold War developed,‖ and produced ―a need for common 
symbols and energies.‖458  The fact that America‘s cold war foe, the Soviet Union, 
preached a Godless atheistic ideology, others have elucidated, only increased faith‘s 
attractiveness as a unifying force during these years.
459
 
 Anyone who studies religion understands that it is complex.  Religion serves 
many anthropological, sociological, psychological, spiritual, and exegetic purposes.  
This wideness of purpose explains religion‘s constancy and also its vitality within the 
human experience.  Consequently, it is not difficult to accept that all of these factors 
contributed to America‘s re-embrace of religion in the 1950s.   
Another factor, however, contributed to Americans‘ return to religion in the 
1950s and the particular form it took.  Americans in the fifties viewed religion as good, 
good for the individual, for society, and for the world.  They did not believe that the 
particulars of a person‘s beliefs mattered, as long as they believed.  Americans in the 
1950s, to paraphrase Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, believed in belief. 
 While belief in belief defined how Americans viewed and understood religion in 
the 1950s, the roots of this understanding trace further back into the American past.  For 
much of the nation‘s history many considered America to be a covenanted nation.  
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According to this understanding, the nation, and the people in it, entered into a compact 
with God.  God bestowed his blessing upon America, making it his chosen nation.  With 
this blessing, however, came an obligation, the obligation to remain faithful and to 
spread his message.  Beginning in the 1930s, however, many came to fear that the nation 
was failing to honor this obligation.  At home, and abroad, secularism seemed to prevail.  
At home church attendance ebbed, evolution and scientific thought spread, and 
materialistic concerns abounded.  Abroad, secularism, in the guise of totalitarian 
nationalism, reigned supreme.  The enormity of this combined secular threat, many 
Americans came to believe, demanded drastic action.  The religious needed to join 
together to form a common front.  The religious needed to unite. 
 
* * * 
  
The idea of America as a covenanted nation predates the formation of the nation 
itself.  Many American believers in the covenant theology were initially English 
believers.  Many Britons had long considered their nation to be covenanted nation.   As 
one historian has written, they held that ―England had inherited the role of God‘s elect 
champions‖ after the Jews, God‘s original chosen people, had killed his only begotten 
son, Jesus. 
460
 
When these covenant believing Englishmen and women settled American shores 
they brought this belief with them.  As early as 1630 John Winthrop, the governor of the 
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Massachusetts Bay Colony, proclaimed that the colony‘s Puritan settlers had entered into 
a compact with God to serve as a ―city upon a hill‖ for the rest of the world to emulate.  
According to one historian, these settlers understood ―the continent‖ as ―the Promised 
Land‖ and the American colonies as ―Israel.‖  They, like the Israelites, had escaped from 
bondage by crossing ―a forbidding sea‖ to live ―a wilderness life, until, by God‘s grace 
and their own faithfulness, the wilderness became a new Canaan.‖461      
 This understanding of America as a covenanted nation persisted well into the 
twentieth century  and, indeed, into the twenty-first.  The 1950s were no exception.  
Billy Graham proclaimed that Americans were ―God‘s people.‖462  Then former 
President Harry S Truman pronounced that ―I have a feeling that God has created us and 
brought us to our present position of power and strength.‖463  As God‘s people, however, 
Americans bore a divine duty.  In exchange for God‘s blessing and favor, they needed to 
remain faithful and spread God‘s word.  As General Lucius D. Clay wrote in the popular 
series This I Believe (which collected Americans‘ conceptions of faith) God ―had been 
good to us as a people‖ and the only way ―we can return thanks for the position of 
leadership which we now hold in the world‖ is by exercising ―this leadership to obtain 
freedom and peace‖ for the rest of the world.464   
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Why did these Americans believe that the nation was a covenanted nation?  
Because it was, they believed, a Christian nation.  ―Protestants came to America,‖ 
declared the authors of the popular book Protestant Panorama, and ―made America after 
the likeness of their‖ own religious ideal.465  ―Some call our civilization a Christian 
civilization,‖ wrote the President of the New York City Council, ―others call it a 
democracy.  When it succeeds,‖ he concluded, ―it is a little bit of both.‖466  
Christian ideals, many believed, provided the very basis for democracy.  ―If I 
were a dictator,‖ proclaimed the editor of United Nations World, ―the first book I would 
burn would be the Bible.  I‘d burn it because I‘d realize that the whole concept of 
democracy came out of that book.‖467 President Eisenhower‘s special assistant for 
Economic Affairs, Dr. Gabriel Hauge echoed this sentiment.  ―The structure of a 
democracy like ours is, of course, political, but its foundation is moral.‖468   
These Americans believed that Christianity provided the foundation not only for 
democracy, but for the entire notion of freedom.  As Francis McMahon reasoned, 
Christianity preached ―the inherent dignity of the individual person, the essential 
equality of all men, the emphasis upon love and friendship‖ and ―the idea of freedom‖ 
from ―spiritual oppression.‖  All of these Christian principles, McMahon argued, 
constituted ―the truth that made men free.‖469 
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The founding fathers, these Americans believed, recognized this and wrote these 
beliefs into the nation‘s founding documents.  As the authors of Protestant Panorama 
wrote ―the Declaration of Independence is not only one of the world‘s great political 
documents,‖ it is also ―a religious Magna carta—written and signed by men to whom 
religion was all-important as the basis of lasting freedom.  Its glowing principles were 
written ‗with a firm reliance upon the protection of divine Providence.‘‖470  Bishop 
Fulton Sheen agreed.  ―According to our Constitution and the Declaration of 
Independence … God‖ is ―the ultimate source of‖ our nation‘s ―political power.‖471  
As a Christian nation, as God‘s chosen nation, America, and its people, many 
believed, possessed a divine mission in the world.  America, McMahon proclaimed, was 
―stamped‖ with a ―providential mission in the family of nations.‖472   The United States, 
Bishop Sheen lectured, had a ―Providential destiny.‖473  Americans, Sheen continued, 
―are destined, under Providence, to be the secondary cause for the restoration of the 
freedom and liberties of the peoples of the world,‖ the primary cause, of course, was 
God.  The Lord, sermonized the Reverend Peter Marshall, ―made and preserved our 
nation‖ so that ―this Republic‖ might ―save the rest of the world, by giving back to them 
the new life that was forged from the anvil of sacrifice and daring adventure in this 
country.‖474  
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 As the twentieth century progressed, however, many Americans came to fear that 
the country was failing to honor its divine responsibilities.  Americans, Bishop Sheen 
chastised, were fleeing from the ―responsibility on which freedom rests.‖475   ―These 
days,‖ criticized Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglass, ―I see America drifting 
from the Christian faith, acting abroad as an arrogant, selfish, greedy nation,‖ no longer 
interested  ― in people and their hopes and aspirations.‖476  
 Why did Sheen and others feel this way?  The American people, these observers 
believed, were no longer sufficiently religious.  They were not honoring the covenant by 
remaining faithful to God.  While the 1950s was a decade of great religion, ―it is also a 
day,‖ mourned James B, Moore, ―of considerable religious complacency.‖477  People 
may have been attending church, but, as sociologist Peter Berger cautioned, ―the person 
listening to the minister in church is a radically different one from the person who makes 
the economic decisions the next day.‖  ―In this second life,‖ he continued, ―the church is 
totally absent.‖478  The title character in the anti-communist 1952 film My Son John 
warns a group of college graduates that many have ―substituted faith in man for faith in 
God.‖479   ―It‖ has ―become customary,‖ lamented Frederick Lewis Allen ―among larger 
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and larger numbers of Americans to sleep late on Sunday mornings and the grapple 
with‖ the ―Sunday paper.‖480 
What was causing Americans to become religiously complacent?   Secular 
materialism.  ―In our times,‖ admonished psychologist Arthur Link, ―the people and 
their leaders‖ are ―breaking the Ten Commandments themselves, all in the name of a 
more abundant life.‖481  ―These days,‖ fretted William O. Douglass, ―I see American 
identified more and more with material things‖ and ―less and less with spiritual 
standards.‖482  Americans, chastised historian Arnold Toynbee, are worshipping 
―Mammon‖ the ―god of industrial prosperity and worldly success.‖483  ―Christians 
today,‖ sermonized Bishop Henry Knox Sherill, ―are beset by powerful forces of 
materialism.‖484  Even in the churches, one observer lamented, the ―blight of secularism‖ 
prevails.
485
 
 Materialistic secularism at home, these Americans believed, was preventing the 
nation from carrying out its divine mission abroad.    America‘s ―unfulfilled moral 
duties,‖ chastised Bishop Sheen, made it ―responsible‖ for the ―slavery‖ of the 
                                                 
480
 Frederick Lewis Allen, ―The Spirit of Our Times,‖ Harpers Magazine, July 1956, 69. See also: Arnold 
J. Toynbee, ―Man Owes His Freedom to God,‖ Colliers, March 30, 1956, 78 ; Catherine Marshall, Man 
Called Peter, 288. 
481
 Henry C. Link, Return to Religion (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1936), 173. 
482
 Murrow, This I Believe, volume 1, 44. 
483Arnold J. Toynbee, ―Man Owes His Freedom to God,‖ Colliers, March 30, 1956, 81. 
484
George B. Leonard, Jr., ―What Change Christian Unity? Look, July 21, 1959, 19. 
485
 ―Why Are We Here?‖ Life, March 30, 1959, 26.  See also: Murrow, This I Believe, volume 1, xviii, 
Peter Marshall, The Prayers, 152-3 ; Murrow, This I Believe, volume 1, 44 ; Catherine Marshall, A Man 
Called, 303 ; Murrow, This I Believe, volume 1, 43 ; Peter Marshall, The Prayers, 44-45, Murrow, This I 
Believe, volume 1, 44.  Instead of relying on religion, many noted, people were relying on secular science 
for answers to life‘s questions.  See: Peter Marshall, The Prayers of Peter Marshall (Carmel, NY: 
Guidepost, 1954),  64 ; Bishop Fulton J. Sheen, ―The Temptations,‖ Colliers, January 8, 1954, 21 ; 
Frederick Lewis Allen, ―The Spirit of the Times,‖ Colliers, March 30, 1956, 67 ; Morrison, Can 
Protestantism, 33, 36-7, 39, 41 ; Tom Dooley, Edge of Tomorrow, 104-5, Murrow, This I Believe, volume 
2, 47. 
171 
 
―countries behind the Iron Curtain and the Bamboo Curtain.‖486  ―Materialistic poverty,‖ 
concluded one American in This I Believe, was preventing the United States from 
defeating ―the jet plane ‗rising in the world‘ of totalitarian enslavement.‖487   
To these citizens secular materialism and the ―‗rising in the world‘ of totalitarian 
enslavement‖ were linked.   Totalitarian powers, they held, were materialistic powers.  
―The leaders of Germany, Japan and Italy,‖ asserted Bishop Sheen, had ―gambled all on 
the supremacy of the material.‖488  Totalitarianism, McMahon proclaimed, is the 
―idolatry of the state or the group.‖   It ―attained explosive force among the peoples of 
the Axis powers.‖489 Soviet totalitarianism too, many believed, was the offspring of 
secular materialism.  ―Soviet thinking,‖ McMahon asserted, ―proceeds from a 
materialistic premise.‖490  
 Totalitarian regimes, many Americans and particularly many Catholics, believed 
represented God‘s judgment and punishment for America‘s moral failings.  ―Whenever a 
civilization begins to die, morally or spiritually,‖ harangued Bishop Sheen, ―vultures 
appear, and they are‖ a ―judgment on corruption.  Such is the mission of Communism in 
the world.‖  It brings ―judgment on‖ countries, like America, who ―have lost faith in 
God and morals.‖   ―Communism, ― he continued, ―came out of our Western civilization; 
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it was produced out of what was putrid, foul, and rotten in the atheism and materialism 
of the nineteenth century.‖491  ―In the sight of all that blood‖ of WWI and WWII, 
counseled another American, ―shall we not ask ourselves‖ if ―God even intended us to 
live in a world of constant hemorrhage?   It is,‖ he continued,‖ because we invoke not 
the blood of Christ that we shed one another‘s blood.‖492   
All, however, was not lost.  Americans could still redeem themselves and honor 
the covenant.  But, instead of merely washing their hands ―Pilate-like of guilt,‖ advised 
Bishop Sheen, they must ―make up for‖ their lapsed faith with ―some kind of penance 
and atonement and repartition.‖ 493  Americans needed to regain their faith.  ‖If 
America‘s leadership is to deserve the confidence of the world,‖ lectured the Federal 
Council of Churches, America ―must be characterized by a righteous and dynamic 
faith.‖494 
Regaining faith, however, many feared, might not be enough.  Secular 
materialism at home and secular totalitarianism aboard constituted imposing threats.  
Specific denominations standing alone could not defeat these threats on their own.  To 
meet the enormity of this challenge the religious, many believed, needed to clasp hands 
and form a united front.  The question which vexed these efforts, however, was how 
broad should this front be?  
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Some Americans believed that the faithful needed to forge the broadest front 
possible, all the world‘s religious needed to unite.  The enormity of the threats demanded 
it. What made this possible was these Americans‘ belief that all religions were 
essentially the same.   They shared the same moral basis.  As Ward Wheelcock 
pronounced in This I Believe, ―I talked with Mohammedans, Buddhists, Hindus, 
Shintoists, Jews and Christians and with people of many other religions‖ and ―all that 
was said in these talks emphasized that the basic, underlying moral and spiritual 
teachings of all religions are virtually the same.‖495  ―I am convinced that any religion in 
which man is good,‖ sermonized another man, is ―a good religion.‖496  Historian Arnold 
Toynbee rationalized that the ―Israelite-Christian-Moslem‖ religions along with the ―the 
Buddhist-Hindu half of Mankind‖ all recognize the ―Ultimate Reality,‖ that ―man owes 
his freedom to God; he is free because God has made him so.‖497  In recognizing this 
―ultimate reality,‖ these Americans held, all were fit to battle secularism at home and 
abroad. 
Others were not as sure.  Religious conservatives, within Judaism, Catholicism, 
but, especially within Protestantism, denounced such catholic efforts.
498
  To them, not all 
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faiths were equal.   They believed, as Charles Morrison wrote in Can Protestantism Win 
America?, that ―Christianity is the only religion which has the dynamic of universality, 
the spiritual resources, the adaptability, and the inherent sense of moral responsibility for 
the character of civilization which world community requires.‖499   For this reason many 
opposed uniting with Hinduism, Buddhism, and Islam, but also with some fellow 
Christians.   Some conservative Protestants attacked liberal Protestant denominations, 
especially liberal Protestants in the Ecumenical movement.     
The ecumenical movement has a long history in American Christianity.  As early 
as 1800 Christian denominations pooled their efforts to accomplish certain specific 
tasks.  They worked together to conduct missionary efforts (both at home and abroad), to 
distribute scripture, to organize and operate Sunday schools, and to cooperate on 
numerous other tasks.
500
  These efforts gained strength as the nineteenth century 
progressed.  Disparate denominations united to battle slavery, alcohol use, and to 
achieve world peace.  During the Progressive era Christian reformers united behind 
organizations such as Josiah Strong‘s Christian Endeavor Society, which preached the 
Social Gospel and strove for Progressive goals.  Christian laymen also united to form the 
Young Men‘s Christian Association (YMCA) and the Young Women‘s Christian 
Association (YWCA).  
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The Ecumenical movement, however, only assumed its mature form at the turn 
of the century when the Federal Council of Churches (FCC) formed.
501
  The FCC 
initially united 9 denominations.  At the height of its power it encompassed 29 
denominations and boasted a membership of over 33 million.
502
  The FCC began as an 
effort to pool Christian resources on specific issues, such as, evangelizing, conducting 
missionary work, providing higher education, promoting temperance and family life, and 
ameliorating labor conditions.
503
  Overtime, however, the FCC became more than that.  
Largely as the result of its administration of the military‘s chaplain program and its role 
assigning radio time for Protestant programs during World War I, it became ―the‖ voice 
of American Protestantism.
504
 
This engendered resentment, especially among conservative Protestants.  The 
emergence of evolutionary thought, historical theology, and comparative religions had 
long since driven a fissure within American Protestantism.  On one side stood liberal 
Protestants who accepted many of the new revelations and on the other stood 
conservative Protestants who resisted.
505
  This schism engendered bitter resentment on 
both sides, but particularly on the ―loosing‖ conservative side.  The creation of the FCC, 
which was dominated by liberal Protestants, fanned these sectarian flames.
506
  
Conservative Protestants did not believe that liberal Protestants and the FCC spoke for 
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them.  They also resented FCC actions, such as cavorting with the ―suspect‖ Eastern 
Orthodox Christians, their tendency to support liberal political causes, and their 
fraternization with pacifists during the world wars.
507
   
For these reasons many conservative Protestants opposed uniting with liberals in 
the Ecumenical movement.  Throughout these years conservative Protestants attacked 
the FCC, waging what one conservative Protestant called ―the battle of the century.‖  
Conservatives accused the FCC of being a ―sort of neo-Catholic Church.‖508  Others, like 
Carl McIntire of the conservative American Council of Churches, accused it of being 
rife with communists.
509
  John T. Flynn similarly accused the FCC of ―standing for State 
Socialism and tending toward Communism.‖510   A 1940 book asked How Red is the 
Federal Council of Churches?
511
  Others, such as the Interstate Evangelical Association 
(IEA) denounced the Federal Council of Churches for theological reasons.  The IEA 
condemned the FCC for its distribution of sex education material.  They accused the 
council of spreading ―indecent literature designed under false colors to poison the minds 
of our youth.‖  According to the IEA, this material was ―so filthy as to pass belief‖ and a 
―shame to all decent people.‖512  
Conservative Protestants, and others, also hesitated in aligning with Catholics.  
These Protestants expressed concern over the Catholic ―doctrine of [papal] 
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infallibility.‖513  They also derided Catholics for their ―cultic worship of Mary.‖514  
Many also attacked Catholics for their, alleged, suppression of free will.  Catholics, 
charged one American, preferred ―censorship to free discussion.‖515  The Papacy, 
charged Charles Morrison, was a ―perfected dictatorship.‖516  In these Protestants‘ eyes 
the Catholic Church had negated the free will God had given man when it established a 
religious hierarchy.  Instead of thinking and acting for themselves, many American 
Protestants believed, Catholics blindly obeyed the Pope and the church hierarchy.
517
  Of 
particular concern to these Protestants was the belief that this repression applied not just 
to ethereal matters, but to temporal matters as well.  As one Protestant warned ―we must 
remember‖ that ―the principle of the Pope‘s authority over earthly rulers has never been 
renounced by Rome.‖518  As the same author cautioned his readers.  The Pope had 
recently issued a proclamation preventing Sicilians from voting for a specific political 
party.
519
  Many came to fear that Catholics would extend this to the United States.  Paul 
Blanshard warned in his 1948 polemic American Freedom and Catholic Power, that a 
―world wide strategy‖ was ―directed from Rome‖ to impose the Pope‘s autocratic rule on 
America.
520
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This was only part of a larger and deeper current of anti-Catholicism which 
coursed through some quarters of American Protestantism in the 1950s.  In 1952, over 
40% of Americans worried that Catholics wielded too much power in society.
521
  In 
1949 the Episcopalian Church adopted a resolution barring members of its flock from 
marrying Catholics.
522
  Distrust of Catholicism can also be seen in 1950s magazine 
articles such as ―Should a Catholic Be President?‖523   
 While some conservative Protestants opposed uniting with fellow Christians, 
even they called for a forging united front against the onslaught ―of atheism, humanism, 
communism … statist … secularism, sectarianism, pharisaism and liberalism.‖524  
Conservatives, like Carl McIntire, formed groups like the International Council of 
Christian Churches.  As McIntire disclosed, he formed the group because he and many 
―Conservative Christians felt increasingly that without some such effort they could not 
effectively confront the Federal Council‘s liberal orientation‖ or ―the insidious dangers 
of modernism‖ and Roman Catholicism.525  The only difference between these 
conservative ecumenical efforts and those of liberals was that conservatives proposed 
uniting with only the theologically ―pure,‖ with fellow conservative Protestants.  
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While some Americans advocated forming a united front of all faiths and others 
proposed forming a front solely of the theologically pure, most Americans supported 
something in-between.  Most Americans advocated creating a united Judeo-Christian 
front.  ―Protestantism, Catholicity, and Judaism,‖ urged MacMahon, must unite to face 
their ―common foe in secularism.‖526   ―The church and the synagogue alike,‖ counseled 
Joshua Liebman, can ―help men everywhere to resist the economic and political slavery 
threatening to engulf human dignity and freedom.‖527   The Federal Council of 
Churches‘ Commission on a Just and Durable Peace decreed that it would ―co-ordinate 
its efforts with … other moral forces in the world, notably … Roman Catholics and 
Jews.‖528   
This call for a Judeo-Christian front built off of the existence of the Judeo-
Christian ethic.  According to the ethic, Protestants, Catholics, and Jews shared a 
common spiritual heritage.  As McMahon explained ―the Judeo-Christian religion has 
given form and shape to our lives.  It‖ designated a ―particular moral and intellectual 
climate.‖529  According to proponents of the ethic, Christians and Jews shared a similar 
belief system and this belief system provided the foundation for the American state.  As 
sociologist Peter Berger wrote at the time, ―American society possesses a cultural 
religion that is vaguely derived from the Judeo-Christian tradition and that contains the 
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values generally held by most Americans.‖530   As the author of a piece in Look 
magazine decreed, Americans ―have a common Judeo-Christian core of belief.‖531  
The widespread acceptance of the Judeo-Christian ethic can be seen in the 
magazine articles of the day.  During the 1950s Harpers ran a series in which 
Protestants, Catholics, and Jews explained their beliefs.  In the series the three faiths 
were portrayed on equal footing.
 532
   Look magazine ran a similar series, ―The Story of 
Religions in America.‖   It contained pieces on numerous Protestant denominations, 
along with pieces on Judaism and Catholicism.
533
  The editors of Look also published an 
article entitled ―Catholic, Protestant, Jews: the Conflicts that Divide Us‖ during these 
years.
534
  Movies like 1947‘s Crossfire and Gentlemen’s Agreement also promoted the 
ethic by railing against anti-Semitism and also, to a lesser extent, anti-Catholicism.
535
  
Even the popular children‘s show Howdy Doody endorsed the ethic.  Every episode 
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concluded with the character Buffalo Bill urging children to ―worship at the church or 
synagogue of your choice.‖536 
In the 1950s, many, if not most, Americans in the 1950s believed that the 
religious needed to unite.  One of these Americans was the Secretary of State John 
Foster Dulles.   Dulles espoused a modified version of the Judeo-Christian ethic while in 
office.  His path to arriving at this understanding, however, was a long and winding one.   
The future Secretary of State hailed from a family with deep religious roots.  
Missionaries and ministers dot his family tree.  His grandfather, John Welsh Dulles, 
braved a 132 day open-boat journey to Madras, to spread the Gospel.  He later died and 
was buried on Ceylon while evangelizing.
537
  Dulles‘ sister also heard the calling.  She 
became a missionary in Lebanon.  Dulles‘ father, Allen Macy Dulles, served as a 
minister in the Presbyterian Church.   He also possessed a doctorate in divinity and in his 
later years held the Chair of Apologetics at Auburn Theological Seminary. 
 As a preacher‘s son Foster, as everyone referred to the future Secretary of State, 
matured in a home steeped in religion.  Each morning began the same.  He rose, sang a 
hymn, and read a verse of scripture.  The morning ritual concluded as he and the family 
congregated and knelt as the reverend led them in prayer.
538
   
Dulles‘ Sunday‘s were particularly religious.  Each holy day he attended Sunday 
school and also his father‘s three sermons.  During these sermons he took notes.  When 
he returned home his father quizzed him on the sermons‘ content.    His father also 
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required him to memorize ten verses from Psalms or the New Testament and two verses 
of a hymn every Sunday and recite them.
539
  On his own accord, the young Dulles once 
memorized the entire gospel of St. John.
540
 
On Mondays the future Secretary of State attended the young people‘s service.  
On Wednesdays he participated in a weekly prayer meeting, and on Friday nights he 
partook in communion.
541
   
 While the future Secretary of State‘s early life was steeped in religion, it was also 
steeped in more earthly matters.  His mother was the daughter of an American 
ambassador.  She spent much of her youth abroad.  Her high society ―debut‖ occurred in 
St. Petersburg.  Her father, John W. Foster, served as President Grant‘s Minister, first to 
Mexico, and later to Russia and Spain.  He later became William Henry Harrison‘s 
Secretary of State.
542
  Dulles‘ uncle, Robert Lansing, also served as a Secretary of State 
for Woodrow Wilson. 
Dulles‘ life vacillated between these two poles of religion and statecraft.  Early 
on it appeared as if the more worldly side had triumphed.  The young Dulles attended 
Princeton in 1904.  Three years later, while still enrolled in school, his grandfather 
secured him a position on the Chinese delegation to the Second Hague Conference.  
After graduating, he departed for France, where he studied under philosopher Henri 
Bergson at the Sorbonne.  Dulles‘ secular path continued when he returned from his 
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studies.  He informed his parents that he would not follow in his father‘s footsteps and 
become a man of the cloth.  Instead he would go into law, where, he confided to his 
mother, he believed he ―could make a greater contribution as a Christian lawyer and a 
Christian laymen than‖ as a ―Christian minister.‖543  Soon thereafter he moved to 
Washington D.C. to attend George Washington Law School. While there he lived with 
maternal grandparents.  His neighbors during this time included the Mexican and 
Chinese ambassadors and the future Secretary of State regularly attended parties thrown 
by Washington‘s elite.  He rubbed soldiers with Senators, ambassadors, and was 
reportedly particularly friendly with the children of President William Howard Taft.    
After completing his studies at George Washington University, Dulles went to 
work for the prestigious law firm of Sullivan and Cromwell in New York City.  His 
grandfather had—once again— used his connections to secure him this sinecure.  The 
future Secretary of State did well for himself.  By 1914 he had become full partner and 
by 1926 he was the managing partner and the highest paid lawyer on Wall Street.
544
   
In addition to submerging himself in jurisprudence, Dulles continued to involve 
himself in foreign affairs.  During World War I he served as Special Council in Regard 
to Central American Affairs.  He also participated on the War Trade Board and held a 
position in the State Department‘s Russian Bureau.  When the war concluded he served 
as both a spokesman and a draftsman on the Reparations Committee at the Versailles 
conference.   
                                                 
543
 Ronald Pruessen, John Foster Dulles: the Road to Power (New York: Free Press, 1982), 10. 
544
 Richard Immerman, John Foster Dulles: Piety, Pragmatism, and Power in U.S. Foreign Policy 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), 10-12 
184 
 
During these early secularly minded years the young Dulles seemed to have lost 
his faith.  His close associate Thomas Dewey recalled that he spent these ―years as an 
atheist.‖545  More conclusively, he confided to his father at the time that he did not know 
―how much religion‖ he ―had left.‖546 
This estrangement from the spiritual, however, did not last long.  The 
destructiveness of World War I disturbed Dulles.  Throughout the course of the next 
several decades he devoted his time and energy to securing a permanent peace for the 
world.  These efforts would eventually lead him back to religion. 
Dulles‘ early thinking, however, was highly influenced by the thoughts of his 
mentor Henri Bergeson.  Bergson stressed the importance of ―dynamic‖ forces.  They, 
according to Bergson, always overcame ―static‖ forces.  Dulles used these ideas to 
interpret international relations.  Dulles theorized that the overriding force in history was 
change.  Change was inevitable.  It, he lectured, ―is the law of life.‖547   
The key to ending international conflict, Dulles believed, was to devise a 
mechanism to allow for ―peaceful change‖ in the international system.548  Contriving 
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such a solution, however, bedeviled Dulles.
549
  In his search for a solution he attended 
two conferences in 1937.  The first, held in Paris, was sponsored by the League of 
Nations.  The second, held at Oxford, was organized by the Universal Christian Council 
for Work and Life.  The stated goal of both was the same:  to secure international peace.  
The spirit and the results of these conferences, however, Dulles found, could not have 
been more different. 
The Paris conference to study ―peaceful change‖ was ―wholly barren.‖  ―Extreme 
nationalism,‖ Dulles deplored, permeated the proceedings.  The attendees were 
―obsessed with the belief in their own national virtues and in the vices of others.‖  
Consequently ―it was impossible to secure any open-minded discussion of the great 
problem of how, in a world which is living and therefore changing, change could 
peacefully be effected.‖  At Oxford, however, Dulles found a ―Christian atmosphere.‖  
This, he recollected, made it ―possible to discuss frankly and see the way to solve 
problems which the Paris conference had not even admitted to exist.‖550 
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Oxford was an eye-opening experience for Dulles.  Afterwards he came to 
appreciate the utilitarian value of religion.  The religious owed their allegiance to a 
power higher than the state.  Consequently, religion broke down national barriers.  
Religion, Dulles came to believe, could play a crucial role in securing peaceful change 
and a lasting peace. 
For this reason the future Secretary of State became deeply enmeshed in church 
affairs in the years which followed.  In 1939 he served as a delegate for the International 
Conference of Lay Experts and Ecumenical Leaders at the World Council of Churches‘ 
conference held in Geneva.  The following year he accepted an offer to chair the Federal 
Council of Churches‘ Council on a Just and Durable Peace. 
The Council on a Just and Durable Peace provided Dulles with a forum to 
develop his ideas on ―peaceful change.‖  During his tenure as council chair he developed 
several potential solutions to the problem, including creating a federal world 
organization modeled on the U.S. government.
551
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Religion or morality during these years was merely a means to an end for Dulles.  
It provided a method to secure world peace and stability.  As he stated after attending the 
conference at Oxford ―that conference led me to conclude that there was no solution to 
the great international problems which perplex the world‖ other than ―by bringing to 
bear … the force of Christianity.‖552  There is no evidence to suggest that the future 
Secretary of State believed in religion during these years.  Rather he believed in 
religion‘s usefulness, its utilitarian value.  This, however, slowly, began to change. 
 By 1937 Dulles had, he proclaimed, regained a ―generalized faith.‖553  His faith 
only deepened over the coming years and decades as he hurled himself into church 
affairs.  He continued his work on behalf of the Federal Council of Churches.  He also 
served as a Trustee of the Brick Presbyterian Church and Union Seminary.  He worked 
with the National Council of Christians and Jews and served on multiple lay committees.  
During these years he also delivered between four and five dozen speeches annually on 
religion and international affairs.
554
 
 As Dulles‘ faith deepened, he, like many Americans, conflated religion with 
national identity and mission.  Initially Dulles was more catholic in his thought then 
most.  He believed that God‘s divine blessing extended to all of Christianity, to Western 
civilization, to Christendom, not just to the United States.   ―The western democracies 
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are,‖ Dulles declared, ―so-called Christian democracies.‖555  They had ―politically 
translated‖ the Christian ―belief in the spiritual nature of man‖ into their founding 
documents, into ―the Magna Carta, the French Declaration of the Rights of Man, and our 
own Declaration of Independence.‖556  As a result the Western Christian democracies, 
Dulles believed, ―became the instruments‖ of ―moral law.‖  They became ―God‘s chosen 
instruments.‖557  As God‘s chosen instruments ―French, the British and the American 
nations,‖ transformed ―the face of the Western World‖ and inspired ―the birth of 
democratic processes.‖   Faith, Dulles concluded, had made the West a ―dynamic‖ force 
in the world.
558
 
 This, however, Dulles decried, was no longer the case.  The West had exhausted 
its ―spiritual springs‖ after the First World War.   It ―no longer‖ seemed to ―be the 
expression of a great faith.‖  It ―had nothing to give,‖ it had ―no fire to impart.‖559  The 
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Western people, Dulles concluded, were a ―burnt-out peoples‖ who had lost their 
spiritual dynamism.
560
 
The cause of the West‘s moral collapse, the future Secretary of State believed 
was secular materialism.  The West, Dulles lamented, had begun to exhibit a ―growing 
dependence on material things‖ and was focused more on secular issues, such as 
―security.‖ 561   ―We have waxed greater in material power and material possessions,‖ 
Dulles bemoaned, but  ―have lost many of the qualities which in the past made us truly 
great.‖562 
While the future Secretary of State initially possessed a more international 
understanding of the traditional American covenant ideology, as the years passed, he 
came to adopt the more parochial American understanding.   As the cold war set in 
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Dulles came to believe that America, not all of Christendom, served as ―God‘s chosen 
instrument.‖   
The future Secretary of State, like many, believed that the nation was founded as 
―a Christian nation.‖563  America, he asserted, ―was founded‖ in the ―belief that all men 
had their origin and destiny in God.‖564  ―Our institutions,‖ he pronounced, ―were 
primarily molded by the Christian belief of our founders.  They believed that there was 
such a thing as moral law‖ and ―they believed there was a Creator who endowed men 
with unalienable rights.‖565   
The founding fathers, Dulles believed, had infused their Christian faith into the 
new government they created.  With ―the Bill of Rights‖ the founders put ―into our 
supreme law the concept … that all men are endowed by their Creator with certain 
unalienable Rights.‘‖566 
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As a Christian nation,  Dulles believed, America had a duty.  ―A great burden,‖ 
he cautioned, ―rest[s] upon us. ‗For unto whomever much is given, of him shall be much 
required.‘‖567   It has ―been reserved to the American people,‖ Dulles eulogized on 
another occasion, ―to show the possibilities of a free society‖ not ―merely for ourselves 
but for the benefit of mankind.‖568  Americans must, he chastised, spread the world of 
God.  As he wrote on another occasion, Jesus ―told the disciples to go out into all the 
world and to preach the gospel to all the nations.  Any nation which bases its institutions 
on Christen principles,‖ he reminded, ―cannot but‖ do the same.569   
But Americans, the Secretary of State came to believe, were not ―doing the 
same.‖   God‘s chosen people, he mourned, had ―fallen far short of that which was 
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required.‖570  Americans, he grieved, no longer possessed ―the faith of our fathers.‖  
They had become ―disconnected from‖ their ―religious faith‖ and ―lost‖ their ―sense of 
mission in the world.‖571  They were losing their ―spiritual power.‖ 572   
Instead of relying upon the spiritual, Americans, Dulles chortled, were relying on 
the secular, the material.  The ―national mood,‖ he railed, had become ―materialistic.‖573  
God, the Secretary propounded, ―was challenging America with ―the test of material 
prosperity.‖  He was tempting ―our society‖ with ―material fruits.‖ 574   
America was not only failing God‘s test at home, Dulles feared, but also abroad.  
Overseas, he lectured, a ―grave peril came.  It came from foreign leaders and parties who 
held irreligious beliefs.  They rejected the Christian concept of the nature of man and 
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they deified race or class.  The danger first took a fascist form.  Now the danger is 
greatest in its communist form.‖575   God, Dulles held, was testing his people with 
secular materialism at home and secular totalitarianism overseas. 
But America, the Secretary of State believed, could still prove its worthiness.  It 
could still pass God‘s test, honor the covenant, and defeat secularism.  ―Soviet 
Communism,‖ he asserted, could ―be peacefully thwarted in its grand strategy for world 
conquest if our free nation is a dynamic moral force in the world.‖576  ―The Communist 
political structure,‖ he urged on another occasion, ―is over-extended, over-rigid and ill-
founded.  It can be shaken by a moral offensive.‖577  
The question which confounded Dulles, and one which he never seemed to 
satisfactorily resolve even in his own mind, was who should take part in this moral 
offensive?  On the one hand, the Secretary seemed convinced that all faiths should 
participate.  The world, he proclaimed, needed ―a united effort by all Americans of every 
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faith‖ 578  All faiths could take part in the moral offensive because they were all based on 
the same moral law.  ―There is,‖ he wrote, a ―general, world-wide agreement about 
‗right‘ and ‗wrong‘ in their broad outlines.‖579  ―Experience in the United Nations,‖ he 
wrote, had shown ―that there is considerable agreement about what is right.  That is 
particularly true between those who are influenced by one or another of the great 
religions.  All the great religions reflect to some degree the moral or natural law, and that 
makes it possible to find many common denominator of right and wrong.‖580   
On the other hand, however, the Secretary of State occasionally professed a 
belief in Christian exceptionalism.  As Dulles stated, while ―the moral principles that 
need to be put to work are implicit in all the great religions,‖ Christians were especially 
qualified because they ―believe that moral truth was uniquely revealed by Jesus-
Christ.‖581  This made Christians, especially Protestant Christians, Dulles believed, 
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―especially qualified to form moral judgments.‖582 Christians were also preeminently 
qualified because they recognized that ―it is only individuals who have souls to be 
saved.‖  This, the Secretary believed, translated to foreign policy, where ―Christians 
tend[ed] to prefer the free society‖ and more vehemently opposed totalitarianism.583   
 President Dwight D. Eisenhower shared many of his Secretary of State‘s beliefs 
about America, religion, and the need for united front.  He, however, harbored none of 
his Secretary of State‘s doubts about other religions.  The President‘s certainty seems to 
have sprung from his own personal religious history.   
Dwight D. Eisenhower grew up in a home in Abilene, Kansas that was, 
according to the President, ―a religious one.‖584   His parents were devout followers of a 
Mennonite sect known as the River Brethren.   ―The Bible,‖ the President later 
reminisced, was a ―daily and vital influence‖ in his parents‘ lives.585 
When the future President departed Abilene he appeared to have left religion 
behind.  Once in the Army he drifted from organized religion.  He failed to join a church 
and only sporadically attended non-denominational church services.
586
  Many historians 
and Eisenhower biographers have taken this to mean that religion and faith were not 
important factors in Eisenhower‘s life.  Nothing could be further from the case.  As 
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Eisenhower once remarked, ―I am one of the most deeply religious men I know.‖587  
 Throughout his years in the Army and in the White House Eisenhower held a 
deep, private, faith.  One fellow soldier recalled that as zero hour for the Allied invasion 
of Sicily approached the future President watched in anticipation on a hill high over 
Malta harbor and ―bowed his head in a short silent prayer‖ and remarked that ―there 
comes a time when you have done all that you can possibly do, when you have used 
your brains, your training, and your technical skill, when the die is cast, and events are in 
the hands of God—and there you have to leave them.‖588  
Once in office the President opened every cabinet meeting with a silent prayer.
589
  
He also had his private residence in Gettysburg, Pennsylvania blessed and once 
distributed copies of a sermon that particularly moved him, entitled ―The Mastery of 
Moods,‖ to over fifty government employees.590  The President‘s personal secretary, 
Ann Whitman, meanwhile, recorded that one day ―the President preached religion to me 
all the day long.‖  It began, she recalls, when she ―took in a copy of the Dartmouth 
Bible, which had been given to him.‖  The President asked her ―what difference there 
was between this and an ordinary Bible.‖  When she answered that she did not know, he 
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went on to assert ―that an atheist is a stupid person, he is one who won‘t think.‖  At this 
point the President‘s secretary, obviously overwhelmed, meekly interjected ―in a small 
voice‖ that she was not an atheist.  Regardless, the President continued, proclaiming that 
―our democracy was founded on religion on the thesis that all men are created equal.  He 
said ‗I know I am better than lots of men‘ but on what else do you base this democracy 
of equal rights‖ except on the belief that ―in sight of God they are equal.‖  ―Later in the 
afternoon he came back to the subject.‖  After Mrs. Whitman informed the President that 
she believed that ―religion was a crutch for many,‖ the President agreed, but stated, that 
even when you have everything in the world, ―the most expensive foods,‖ the ―one you 
love,‖ this still ―isn‘t enough.‖  At this point someone interrupted the conversation, but 
later in the day the President ―again came back to the subject.‖  He stated ―that he could 
except the theory that earth was created by fiery volcanoes, but,‖ he continued, ―we had 
always been taught scientifically that intense heat destroys life, the first protoplasm,‖ he 
concluded, ―must have come from somewhere.‖  The President continued, that ―he did 
not conceive of God as any being—that he abhorred the trappings of the church as much 
as anyone—but.‖  And at this point the letter abruptly ends.  The succeeding pages are 
sadly missing from the archive.
591
 
Regardless, these examples reveal that Eisenhower was a deeply religious man.  
What distinguished him from his contemporaries, however, was that he held no 
allegiance to any specific church or denomination.  As he remarked in a Presidential 
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press conference, I don‘t ―necessarily adhere to any particular sect or organization.‖592  
To Eisenhower, faith was a personal matter.  One did not need to attend a church to be 
religious.  One simply needed to believe. 
Eisenhower, like many religious Americans at mid-century, conflated faith with 
America and its form of government.  ―Free government,‖ he asserted, ―cannot be 
explained in any other terms than religious.‖593  ―Democracy,‖ he proclaimed on another 
occasion, ―is the political expression of a deeply felt religion‖594  ―I do not believe,‖ he 
once bluntly stated, that ―Democracy can exist without religion.‖595 
For Eisenhower, the foundation of freedom and democracy was spiritual.  
―Spiritual values,‖ he proclaimed, ―are the ultimate source of every freedom‖596   As the 
President questioned,  ―If we have not‖ the faith ―that man is more than an animal, that 
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he possesses a soul‖ then ―why should any of us admit that any other is born equal, with 
rights equal to himself?‖597 
It was only because Americans possessed spiritual beliefs, Eisenhower argued, 
that the founding fathers had enough ―faith in man‖ to turn him ―loose … on his 
own.‖598  Americans‘ faith, Eisenhower reasoned, assured the founding fathers that the 
citizenry understood that ―man was made in the image of God—was first of all a 
spiritual being‖599  Only because Americans had faith and recognized that they were 
created in God‘s image, Eisenhower believed, did the founders trust them with freedom.  
It assured that Americans would voluntarily sacrifice for the common good. 
So important was religion to the founding fathers and to their understanding of 
democracy, Eisenhower asserted, that ―our forefathers,‖ could conceive of no other ―way 
of explaining this new free government except by saying ―we hold that all me are 
endowed by their Creator with certain right.‘600  With their belief in ―unalienable rights,‖ 
Eisenhower stated, the founding fathers ―wrote their religious faith into our founding 
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documents.‖  They also ―stamped‖ it in the form of the phrase ―in God on the face of our 
coins and currency.‖601  
This spiritual foundation bestowed upon America, Eisenhower believed, ―a 
continuing purpose.‖  This purpose, Eisenhower continued, ―was clearly stated for us in 
our founding documents.‖  Lincoln,‖ he continued, ―defined it.‖  The United States was 
fated to bring hope to the world.
602
  America, as he stated on another occasion, was 
―blessed as no other people on Earth,‖ it was ―the hope of the world.‖603  ―The Power 
that had made and preserved us a nation,‖ he declared, had bestowed this mission upon 
the nation.
604
 
Unfortunately, Eisenhower waxed, while ―one hundred years ago, fifty years ago, 
America was the wonder of humanity and the symbol of man‘s hopes and goals 
everywhere,‖ it no longer represented ―the spiritual and material realization of the 
dreams.‖605  America, he fretted, had abandoned its ―basic concepts.‖606 
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At home, Eisenhower sermonized, America was ―tending too much to the 
material.‖607  We are ―too ready,‖ he decried, ―to adhere to and to place our trust in 
material values.‖608  ―We give far too much attention,‖ he cautioned, ―to material 
values.‖609 
Secularism also, Eisenhower believed, challenged America abroad.  Overseas, he 
admonished, we are ―confronted by a militant atheism and a brazen materialism.‖610  The 
enemy that America faced abroad, ―Godless communism,‖ was, cautioned Eisenhower, 
above all a ―moral enemy.‖611 
This moral enemy, however, Eisenhower believed, was weak.  As he confided to 
Jordan‘s King Hussein, the ―free world‖ has ―a common bond of dedication to spiritual 
values.‖  We ―value human dignity and freedom.‖  This is something that communists, 
the President judged, ―do not have.‖  This made them weak. To defeat communism, he 
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extorted, the free peoples of the world ―must present a common defense against 
communism.‖612 
 In order to do this, however, the administration would first have to battle 
secularism.  At home it needed to rally people back to religion.    Americans, he urged, 
must ―will forward under God.‖613  Because ―Faith is the mightiest force man has at his 
command.‖614 
 But regaining faith and defeating secularism at home, the President believed, 
would not be enough.  To defeat secularism abroad the religious in America also needed 
to unite with the religious worldwide.  The President was willing to do this because he, 
like many Americans, believed that all religions shared a common spiritual basis.  As he 
rationalized even the ―Mohemmedans, the Buddhists and the rest‖ of the world‘s 
religious ―strongly believed that they achieve a right to human dignity because of their 
relationship to the Supreme Being.‖615  For this reason they could be trusted to stand 
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united with American Protestants, Catholics, and Jews.  Eisenhower‘s goal was ―nothing 
short of inviting every single person, in every single country in the world, who believes 
in the power of a Supreme Being, to join in a mighty, simultaneous, intense act of 
faith.‖616 The President wanted to lead ―in a moral regeneration throughout the 
world.‖617 
The President himself would lead this regeneration.  As he confided to Billy 
Graham, ―one reason I was elected President was to lead America in a religious 
revival.‖618  He led by personal example.619  After his inauguration he joined a church, 
the Presbyterian Church in Washington.  He also underwent an adult baptism, the first 
President to do so while in office.
620
  He began his inaugural address by asking the 
crowd to bow their heads while he read a prayer he had written for the occasion.
621
  His 
inaugural speech itself was tinged with religious language.  ―We sense with all our 
faculties that forces of good and evil are amassed and armed and opposed as rarely 
before in history.‖  His fellow Americans must, he urged, ―give testimony‖ to the entire 
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world of ―our faith.‖622  His administration also included only the second minister in 
American history.
623
  In addition the President supported Congressional efforts to add 
the phrase ―under God‖ to the pledge of allegiance and to place the motto ―In God We 
Trust‖ on all federal currency.  He also supported the American Legion‘s ―Back to God‖ 
campaign and the release of a new stamp bearing the phrase ―In God We Trust.‖624  In 
1956 he decreed that all mail had to be canceled with a stamp that read ―Pray for 
Peace.‖625    The President also called for a National Day of Prayer and his State 
Department promoted the National Day of Prayer by mailing promotional materials to 
the national press, but also to 50 major religious press services and periodicals.
626
  He 
also lobbied for the construction of a non-denominational prayer room in the Capital.  
The room, when completed, stood as an altar to the common front.  It was purposefully 
non-denominational, all-embracing; it contained a ―large, plain oak altar, below a blue 
and white colored stain-glass window.  The window‖ had ―several motifs.  An open 
book symbolizing the Book of Law, a scroll which represents the Sermon on the Mount, 
and a candle.‖627 
Administration efforts to encourage religion were often done with a soft touch, 
by design.  The administration only made ―suggestions‖ to religious leaders.  They did 
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so because they wanted the ―influence of government‖ to be ―insignificant or unnoticed‖ 
so religious organizations would ―have the impression that activities are undertaken at 
their own initiative.‖628  Moreover, while Eisenhower wanted to encourage belief, he did 
not want to ―establish‖ a state religion.  As he related to his staff in a pre-inaugural 
meeting   ―I don‘t want to deliver a sermon.  It‘s not my place.‖ But, he continued ―I 
firmly believe that our Government‖ is ―deeply imbedded in religious faith.‖   The 
founding fathers included the phrase we are endowed by our Creator with certain 
inalienable rights for a reason.  And ―Unless you accept that sentence,‖ Eisenhower 
sermonized, ―our form of Government makes no sense‖629  Throughout his presidency 
Eisenhower walked this fine line at home between encouraging belief, but not 
establishing a state religion. 
 Abroad the President would be more blatant.  He unleashed a ―spiritual 
offensive.‖630  ―Our over-all objective‖ with this spiritual offensive, Operations 
Coordinating Board (OCB) wrote, was to use ―religion as a cold war instrument‖ for 
―the furtherance of world spiritual health.‖  The administration did so because it believed 
that ―the Communists could not exist in a spiritually healthy world‖631  As another OCB 
document elucidates ―belief in theism‖ is the ―basis for individual liberty of conscience 
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and consequent human rights.‖ 632  Religion, in short, the administration believed, was 
synonymous with freedom, liberty, and human rights.  This was a force, they believed, 
that communists could not resist.  As one United States Information Agency (USIA) 
documents stated the ―worlds‘ 1 thousand million religious‖ are ―so great a force‖ that it 
―could frighten the Kremlin into‖ peace.633  
The administration‘s ―spiritual offensive‖ took many forms.  The USIA tailored 
its propaganda to stress ―faith for freedom.‖634  The agency planned to devote between 
100,000,000 and 200,000,000 words to ―moral-spiritual values in American life.‖635  It 
also increased coverage of ―religious, moral and spiritual and moral events, and public 
statements.‖636  It distributed moral books and pamphlets.  On average it released six 
leaflets and one picture story on the topic every month.
637
  It also distributed 32 books on 
the moral basis of freedom.
638
   
The Operations Coordinating Board also utilized ―the religious factor,‖ 
especially in Southeast Asia.  It provided seed money to local Buddhist leaders to fund 
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the distribution of ―documentary and devotional materials.‖639   It provided Buddhist 
groups with ―anti-communist pamphlets and posters‖ and broadcast daily Buddhist 
prayers in Laos.
640
 
 Administration agencies also worked tirelessly to frame the cold war as a moral 
struggle.  USIA propaganda portrayed the cold war as a conflict between the religious 
and atheistic communists.
641
  In furtherance of this goal the USIA gave prominent 
coverage to the Soviet Union‘s anti-religion campaign.  It also distributed material which 
highlighted America‘s religiosity.  It distributed a ―Background and Action kit on 
Religion in the United States.‖642  It gave particular attention to ―interfaith cooperation‖ 
in the United States in order to demonstrate that Americans recognized the importance of 
faith, regardless of what religion that faith was in.
643
   In furtherance of this USIA film 
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crews attended the World Council of Churches meeting in Evanston, Illinois.   Agency 
propaganda gave the conference ―heavy and comprehensive coverage.‖644   
The government also labored to convince foreign peoples of Americans‘ 
religiousness and their religious tolerance with its person to person program.  
Government agencies brought foreign religious leaders to the United States to ―draw‖ 
them ―closer to America.‖  It also dispatched religious Americans to foreign counties to 
impress upon foreign peoples Americans‘ religious piousness.645  
The administration also reached out to foreign leaders to convince them to use 
morality as a weapon in the cold war.  In a letter to the Greek Queen, President 
Eisenhower proposed ―getting an organized effort to get out governments—all 
governments—to direct attention of the people‖ to ―spiritual values.‖646 
 A final component of the administration‘s moral or spiritual offensive was to 
support morally dynamic leaders throughout the world.  One such leader, as the next 
chapter will reveal, was King Saud of Saudi Arabia. 
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CHAPTER VII 
AMERICA‘S MIRACLE MAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST: KING SAUD AND THE 
ADMINISTRATION‘S EFFORTS TO CONTAIN NASSERISM AND COMMUNISM 
 
Saud bin Abdul Aziz bin Abdul Rahman bin Feisal al Saud, more commonly 
known as King Saud, ascended to the Saudi throne in November of 1953, after the death 
of his father, Emir Abd al-Aziz ibn Abd al-Rahman Al Feisal Al Saud, or ibn Saud.  Ibn 
Saud forged the modern Saudi state.  The Saudi dynasty, however, traces further back, to 
1744.  In that year Muhammad ibn Saud, Shaikh of two small villages near Dar‘iyya 
concluded an alliance with Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, founder of the Whahabbi 
branch of Islam.  This collaboration proved  most successful.   Fortified by religious 
passion and conviction the forces of Muhammad ibn Saud conquered the Najd, the 
central region of the Arabian peninsula.  Over the course of the next two generations 
Saudi influence extenuated further, as far north as Aleppo in modern day Syria and as far 
south as the ports of modern Yemen.  This first Saudi state, commonly referred to as the 
First Realm, collapsed under Ottoman pressure in 1819.  A Second Saudi Realm rose in 
1824 under the guidance of Muhammad ibn Saud‘s grandson.  By 1891, however, it too 
had succumb.  In this instance to dynastic strife and the forces of a regional rival, 
Muhammad ibn Rashid. 
Defeated, the Saud clan fled, first to the Rub al‘Khali, or the Empty Quarter, the 
barren deserts of southern Arabia, and later to the coastal sheikdom of Kuwait.  Ibn Saud 
spent his early years here, the reluctant guest of the Shaik of Kuwait.  This would not 
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last.  Ibn Saud had aspirations.  He dreamt of reclaiming his family‘s realm.  In 1902 an 
opportunity presented itself.  The Shaik of Kuwait had entered into battle with Rasheed.  
After failing to capture Kuwait City Rasheed led his forces north, to regroup and confer 
with his Ottoman allies.  Riyadh was left scarcely defended.   Ibn Saud struck.  He 
gathered sixty men and launched a—seemingly—futile raid.  To the surprise of many, it 
succeeded.  Ibn Saud founded the third and final Saudi state.  Over the course of 
succeeding years and decades ibn Saud expanded Saudi reach further.  Doing so brought 
him into conflict with the Ottoman Turks and also with rivals on the Arabian Peninsula.  
Initially he compromised with the militarily superior Ottomans.  He accepted their 
suzerainty and became a provincial governor.  He, however, continued to expand his 
realm whenever possible.  This accelerated after the First World War sounded the death 
knell for the Ottoman Empire.   In the years that followed ibn Saud battled and defeated 
both of his Arabian rivals.  In 1921 he vanquished Muhammad ibn Rashid, his rival in 
the north, and in 1924 he defeated Hussein ibn Ali, the Hashemite Asheriff of Mecca, his 
rival in the west, who controlled the Hejaz, home of the Muslim holy places of Mecca 
and Medina.  This left the Saudi state the predominant power on the Arabian peninsula 
and this was the position that his son inherited when he ascended to the throne.
647
 
Throughout much of its early years in existence the third Saudi state was of little 
consequence to the United States.  This changed in the late 1930s when oil was 
discovered.  On June 1, 1932 a crew from the Standard Oil Company of California, or 
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Socal, struck oil on the island of Bahrain, just off the Saudi coast.  Believing that oil 
could similarly be found across the sea in the Kingdom, Socal concluded an agreement 
with ibn Saud in May of 1933.  Prospecting soon commenced and in 1938 the number 7 
well at Damman paid out.  A close relationship between the American oil company, later 
renamed the Arabian American Oil Company or Aramco, and the Saudi state soon 
emerged. 
648
 
American business interests in the Saudi state attracted the attention of the 
American government.  But, it was not until World War II that the U.S. became truly 
interested in or involved in Saudi affairs.  Domestic American oil production steadily 
declined during these years.  While western hemisphere production could still fulfill 
American needs, it could not, officials fretted, supply America‘s allies in Europe.  Under 
these circumstances the discovery of vast Saudi oil reserves proved a godsend.  Saudi 
and other Middle Eastern sources, officials believed, could supply America‘s desirous 
European allies.
649
   
American policymakers in the years that followed labored to assure the continued 
flow of oil from Saudi Arabia to Western Europe.
650
  The U.S. government courted the 
King.  In January of 1943 the American government declared Saudi Arabia eligible for 
Lend Lease aid.  Shortly thereafter the first shipment of eighty trucks arrived.
651
  In 1945 
the U.S. military began constructing an air base at Dhahran.  And in February of that 
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year President Franklin D. Roosevelt met with ibn Saud.  The President sought the 
King‘s assistance in resolving the Palestinian problem.  This would prove a fool‘s 
errand, but the quixotic task did produce one of the strangest meetings in the history of 
American foreign relations.  President Roosevelt met with ibn Saud on his return voyage 
from the Yalta conference.  The President‘s ship steamed into the Suez Canal and laid 
anchor in the Great Bitter Lake.  Another warship, the USS Murphy, sailed to Jeddah to 
collect ibn Saud.  When the Murphy docked the captain found the King waiting—with 
an entourage of 48, several dhows laden with rice and vegetables, and 100 live sheep.  
Despite the protests of the captain, the King adamantly refused to leave without some of 
the sheep (He maintained that a pious Muslim could not consume meat killed more than 
24 hours previous).  Once aboard ibn Saud declined a cabin in the ship‘s quarters, 
instead, he, and his retinue, pitched tents on the deck.  Seven sheep were tethered to the 
destroyer‘s fantail and the King presented every sailor aboard with $40 and officers with 
gold daggers and swords.
652
 
When President Truman succeeded Roosevelt he continued his predecessor‘s 
policies.  Truman dispatched a military survey team to the Kingdom in September of 
1949.  He also provided Saudi Arabia with Point Four aid, and pledged that the ―United 
States is interested in the preservation of the territorial integrity of Saudi Arabia‖ and 
that ―no threat to your Kingdom could occur which would not be a matter in immediate 
concern to the United States.‖653   
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By the time Dwight D. Eisenhower became president in 1953 the U.S. had 
become firmly committed to the Saudi state.  A confluence of interests had cemented 
this relationship.  As one historian has written, ―the military wanted increased 
production to conserve Western hemisphere strategic reserves; the Department of State 
wanted economic stability in the area to guard against the spread of communism‖ and 
American oil companies wanted increased markets and an additional source of supply.
654
  
Despite this, U.S.-Saudi relations did not constitute a priority for the new administration.  
Across the globe more pressing matters (Soviet expansion, the ongoing Korean War, and 
the rise of the RCC in Egypt) demanded American attention.  Relations with Saudi 
Arabia represented, at best, an afterthought. 
This, however, slowly began to change.  As relations with Egypt and Nasser 
cooled the Eisenhower administration began searching for a regional alternative, for a 
Middle Eastern leader who could oppose both Soviet Communism and Nasserism.  King 
Saud, the administration came to believe, could fulfill this role.   
The Eisenhower administration labored to promote King Saud as a regional 
alternative to Nasser.  The administration‘s conceptualization of religion, along with its 
racialized assumptions about Arabs elicited this decision.  President Eisenhower and 
Secretary Dulles viewed faith, regardless of in what religion, as a potent weapon in the 
cold war.  They believed that it imbued leaders and peoples with the dynamism 
necessary to successfully confront communism.  King Saud, they became convinced, 
possessed such faith.  Racialized assumptions of Arabs‘ religiousness and despotism, 
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meanwhile, convinced them that King Saud, as keeper of the Muslim holy places, could 
rally Muslims throughout the Arab world against both atheistic Soviet communism and 
Nasserism.  King Saud, in short, they believed, could work miracles.   
 U.S.-Saudi relations under Eisenhower, however, began more modestly.  The 
Kingdom ranked relatively low on the administration‘s list of priorities.  U.S.-Saudi 
interactions throughout these early years consisted largely of the Saudis pressing for 
American aid and assistance and the administration attempting to ignore these appeals.  
Throughout 1953 and early 1954 Saudi officials lobbied for American aid and military 
equipment.  The new administration attempted to anticipate these concerns.  During 
negotiations to renew the American lease for the air base at Dhahran the administration 
―implied‖ a ―quid pro quo‖ of arms for renewal.655  None, however was immediately 
forthcoming.  In March, Prince Faisal traveled to Washington to meet with President 
Eisenhower.  In a meeting held later in the visit the Prince informed Secretary Dulles 
that the Kingdom requested military and economic aid, which had been first promised by 
the Truman administration.
656
  Later that month the administration followed through on 
its earlier implications.  It offered Saudi Arabia 5 million dollars in Mutual Security Act 
aid.  The King, however, refused to sign the agreement, believing, as Shaikh Yusaf 
explained, that if he agreed to the terms enumerated in the agreement ―anything‖ the 
Saudi state possessed ―both economic and military‖ would be ―under US control and 
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dictation.‖  If this occurred, the King feared, the whole ―country would be under‖ 
American ―control.‖657 
 In addition to requesting aid during these years, the Saudis requested U.S. 
assistance in their dispute with the British over the Buraimi oases.  Buraimi consists of 
ten villages, with a collective population of nearly 10,000 people, located in the 
southeast corner of the Arabian Peninsula.
658
  Their springs support the nomadic 
Bedouins who traverse the area.  They also serve as an important regional 
communications hub.  Buraimi lay far afield of Saudi territory.  Today the oases reside 
in Oman, nestled near the border with the United Arab Emirates, which at the time was 
known as Abu Dhabi, over a 100 miles from Saudi territory.  The Saudis, however, 
contended that the tribesmen in the area had in the past paid tribute to the Saudi 
monarchy, which they had for two short periods of time in the nineteenth century.
659
  
Buraimi was of importance to ibn Saud for several reasons.  Controlling the 
oases provided power and prestige.  As one historian has written ―only by controlling 
access to Buraimi could a sedentary dynasty hope to impose its authority over the 
regions‘ inhabitants.‖660  Tribute also factored into the decision.   The Saudi King, as one 
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historian has written, used ―largesse to the tribes to sustain his own prestige.‖661  Ibn 
Saud‘s dynastic power and authority rested upon tribesmen‘s pledged loyalty.  Largesse, 
money and gifts flowing outward from Riyadh secured this loyalty.  The problem which 
confronted ibn Saud in the 1940s and the early 1950s, however, was that he was 
perennially short on cash.  The King lavished his generosity on anyone and everyone: 
tribesmen, his family (which by this point, due to his legendary prowess, numbered 
nearly a thousand), and those who approached his palace door hungry in search of 
food.
662
  The Kingdom‘s revenue, however, was still relatively modest.  It came from 
collecting fees from pious Muslims conducting their hajj, the pilgrimage to the Muslim 
holy places required of all Muslims who can afford it.  It also came from oil.  But oil 
production during these years was still relatively modest.  In 1946 the Kingdom 
produced a mere 60 million barrels of crude oil and it collected just 10 million dollars in 
oil revenue.
663
  Ibn Saud only met his considerable obligations by accumulating massive 
amounts of debt.
664
 
 In order to raise additional capital, maintain the loyalty of the tribesmen upon 
which his Kingdom rested, and to aggrandize his power and prestige, ibn Saud 
dispatched tax collectors to Buraimi in 1928.  Rebellion at home, however, soon forced 
the King to abandon the endeavor.
665
  At this point, however, Buraimi became 
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intermeshed in the larger issue of delineating the borders between the Saudi state and the 
British supported Shaikdoms which surrounded it.
666
 
 The Shaikdoms of Kuwait, Bahrain, Muscat, Oman, Abu Dhabi, and Aden were 
ruled by local Shaiks, local rulers, who made their fortunes from trading, pearling, and 
piracy.
667
   It was this last vocation which drew the attention of the British.  Arab pirates 
operating out of this ―pirate coast‖ imperiled Britain‘s naval lifeline to India.  After 
intervening in the area London convinced the rulers of Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the 
Trucial states (which included Abu Dhabi and Dubai), to enter into protective alliances 
with it.  The Shaiks conceded control of their foreign policy in exchange for protection.   
The British also became the arbiters of the Sultanate of Muscat‘s foreign policy.668 
 The exact borders of these shaikdoms, and of the Saudi state, however, remained 
nebulous.  For what mattered in the Arabian desert was securing the loyalty of the 
nomadic Bedouins who roamed it, not of assuming physical control of the—largely—
valueless desert.  Britain, however, accustomed to Europeans conventions of clearly 
demarcated borders, required fixed borders for the states it had committed to defend.  
This drew the English into negotiations with the Saudis. 
 The existence of oil added urgency to these efforts.  Oil companies required 
sovereign owners to establish contractual agreements with.
669
  Until sovereignty over 
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these areas was resolved oil companies could not exploit the resources which lay under 
the region‘s shifting sands. 
 Negotiations to fix the region‘s boundaries commenced in 1935 and met 
intermittently after that.  The issue of Buraimi first emerged during negotiators held in 
Damman in 1952.  When the Suadis claimed Buraimi.  The British maintained that the 
Saudi state, as a ―successor state‖ to the Ottoman Empire, was subject to a convention 
signed by the Ottoman Empire in 1913.  This agreement established the so-called ―blue‖ 
and ―purple‖ lines, which demarcated the southern and eastern reaches of the Empire.  
These borders stopped well short of the disputed oases.  The Saudis considered the 
contention that they were bound by this agreement rubbish.
670
 
As early as 1951 the Saudi government asked the United States to support its 
claim to Buraimi.  Events on the ground, however, soon added urgency to the request.
671
  
In mid-1952 Saudi officials protested the presence of British officials in the area.
672
  
When said officials refused to depart, the Saudis took action.  In late August, Amir Turki 
Ibn Abdullah Ibn Utayshan, along with 40 men, accompanied a local chief into the 
area.
673
  Once there Turki established Saudi control over Buraimi and eight surrounding 
settlements.
674
  The rulers of Muscat, Oman, and Abu Dhabi, all of whom claimed the 
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area for themselves,  protested to the British, their protector.  Pressured by its 
protectorates, Britain reacted.  It threatened to man a series of fortifications in the 
area.
675
  In response the Saudis too, turned to their protector, the United States.  Riyadh 
inquired whether the U.S. would uphold President Truman‘s pledge to guarantee the 
nation‘s territorial integrity.676 
 Tensions continued to escalate.  In late September British officials detained a 
Saudi car.   Royal Air Force planes began overflying the oasis and British forces 
blockaded the movement of food into the area.  The British  also restricted access to the 
oases.  They impelled those traveling to and fro to produce passports.  One can only 
image the look on a nomadic Bedouin‘s face when an English official stopped him and 
asked him to produce a valid passport!
677
 
 Again the Saudi government asked the United States for assistance.  It pleaded 
for the Truman administration to ―work quietly behind the scenes.‖   It wanted the 
administration to support the creation of a tripartite commission.  Under the proposal the 
commission would visit the disputed area and question the inhabitants, asking them who 
they desired to pledge their loyalty to.
678
  To compel U.S. support the Saudis threatened 
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to take the issue to the Security Council.
679
  The outgoing Truman administration, 
however, was reluctant to get involved in the dispute.  As the Acting Secretary of State 
concluded, ibn Saud‘s request put the United States ―in [a] very uncomfortable 
position.‖680  It trapped America between two allies.  Serving as a moderator only 
promised to disappoint one, if not both of them.  Additionally, the administration did not 
completely trust Saudi motives.  As the Acting Secretary of State warned, the ―latest 
Saudi moves‖ were an ―attempt‖ to ―enhance‖ and obtain a ―perhaps undeservedly 
favorable settlement‖ in ―ways not compatible with maintaining‖ smooth relations with 
Britain.
681
  If at all possible, the administration wanted to, as Secretary of State Dean 
Acheson stated, ―remain aloof‖ from the matter.‖682 
 As the administration prevaricated the situation worsened.  In October Saudi 
Arabia dispatched 700 men to al-Khaj.  Muscat responded, it mobilized 8,000 troops and 
deployed men from their army, the Trucial Levies, to the forts in the area.
683
   
Finally the Truman administration responded.   It recommended that the two 
sides enter into direct negotiations.
684
  They did so and on October 26
th
 the two sides 
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concluded a ―standstill agreement.‖  The forces of each side would remain in place, 
receive supplies, but, receive no further reinforcements.
685
 
 When Dwight Eisenhower assumed office in January of 1953 the Saudis had just 
rejected a British offer to enter into formal arbitration.
686
  In March, Prince Faisal asked 
Secretary Dulles if the new administration would honor President Truman‘s pledge and 
provide active ―intervention in the Buraimi dispute.‖687  While the new administration 
valued Saudi Arabia, it too, was reluctant to get involved. 
 Once again, however, events on the ground precipitated action.  In March, the 
British government delivered an ultimatum to ibn Saud: agree to arbitration or they 
would evict Turki.  Ibn Saudi responded by dispatching tax collectors to the oases.
688
  
This prompted the Trucial States to deploy their army to blockade the region.  The 
Trucial States also declared that they would no longer honor the ―standstill 
agreement.‖689  At this point the Saudis agreed to consider some sort of ―middle course‖ 
between their proposed tripartite commission and the British offer of arbitration, if, the 
British agreed to abide by the pre-April 2
nd
 status of affairs.
690
 
In May, Secretary Dulles embarked upon his whirlwind trip of the region, which 
included a visit to Riyadh.  There the Secretary informed the Saudis that President 
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Truman‘s pledge did not apply to Buraimi.  It, Dulles later stated, was only an 
―assurance against external threat‖ not a ―cloak for Saudi expansion.‖691 
 By this point even Secretary Dulles was forced to acknowledge that U.S. 
relations with the Kingdom were ―poor‖ and he began to worry that ibn Saud might 
―throw away‖ the alliance with the U.S.  The administration, he concluded, could not 
allow this to occur.  Saudi Arabia, with its ―great oil concessions‖ and ―air base,‖ was of 
―particular importance.‖  But, there was not anything, he believed, the administration 
could do to improve relations as long as ibn Saud remained alive.  The King, as Dulles 
colorfully phrased it, was ―old and crotchety‖ and unreasonable.692 
 In the meanwhile, events on the ground continued to worsen.  What exactly 
occurred next is difficult to ascertain.  But it appears that a faction within the Bani Kaab 
tribe loyal to Muscat requested British assistance.  As British forces entered the area and 
began patrolling tribesmen from the same tribe, loyal to Saudi Arabia, began attacking 
British patrols and checkpoints.
693
  The British responded, the Saudis alleged, by 
deploying armored cars and aircraft against civilian homes containing ―peaceful women 
and children‖ and by threaten to ―burn all the houses with their people‖ unless they 
surrendered within fifteen hours.
694
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After this incident the Saudis again appealed to their American sponsors.  They 
requested that the United States ―mediate‖ the dispute.695  The U.S. government again, 
however, insisted that the two sides instead agree to arbitration, conclude a new 
―standstill agreement,‖ and agree to neutral supervision for the area.696  Negotiations 
temporarily stalled.  The two sides had difficulty agreeing whether their forces would be 
required to withdraw before negotiations commenced.  Eventually, however, the two 
sides agree.
697
   
In November of 1953, however, the aged ibn Saud died.  The King had 
discerningly planned for a transition of power.  He designated that his son, referred to in 
the west as King Saud, to serve as his successor.  Saud indeed became King, but only 
after much excitement.  Prince Faisal, another of ibn Suad‘s many heirs, resisted the 
transition.  After a protracted dispute the two brothers reached a compromise.  Saud 
became King, Faisal became Prime Minister, and also retained his title of Viceroy of the 
Hijaz.  A side-note to this affair, one which would take on later significance, is that in an 
attempt to create a non-royal power base King Saud began importing non-Saudis into the 
country and appointed them to important positions of power.  One of these men was 
Yemeni entrepreneur Shaykh Muhammad Bin Ladin, father of Osama.
698
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 Despite the ascension of King Saud relations between the Kingdom and the 
United States remained strained.  The Buraimi situation continued to fester and in May 
the new King added fuel to the fire when he requested that Aramco dispatch an 
expedition to Buraimi to survey for oil.  Soon after arriving RAF aircraft overflew the 
caravan and dropped leaflets on them warning that they were ―committing trespass.‖699   
In July the two sides finally agreed to reopen arbitration.
700
  And they made 
quick progress.  They conceded to the creation of a joint police force to patrol the area.  
They also agreed that the area would become a ―no-oilman‘s land,‖ that there would be 
no oil exploration in this area.
701
  And in August Prince Turku finally left.  As he 
departed he refused a British escort.  Shortly thereafter he got lost in the desert.  A 
British detachment eventually rescued the woe begotten Prince.  When they came upon 
him, they reported, he was ―in a state of collapse from heat exhaustion.‖702 
 Despite this progress the Eisenhower administration begun to have concerns 
about U.S.-Saudi relations.  The administration worried that the Saudis were unhappy 
with American aid and support.  They came to fear that the royal family may have come 
to ―believe that they might have backed the wrong horse‖ in aligning with the United 
States over Great Britain.  As the old saying goes, hindsight is twenty-twenty and 
Eisenhower administration officials came to see that they had been overly critical of the 
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Saudis.  President Eisenhower conceded that there had been ―some degree of justice in 
the grievance felt by the Saudi Arabians.‖  He went on to question ―whether we ought 
not to take some action against the British.‖  Who, he believed, ―had been ―behaving in a 
very high-handed fashion.‖   The Secretary of State, however, disavowed him of this 
notion.  As Dulles counseled, the ―arbitration agreement‖ was ―virtually ready for 
signature‖ and the United States, he believed, should do nothing to rock the boat.703   
Perhaps Dulles should have listened to the President, instead of vice-versa.  For 
discontent was indeed mounting within the Kingdom.  Prince Faisal, frustrated with the 
United States‘ unwillingness to help in the Buraimi dispute, concluded that ―there is no 
difference between a useless friend and a harmless enemy.‖704   
But, it would not be Buraimi which further complicated U.S.-Saudi relations.  It 
would be two new issues.  In January of 1954 King Saud concluded an agreement with 
Greek shipping magnate Aristotle Onassis.
705
  According to the agreement Onassis 
would provide the Saudis with a tanker fleet.  In exchange he would receive a share of 
the lucrative trade of transporting Saudi oil.  The deal distressed U.S. oil companies.  It 
stated that Saudi crude could only be transported by Onassis oil tankers or by tankers in 
service before 1954.  As competitors‘ tankers aged and were pulled from service only 
Onassis‘ ships would remain and he would possess a monopoly over the transportation 
of Saudi crude oil.  The oil companies also feared that the agreement established a 
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worrying precedent, which might later be used to justify nationalization of the entire oil 
industry.
706
 
 Concerned, the oil companies lobbied the administration, which was also 
troubled by the agreement.
 707
  The Joint Chiefs of Staff predicted that if it went into 
effect the United States could ―expect all other oil-producing countries‖ to ―follow the 
lead,‖ which, the JCS counseled, would leave the United States at a ―disadvantage.‖  
Administration officials also worried that the deal would force Aramco to suspend 
operations in Saudi Arabia and that it might eventually force the U.S. reserve tanker fleet 
out of business.  All of this led the President to conclude that the U.S. ―could not afford 
to sit around and get blackmailed.‖708 
At a National Security Council meeting Eisenhower questioned if the United 
States could simply allow the deal to go into effect and then, afterwards, ―break‖ 
Onassis.  Secretary Dulles, however, cautioned against his.  He noted that Onassis was a 
―dangerous and slippery character.‖  During the course of the meeting officials proposed 
several other solutions.  The President questioned if the United States could simply buy 
Iranian oil as an alternative?  He also asked if the U.S. could have its European allies 
close their ports to Onassis‘ ships.  The Secretary of the Treasury, however, counseled 
the President that this would not work because ―Greeks were notoriously mobile.‖709 
                                                 
706
 Memorandum of a Conversation, February 9, 1955, FRUS, 1955-57, vol. 13, 250. 
707
Memorandum of a Conversation, February 9, 1955, FRUS, 1955-57, vol. 13, 250. 
708
 207
th
 Meeting of the National Security Council, July 22, 1954, Ann Whitman File, Papers as President, 
NSC Series, Box 5, folder ―207th,‖ DDEL.  
709
 207
th
 Meeting of the National Security Council, July 22, 1954, Ann Whitman File, Papers as President, 
NSC Series, Box 5, folder ―207th,‖ DDEL.  
227 
 
 In the end the administration adopted a carrot and stick approach.  The U.S. 
government applied pressure.  It counseled King Saud to cancel the deal.  Secretary 
Dulles also instructed the Attorney General to file suit against Onassis in an unrelated 
case in which he concealed foreign ownership of a company seeking to purchase 
American ships.  Oil companies, meanwhile, dangled the carrot.  They offered the King 
70 million dollars in retroactive royalties if he rescinded the agreement.  King Saud 
eventually obliged.
710
 
 The formation of the Baghdad Pact also complicated U.S.-Saudi relations.  The 
prospect of ―Hashemite encirclement‖ had long preoccupied Riyadh.711  The term 
Hashemite refers to the family of Hussein ibn Ali, the Hashemite Asheriff of Mecca.  
The British had installed his two sons as rulers of the newly formed states of Jordan and 
Iraq.  The Saudis feared that these Hashemite rulers might one day attempt to reacquire 
their ancestral homeland in the Hijaz, home of the holy places of Mecca and Medina.  
The formation of the Baghdad Pact only heightened these concerns.  As one historian 
has noted, the Saudi government ―saw in Iraq‘s participation in the Baghdad Pact ―a 
most violent form of the old Hashemite threat.‖712  
Saudi opposition to the pact pushed the Kingdom into common cause with the 
man it was designed to contain: Gamal Abdel Nasser.  Throughout 1955 the Saudi state 
moved closer to Nasser and Egypt.  As mentioned earlier the King concluded the ESS 
Pact with Egypt and Syria in early 1955.  In addition, in January of 1955, 200 Egyptian 
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military advisors arrived in the Kingdom.  Egyptian bureaucrats and teachers also 
flooded the country and Saudi propaganda began vehemently denouncing the pact.
713
   
This, and the Onassis affair, prompted the administration to begin reviewing ―the 
whole complex of our relations with‖ the Saudi government, studying whether the 
United States should continue to support the Saudi state.
714
  Despite their concerns with 
the King‘s recent actions, however, officials concluded that they needed King Saud as an 
ally.  They could not afford to alienate him.  Any American strategy to contain Nasser in 
the Middle East must try, Secretary Dulles pronounced, to win King Saud away from 
Nasser.  If the United States did not, it would, he concluded, be very ―difficult to counter 
the combined Nasser + Saud [sic] alignment.‖  King Saud could use his oil money to 
―stir up trouble in the area.‖715 
 As part of the second phase of Operation OMEGA, the administration‘s plan to 
contain and undermine Nasser, the administration initiated a ―sustained effort to detach 
Saudi Arabia from Egyptian orbit.‖716  The administration‘s plan for King Saud, 
however, went far beyond just ―detaching‖ the King from Nasser.  The President wanted 
to build him up as a ―spiritual leader‖ who the U.S. could use to exercise ―political 
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leadership‖ in the region.717  The administration chose to, as Secretary Dulles admitted, 
win ―King Saud away from Nasser, and‖ use him to ―give important anti-Communist 
leadership in the Arab world.‖ Saud, in short, was to be ―built up‖ as a ―counter to 
Nasser‖ and to communism in the Arab world. 718  
 Why did the administration have such faith in King Saud?  He had done nothing 
previous to inspire it and as the President candidly admitted he did not even ―know the 
man.‖719   The answer lay in how the administration conceptualized religion.  
Administration officials believed that the King‘s Muslim faith imparted to him the 
dynamism necessary to confront both atheistic communism and Nasserism.  The 
administration held that faith, regardless of in what religion, was necessary to confront 
and defeat communism.  This was particularly true, the President believed, of Islam.  
The ―Arabs‘ religion,‖ he later confided to Jordan‘s King Hussein, ―was so incompatible 
with atheistic Communism that,‖ he believed, ―Communists could never get a hold of 
the common people in Arab lands.‖720  ―Islam, Christianity, and Judaism,‖ he affirmed 
on another occasion, are ―natural allies against atheistic communism.‖721   
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King Saud, the administration believed, was important not just because he was a 
pious Muslim, but also because his kingdom contained the holy places of Islam.   This, 
administration officials were convinced, imparted great power.  Power they wished to 
harness.  As the President confided to his diary, as keeper of the holy places of Islam, the 
King could ―disrupt the aggressive plans that Nasser is evidently developing.‖722  
Because of this, he, as Secretary Dulles stated, ―represented the key‖ to the Middle East.  
He ―was in a position to exercise religious influence in the area.‖  He was in the position 
to rally the Arab masses against both communism and Nasser.
723
 
 It is important to note that Secretary Dulles, while he delivered the administration 
line, seemed less enthusiastic about this new strategy than the President.  The plan to 
promote King Saud as a regional counterweight was Eisenhower‘s initiative.724  The 
Secretary seemed to have merely gone along with it.  In large part this stemmed from the 
Secretary‘s ambivalence toward other religions.  While the Secretary believed all the 
religious should unite, he also occasionally espoused a form of Christian superiority.  He 
did not believe that all faiths were created equal.  This seems to have been especially 
true in regards to Islam.  Throughout the 1930s and 40s Dulles made continual 
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references to the ―threat of Islam,‖ which in the Middle Ages threatened to ―overrun 
Christendom.‖725  The Secretary seemed to have viewed Islam as some sort of 
competitor to Christianity and Christian civilization.  If he ever voiced his apprehensions 
concerning Islam, however, they are not documented in the record and he loyally carried 
out the new initiative.   
 The administration‘s plan to utilize King Saud, and his religious position in the 
Arab world, sprung not only from officials‘ beliefs about religion, but also from their 
racialized understanding of Arabs.  Egyptian actions conjured associations of Arab 
irrationality and gullibility in officials‘ minds.   Saudi actions, however, invoked other 
racialized assumptions, the assumption that Arabs were despotic and overly religious.  
Administration officials often spoke of the ―puritanically religious majority of the‖ Saudi 
―population.‖  They also referenced King Saud governing ―in practice in traditional 
totalitarian ways,‖ and Arabs‘ ―traditional authoritarian ways.‖726   
This difference arose from the context.  Egyptian opposition to U.S. policy 
triggered associations with Arab irrationality because how else could one explain 
Egyptian leaders‘ rejection of American policy, which in the administration‘s mind was 
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always ―right?‖   Saudi actions, while they occasionally coerced a reference to the 
Saudi‘s ―highly emotional‖ state, more frequently bred associations with despotism and 
religiousness.
727
   There are three important reasons for this.  First, the Saudis, at least 
privately, consistently supported American initiatives in the region.  They were 
therefore, in the minds of policymakers, rational.  Second, Saudi leaders presented 
themselves as religious.  King Saud consistently emphasized his faith.  He made 
reference to his ―position‖ as ―servant to [the] Holy Shrines‖ and decreed that he was a 
man devoted to ―religious belief and Islamic principle.‖728  Third, the Saudi government 
was a monarchy, where one man ruled.
729
  These three factors elicited assumptions of 
Arabs‘ religiousness and despotism instead of their irrationality and gullibility. 
These racialized assumptions undergirded the administration‘s strategy to 
promote King Saud as a regional power.  The plan assumed that all Arabs were religious.  
It also assumed that all Arabs would blindly obey an authority figure, that they were 
used to being ruled despotically. 
The administration now had its new strategy to contain Nasser and communism, 
in order to employ it, however, officials needed to repair relations with King Saud.  To 
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do so the administration labored to resolve two issues.  First it would provide the 
Kingdom with arms.
730
  Second, it worked to resolve the Buraimi dispute.  As Dulles 
confided to the British ambassador, ―we believe the winning away of the Saudis from 
Egypt depended upon the UK reaching an accommodation with the Saudis on 
Burami.‖731 
In May the Eisenhower administration took the first step towards resolving the 
first of these issues when it conceded to sell 3 B-26 bombers to the Kingdom.  The 
administration also pledged to consider a Saudi request to purchase several M-47 
tanks.
732
   
This token sale, however, was insufficient.  King Saud demanded more arms.  In 
July he applied pressure.  He informed Washington that the Soviets had offered to sell 
him arms in exchange for full diplomatic recognition.  He intimated that he might accept 
the offer.
733
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The administration did not like being ―blackmailed,‖ but in July it agreed to sell 
Saudi Arabia 18 M-41 tanks.
734
  This still proved insufficient.  Riyadh requested 
additional military and economic aid.
735
  And again King Saud applied pressure.  During 
negotiations to renew the lease for the Dharan air base Saudi officials informed their 
American counterparts that in exchange for renewing the lease the U.S. government 
would have to provide sufficient arms to raise a 13 regiment army or pay 50 million 
dollars a year in rent.
736
  As the King rationalized, you  ―use our airfields and‖ as a result 
you should ―help strengthen our Armed Forces by supplying military equipment.‖737 
The administration offered a counterproposal.  They pledged to provide an air 
training program, to build a new terminal at Dhahran, to provide 35 million dollars in 
aid, and to possibly approve up to 85 million dollars in future arms sales.
738
  The Saudis 
held fast.  King Saud informed the administration that he did ―not really see anything 
new‖ in the offer and he delivered an ultimatum.  The United States must provide 25 
million dollars in aid and 85 million dollars in arms grants, or he would let the lease 
expire.
739
  The administration refused.   
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 The administration also labored throughout this period to alleviate Saudi 
concerns regarding Buraimi.  Progress had been made on the matter.  Arbitration 
meetings commenced in September of 1955 in Geneva.  But just six days into talks the 
British member of the committee resigned.  He claimed that the Saudis had violated the 
terms of arbitration by supporting a coup d’état in Abu Dhabi, by bribing members of 
the Abu Dhabi royal family, by smuggling weapons into the region, and by attempting to 
influence the Pakistani member of the committee.
740
  The British allegations failed to 
convince the administration.  CIA director Allen Dulles asserted that he believed the 
British had purposefully ―sabotaged arbitration‖ when it ―appeared to be going against 
them.‖741 
 After withdrawing from the talks the British took a series of aggressive actions in 
the region.  Their forces overran a small Saudi police station and occupied the oases.
742
  
Days later an Aramco crew reconnoitering the area reported bring ―buzzed‖ by a RAF 
plane and in November British officials arrested several local Shaiks and imprisoned 
them in Dubai.
743
  
Great Britain‘s actions left administration officials exasperated.   They were 
sabotaging administration efforts to court King Saud.  Administration officials began to 
fear that the Saudis would take their case to the United Nations Security Council.  If this 
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occurred it would prove a boon to the Soviets, who were scheduled to assume 
chairmanship of the council.
744
   
Throughout this period the administration attempted to persuade its allies to, as 
the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs informed his British colleagues, 
―consider broadening the discussions and seeking a general agreement on the 
boundaries.‖745   This suggestion, however, met with only icy silence.  A similar reaction 
occurred every time the administration attempted to convince the British to settle their 
dispute in order to ―win King Saud away from Nasser‖ and have him exercise ―anti-
Communist leadership‖ in the region.746  
This was because the British scoffed at the notion of promoting King Saud as a 
regional alternative to Nasser.  When first informed of the proposal the British 
Ambassador to Washington reported to London that the Americans wanted to build ―up 
King Saud as ‗monkey monk‘ of the Arabs.‖747  Harold Beeley of the Foreign Office 
later concluded that ―it would be an illusion to imagine‖ that ―King Sa‘ud, as guardian of 
the holy places, could rival the political authority of ‗Abd al-Nasri.‖748   
Instead of building up King Saud the British wanted to maintain their position in 
the gulf.  Saudi Arabia, however, they believed, threatened this.  ―Saudi Arabia is 
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basically hostile,‖ to the ―United Kingdom and its position,‖ they declared.749  ―Saudi 
activity,‖ the British representative at the United Nations stated in overblown rhetoric, 
―is entirely consistent with that of the Soviet Union and serves the same purpose.‖750  
The British believed that the Saudis were bent upon further conquest.  They, the British 
Foreign Secretary charged, regarded ―Buraimi as a springboard for future expansion.‖751  
If allowed to occur, this expansion, they screamed, would threaten the ―very existence of 
the UK economically.‖  It would imperil the county‘s access to gulf oil, which 
represented the ―whole difference to our national survival.‖752   
Because of these fears the British refused to reenter arbitration talks.  They 
would not, they stated, return to the talks and ―submit to Saudi bribery.‖  At most, they 
agreed, to offer ―minor adjustments‖ to the existing British recognized border. This did 
not satisfy the Saudis who delivered an ultimatum to the British demanding that they 
withdraw from the disputed oases.
 753
   
In late 1956 administration efforts to improve relations with Saudi Arabia had 
stalled.  But, it did not appear as if the administration would be able to use King Saud to 
counter Nasser and the Soviets any time in the near future.  Events in the region, 
however, forced them to try.   
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 In late summer the Suez Crisis erupted.  Throughout the crisis the Eisenhower 
administration attempted to utilize King Saud as a stabilizing force in the region.  They 
encouraged the King to act as a mediator in the dispute.  A role Saud seemed more than 
willing to play, since Nasser had undertaken the action without consulting his alleged 
ally.
754
  All did not, however, go according to plan. 
 While Saud dutifully acted as a liaison between Egypt and the west, and 
counseled moderation, he also took actions inimical to western interests.  After the 
combined British/French invasion he severed relations with the two belligerent powers 
and embargoed all oil exports to the two counties and also to the British protectorate of 
Bahrain.
755
 
The administration responded by attempting to induce the King‘s cooperation.  It 
dispatched special envoy Robert Anderson to Riyadh in order to persuade the King to 
support the administration‘s planned Users‘ Association.  As Anderson later informed 
Prince Faisal the administration wanted the Saudis to ―urge‖ Egyptian ―acceptance‖ of 
the proposal.   They envisioned them ―lubricating the way‖ for a settlement.756   
Convincing the King to do so, however, proved an uphill battle.  He was 
suspicious of plans to internationalize the canal.  He questioned why internationalization 
was only being proposed for the Suez Canal and not for other non-Arab waterways?  He 
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also cautioned that the internationalization of the canal might provoke the Soviet Union 
into calling for the internationalization of all waterways.
757
  His Highness also 
maintained that ―Egypt is ready to do anything‖ to ―guarantee the users.‖  Egypt, he 
informed them, ―has guaranteed international use of the canal‖ and if the west wanted 
―more of a guarantee, Egypt is ready.‖  When pressed the King insisted that ―any 
solution should have due regard for all the sovereign rights of Egypt.‖758   
Anderson and the American ambassador attempted to dissuade the Saudis of their 
position.  Anderson warned that world confidence in the canal had been shaken and that 
unless it could ―be restored‖ the ―people in the world will be turning to other 
alternatives.‖  ―Canada,‖ he insinuated, was currently ―producing 40% of its potential.‖  
―Large Amounts,‖ he stated, could also come from the United States and Venezuela.  
And ―because necessity is the mother of invention,‖ Anderson continued, ―there would 
be a great effort to extract oil from shale.‖759  CIA agent Wilbur Eveland, who 
accompanied Anderson, claims that Anderson also made a clumsy attempt to intimidate 
the Saudis by hinting that the west might abandon Middle Eastern oil all together and 
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turn instead to nuclear power.
760
  Anderson also informed the Saudis that if the dispute 
was not resolved it might damage the Saudi economy.  As Anderson noted, Saudi trade 
with the west demanded an expansion of the facilities at Suez and Nasser did not possess 
the funds necessary to undertake such an expansion.  He also prophesized that Nasser 
might levy ―exorbitant‖ fees upon Saudi oil shipments.761  All these threats and pressure 
notwithstanding the best Anderson could secure from the Saudis was a pledge to 
dispatch an emissary to meet with Nasser.
762
 
The King did indeed dispatch an envoy to Cairo, and the envoy did work to 
lessen tensions.  As per his instructions, he labored to ―persuade Nasser to stop his radio 
and other propaganda attacks against Western powers.‖763  He also, he claimed, 
―managed to convince Nasser‖ that the ―United States really stood for peaceful 
settlement.‖  In addition he urged the Egyptian leader to ―search‖ for an ―acceptable 
compromise,‖ and to ―do everything possible to reduce tension.‖764   
 Despite Saud‘s less-than-satisfactory performance during the crisis the 
administration continued to have high hopes for him.  Herbert Hoover predicted that 
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after the Suez Crisis had been resolved the King would serve ―as a counter weight to 
Egypt.‖765  President Eisenhower continued to believe ―that if the King‖ could ―really 
come along with the West, we will be able to counter Nasser to a great degree.‖766  As 
the President argued on another occasion, ―if we could build up‖ King Saud ―as the 
individual to capture the imagination of the Arab World, Nasser would not last long.‖767    
 The administration continued to believe that it had found its solution to its 
Middle Eastern problems.  There were several reasons for this.  Saud was, as a briefing 
paper stated at the time, ―a moderate Arab leader who has demonstrated will to resist 
Communism.‖768  In his willingness to take a firm stance against Soviet communism the 
administration had finally found, it believed, what it had been looking for since it 
entered office, an Arab leader who would ―stand up and be counted‖ in the cold war.  
The administration‘s faith in Saud sprung also from another source.  In King Saud the 
administration saw a miracle man of sorts.  Historian Seth Jacobs has used the term to 
describe the Eisenhower administration‘s support of Ngo Dihn Diem in South Vietnam 
during this same period.  Jacobs argues that Diem‘s Catholicism imparted to the 
administration the conviction that Diem was ―the Miracle Man who alone could 
galvanize an otherwise simpleminded people for holy war against the communists.‖769  
In Saud, the administration seemed to have found its Middle Eastern equivalent.  A man, 
who they believed, could almost magically solve all of its problems in the region, who 
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could use his status as keeper of the Muslim holy places to rally the Arab masses against 
both Soviet communism and the rising tide of Arab Nationalism led by Egypt‘s Gamal 
Abdel Nasser.   
As such, King Saud became, to quote Eisenhower, the ―‗stone‘ on which to 
build‖ in the  Middle East.770  Around King Saud the administration assembled a 
constellation of leaders who pledged to ―stand up and be counted‖ in the cold war and 
who the administration vowed to protect with the Eisenhower Doctrine.  These were the 
region‘s conservative rulers, who feared that the rising tide of Arab nationalists would 
unseat them.
771
  Of these leaders, King Saud was clearly the most important.  But the 
administration also wagered on Nuri al-Said in Iraq, Camille Chamoun in Lebanon, and 
King Hussein in Jordan.  This, as the next chapter will reveal, proved a perilous strategy. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
FOUNDATIONS OF SAND: THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION‘S 
STRATEGY AND THE NASSERIST ―FLOOD‖ 
 
By the end of 1956 the Eisenhower administration had its new Middle East 
strategy.  It would support those nations who pledged to ―stand up and be counted‖ in 
the cold war, who vowed to battle both Nasserism and Soviet communism.   The 
Eisenhower Doctrine formalized this commitment in early 1957.  It provided aid and 
protection.  The nations who aligned with the U.S. and who accepted this assistance 
were the conservative or reactionary ones in the region.  As a National Security Staff 
memorandum noted, with its new policy the United States had sided with ―the archaic, 
status-quo, and reactionary regimes‖ in the Middle East.772  The leaders of these state 
endorsed the doctrine, in large measure, because they feared for their survival.  The 
rising tide of popular Arab nationalism threatened to sweep them from power.
773
  They 
clutched the American lifeline. 
This would prove a problem.   As President Eisenhower once cautioned, ―we 
must remember that we‖ must ―get indigenous peoples as well as governments on our 
side.‖  If the United States did not succeed in rallying ―indigenous‖ peoples to ―our 
policies,‖ the President prophesized, these policies will ―stand on a foundation of 
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sand.‖774    Unfortunately for the President he failed to heed his own advice and 
throughout 1957 and 1958 the rising tide of Arab nationalism eroded the 
administration‘s foundation of sand.  
 This troubling period began on a high note.  In January King Saud visited 
Washington.  Several issues were on the agenda, including renewal of the lease for the 
American air base at Dhahran and settlement of the Suez Crisis.  Briefing papers for the 
meeting also make it clear, however, that administration officials viewed the trip as an 
opportunity to again attempt to promote the King as a regional leader.
775
  Difficulties, 
however, marred these efforts from the beginning.  Problems arose before the King ever 
set foot on American soil.  In the weeks preceding the visit Saudi officials informed the 
administration that the King was considering canceling the visit.  He believed that 
President Eisenhower‘s insistence on greeting him at the White House instead of at the 
airport as he requested represented a slight.  A man of his stature, he believed, should be 
met upon arrival.  
This development took White House officials by surprise.  Quickly, however, 
they labored to resolve the misunderstanding.  They assured King Saud that the 
President‘s decision did not represent a slight.  It was standard protocol for him to greet 
foreign dignitaries at the White House.  He had, they informed the Saudi government, 
met all previous dignitaries there.  Time and security considerations precluded the 
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President from doing else wise.  It is perhaps a sign, however, of how much the 
administration valued King Saud that officials informed him that the President would 
indeed meet him at the airport, if he so desired.  But, they pleaded with him, not to 
demand this.  It, they confided, would cause previous dignitaries, who had been met at 
the White House ―embarrassment.‖  But, when the King arrived several weeks later 
Eisenhower was indeed there to greet him as he disembarked.
776
  King Saud was no 
ordinary foreign dignitary.   
 Another transportation issue marred the King‘s visit.  Before flying on to 
Washington the King‘ ship docked in New York City.  Normally under such 
circumstances the mayor of New York City would welcome him.  The sitting mayor, 
however, refused to do so.  He accused the King of practicing slavery and labeled him an 
anti-Catholic and an anti-Semitic.  Administration officials once again intervened.  They 
arranged for the U.S. military to greet the King.  Air Force planes saluted his ship as it 
entered New York harbor.   Ships from the Navy escorted his vessel ashore and a Marine 
Corps band serenaded his Highness when he disembarked.
777
 
 After the King arrived in Washington talks commenced.  Administration officials 
had high hopes.  They wished to secure the King‘s support for the Eisenhower Doctrine, 
obtain a renewal for the Dhahran lease, and settle the lingering aftereffects of the Suez 
Crisis.  They also hoped to implore the King to exercise his religious influence in the 
region. They wanted him to ―use his influence to dissuade Yemen from establishing‖ a 
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―close relationship with the Soviet bloc.‖778  They also planned to urge the King to 
exploit the recent Soviet invasion of Hungary by using ―his influence among other Arab 
leaders to emphasize the threat which Communism poses.‖779 
The King did not reject these overtures, but, he had his own agenda.  The Saudi 
government, he informed officials, still required arms.  The need was now more pressing 
than ever.  The British, he bemoaned, were ―nibbling‖ at ―any number of my borders.‖   
Israeli forces had recently conducted raids onto Saudi territory and the Iranian military 
had recently occupied two small islands in the Persian Gulf.
780
  To alleviate these 
pressures the King requested 100 million dollars in military aid, enough to equip 12 
infantry divisions, a Royal Guards regiment, expand the air force, and create the 
―nucleus‖ of a navy.  The King also requested financial aid.  He presented the 
administration with a list of projects he desired funding for.   The list included an 
upgrade to Dammam and Jidda harbors, road projects, railroad projects, mining projects, 
and television stations.
781
  In an effort to elicit American cooperation, his Highness 
reminded administration officials that he had remained a loyal friend to the United 
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States.  He had recently rejected a Soviet military aid offer, which would have provided 
him with ―any amount of arms he desired‖ at prices lower than anyone else could 
provide.  The message was clear, if the United States did not provide the Kingdom with 
the assistance it required, the King might be forced to reconsider his loyalty.
782
   
Arms and aid were not the only issues on the King‘s agenda.783   He also urged 
the administration to meet with Nasser, and the Syrian government, and protested the 
continued Israeli occupation of Sharm al-Shayk and Gaza.
784
  It would be this last issue 
which would complicate relations with Saudi Arabia throughout early 1957.  Following 
the combined British, French, and Israeli invasion of Egypt Israeli forces had withdrawn 
from most areas, but a small number remained at Sharm al-Shayk on the tip of the Sinai 
Peninsula and also in the Gaza strip.   This continued presences of Israeli forces, 
particularly their presence at Sharm al-Shayk, disturbed the King.  Sharm al-Shayk 
overlooked the Gulf of Aqaba, which King Saud viewed as one of the ―sacred areas of 
Islam.‖785  A continued Israeli presence there, he informed U.S. officials, undermined his 
standing with his people—and also with the rest of the Arab world.786  It also raised 
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security concerns.  In the months which followed Israeli forces used control of this 
strategic locale to open the Gulf.   Israeli ships began plying the waters.  This was 
unacceptable to Saud.  A Jewish presence in the gulf, he maintained, endangered ―the 
approaches to the Holy Places.‖787  For this reason the King requested that the 
administration support Arab efforts to expel Israeli forces from Sharm al-Shayk and to 
preserve Aqaba as a ―closed Arab gulf.‖788  The administration agreed to the former, but 
not to the latter.  The Gulf of Aqaba, they maintained, was an international waterway.
789
 
The Aqaba affair complicated U.S.-Saudi relations throughout much of early 
1957, the King even threatened to raise the issue before the Security Council.  
Consequently frustration emerged.  Secretary Dulles grumbled during this period that 
King Saud ―was acting more like the head of the Moslem religion‖ than as ―a head of 
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state,‖ an ironic statement considering this is how the administration had been 
encouraging him to act.  President Eisenhower complained during this period that the 
―pasha‖ is ―funny-almost childish particularly when he talks about Allah.‖790 Despite 
these grumblings, however, administration officials continued to have faith in Saud.  The 
King‘s visit, while it did not proceed exactly as planned, did produce some result.    The 
King had extended the American lease at Dhahran for an additional five years and the 
administration had offered the Kingdom 50 million dollars in training aid.
791
  This led 
Secretary Dulles to conclude that the ―Saudi thing‖ had come ―out pretty well.‖792  
Relations only improved as the months passed.  Once the King returned home, 
he, the President declared, ―stood solidly in his support.‖793  In response the 
administration increased its aid proposal.  It offered to provide the Kingdom with 
economic aid.  It also offered to sell the Saudis 110 million dollars worth of arms.   
Administration officials also considered providing more aid in the future, including, a 
three year armaments credit, a grant to finance the construction of air defenses at 
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Dhahran, 70 million dollars in economic aid, and 20 million dollars in grant money to 
offset any revenue lost during the Suez Crisis.
794
  That same month the Saudis privately 
lent their support to the Eisenhower Doctrine.  The most welcomed development came 
when a rift opened up between King Saud and his onetime ESS Pact ally, Nasser.  It 
began in April when Saudi officials uncovered an alleged Egyptian plot to assassinate 
the King.   King Saud took quick action.  He expelled Egyptian advisors from the 
Kingdom. 
It was at this hopeful juncture, however, that events in the region began to 
undermine the administration‘s strategy.  Nasser‘s popularity began to crest and the 
rising tide of Arab nationalism began to lap against the administration‘s foundation of 
sand.   The first state to feel the pressure was Jordan. 
The Jordanian government had long been a dependable ally of the west.  This 
was in no small measure due to the fact that the state, and its monarchy, owed their very 
existence to the western powers.  As the Second World War ended, the British ―carved‖ 
the state of Transjordan out of the ―vacant lot‖ which lay between Palestine and Iraq.  
On the throne they installed the son of their onetime Arabian ally, Shareif Hussein of the 
Hejaz.  The first Jordanian King, Abdullah, reigned for less than a decade.  An assassin‘s 
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bullet struck him down in 1951.  His son, Talal, fared no better.  Less than a year after 
assuming power, he resigned.  Rumors swirled that he suffered from schizophrenic.  
Afterwards, his son, Hussein, ascended to the throne. 
The Jordanian state‘s prospects did not appear bright in1957.  In less than a 
decade of existence it had gone through three monarchs.  The current King, Hussein, was 
a mere 21 years of age and was better known for his playboy lifestyle than for his 
governing abilities.  The state was also continually in the red.  Only an annual subsidy 
from the British kept it solvent.  Jordan was also divided, politically, and ethnically.  The 
Bedouin tribesmen who inhabited the eastern portion of state supported the monarch.  
They had loyally supported the Hashemite line in the past.  A large Palestinian refugee 
population, however, resided in the western part of the state—and continued to grow.  
By 1956 they composed two thirds of the state‘s population.  These refugees possessed 
no traditional loyalty to the king or to his family.  They were also, unfortunately for  
King Hussein, becoming radicalized.  The loss of their homeland in Palestine had made 
many of them anti-Western and receptive to Arab nationalist calls for unity.   
These issues began to come to a head in late 1956.  In October the NSP, the 
Jordanian nationalist party, rode Palestinian resentment to electoral victory.  The NSP 
formed a government.   Sulayman Al-Nablusi served as prime minister.  The new Prime 
Minister quickly implemented a nationalist agenda.  He moved closer to Nasser and 
Egypt.  In February he signed the Arab Solidarity Agreement with the ESS states, they 
pledged to provide Jordan with an annual subsidy to replace the one the British 
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provided.
795
   In March Al-Nablusi called for federation with Egypt and Syria.  That 
same month he provided the USSR and the People‘s Republic of China with diplomatic 
recognition.
796
  And in April he demanded that the King dismiss several of his pro-
western advisors.  King Hussein reluctantly complied with this demand.  Three days 
later, however, al-Nablusi presented the King with another list of advisors he wanted 
dismissed.  On the list was the name of one of King Hussein‘s closest advisors, Bahjat 
al-Talhuni, Chief of Royal Diwan.  Hussein refused this request.  He would not fire his 
dear friend and trusted confidant.  Instead he demanded Al-Nablusi‘s resignation.  The 
prime minster obliged, believing that the King would be unable to form a new cabinet.
797
   
Al-Nablusi was correct.  King Hussein had great difficulty forming a new 
cabinet.  As the days passed unrest emerged, particularly within the army.  The former 
Prime Minster, and his ideas, enjoyed a great deal of support within the ranks, 
particularly with troops who hailed from the Palestinian portion of the country.  In April 
a group of sympathetic officers took action.  They ordered the Jordanian first armored 
regiment to occupy positions around the capital city of Amman.
798
  King Hussein 
discovered the plot and responded quickly.  He ordered these men to return to their 
barracks and they obeyed.  The conspirators, however, did not give up so easily.  Several 
officers stationed at the army base at Zerqa ordered their men to march on the 
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presidential palace.  Fortunately for the King, many of these soldiers were Bedouins.  
They refused the order.  Fighting erupted.   
The situation threatened to spin out of control.  The armed forces of several Arab 
states were stationed on Jordanian soil.  The King had welcomed them after the Suez 
Crisis erupted.  As Zerqa smoldered troops from one of these nations, Syrian, began to 
move ominously south, towards the capital.  
The young monarch reached out to the American government.  He asked whether 
the administration would provide him with assistance under the Eisenhower Doctrine.  
Administration officials were sympathetic to the King‘s request.  They believed that 
―Egyptian and Syrian intrigue‖ were to blame for the crisis.799  But, officials failed to see 
how they could intervene.  As they informed the King ―the Doctrine was applicable‖ 
only ―in case of overt aggression by international Communism or by states in the area 
dominated by international Communism‖ and ―despite its international overtones‖ the 
Jordanian crisis was ―essentially an internal problem.‖  For this reason they would not, 
they informed him, honor his request.
800
  Administration officials did, however, dispatch 
the 6
th
 fleet to the eastern Mediterranean in a sign of solidarity.  They also assured the 
King that if Soviet forces attacked the United States ―would intervene militarily.‖801   
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The King also received support from his Arab neighbors.  A sympathetic Iraqi 
government amassed forces along the border, as did the Turkish government.
802
  King 
Saud also lent King Hussein his support.   A small number of Saudi forces had likewise 
been stationed in Jordan following the Suez Crisis.  King Saud ceded control of these 
forces to his fellow monarch.  He also wired Hussein 250,000 dollars.  This was most 
appreciated.  The Jordanian King used these funds to pay his soldiers and maintain their 
loyalty.  Saud also promised to send Hussein the Saudi portion of the ESS subsidiary, 
nearly 2.5 million pounds.
 803
 
Buttressed by foreign support the Jordanian monarch took decisive action.  He 
personally drove to Zerqa, where he rallied loyal Bedouin troops.  Men loyal to the King 
were soon patrolling the capital.    
The situation stabilized, the King began to reassert control.  He purged the army 
of Arab nationalists.  He also formed a new loyalist cabinet, whose only dissenting voice 
was al-Nablusi‘s, who remained as Prime Minister.804  The King also cracked down on 
the general public.  Before he did so, however, he labored to secure certain assurances.  
King Hussein feared that the Israelis might exploit the situation and invade the West 
Bank.  To prevent this from occurring he asked the United States for military support in 
the event of an attack by either Israel or the Soviet Union.   The administration almost 
immediately pledged to support Jordan if the Soviets intervened and quickly and quietly 
approached the Israelis and obtained an assurance that they would not intervene.  
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Administration officials also encouraged the Turkish government to keep their forces 
massed along the border.  Reassured, the King declared martial law, suspended 
parliament, and arrested his opponents.
805
  The situation in Jordan was stable—for the 
time being. 
During the Jordanian crisis administration officials were heartened by the actions 
of King Saud.  Administration officials expressed to the King their ―appreciation for the 
very effective measures he‖ took to ―support King Hussein and the King‘s actions in the 
months which followed only reinforced this faith.
806
  In May the King took the first step 
towards improving relations with a conservative state in the region, Iraq.  King Saud 
traveled to Baghdad.  This was an unprecedented step.  The Saudis had long distrusted 
the Hashemite rulers of Iraq and Saudi propaganda had vehemently denounced the Iraqi 
government when it entered into the Baghdad Pact.  While in Baghdad King Saud even 
proposed that the two countries form a ―new alignment‖ against the forces of Arab 
Nationalism.  Administration officials, needless to say, approved.
 807
 
More good news arrived in May.  Nasser sought a rapprochement with the 
United States.  Administration officials attributed this change of heart to the economic 
sanctions they had imposed on Egypt.  Nasser was apparently feeling the pinch.  The 
administration‘s strategy to contain and pressure the Egyptian leader into seeing the 
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error of his ways seemed to be working.
808
  Administration backslapping, however, did 
not last long.  Another crisis soon erupted, this time in Syria.   
The Levant had long been unstable.  It, one CIA official pronounced, suffered 
―from chronic governmental weakness.‖809  Coups dotted the recent Syrian past.  Four 
occurred in the years leading up to the crisis alone.  The last of these coups forced 
General Abid al-Shishakli, a man administration officials had placed great hope in, from 
power.  Afterwards the Levant state began a slow—halting—drift leftwards.  In 1954 the 
Syrian people elected their first Communist representative.  In 1955 Syria concluded the 
ESS Pact with Egypt and Saudi Arabia.  In 1956 it sided with Egypt during the Suez 
Crisis.  During the crisis sympathy military officers sabotaged the oil pipeline which cut 
through Syrian territory.  When the crisis concluded the Syrian government continued to 
support Nasser and his polices.  In the United Nations it voted against a resolution which 
would have compelled the Egyptian leader to stop restricting traffic through the canal.   
Communist influence also increased.  The Syrian press increasingly portraying 
the Soviets, and their initiatives, in a favorable light.  The Syrian government allowed 
the Soviets to expand the size of their legation in Damascus.  The state also welcomed a 
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Soviet military attaché.  It awarded a Czech firm a contract to build an oil refinery.
810
  It 
also concluded several trade agreements with both the Soviet Union and the People‘s 
Republic of China.
811
  
These developments distressed administration officials.  Secretary Dulles 
pronounced that Syria was the ―nearest of all the Arab states to becoming a Soviet 
puppet.‖812  This was not something administration officials believed, they could allow.  
A Soviet dominated Syria, the Special Assistant for Intelligence prognosticated, ―would 
inhibit the development of the Northern Tier.‖813  It would also allow, cautioned the U.S. 
ambassador, ―communist poison‖ to spread to ―neighboring states.‖814   
To prevent this from occurring, the United States, Secretary Dulles concluded, 
must demonstrate to the Soviets that ―while a Soviet satellite can exist in areas 
contiguous to the Soviet Union‖ it ―could not exist in a detached area‖815  To 
demonstrate this to the Soviets the administration apparently undertook extreme action.  
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Archival records are less than conclusive, but, it appears that administration officials 
colluded with their British counterparts to overthrow the Syrian government.  During 
one conversation, for instance, Secretary Dulles agreed to send CIA officials to London 
to ―talk with the British‖ about ―what might be done‖ in Syria.816  After Dulles informed 
him of this, the British ambassador queried if this meant ―that the Secretary agreed that 
if there were means‖ the two governments ―should try to get a more friendly regime in 
Syria.‖  The United States government ―did agree,‖ Dulles clarified, if it would not 
―result in war‖ 817 
The product of this collusion was Operation Straggle.   According to CIA 
operative Wilbur Eveland, Straggle called for the exiled conservative Syrian Parti 
Populaire (PPS) to seize control of the country.
818
  The Agency provided the PPS with 
funds so that it could bribe key officials and purchase several newspapers.  Eveland 
himself recounts making money drops during this period.  He recounts driving into the 
mountains, reversing his direction until he reached an old French casino where he turned 
onto a deserted side road transferred a briefcase full of money into a PPS leader‘s 
Chrysler limousine.  When the time came PPS sympathizers were to occupy key 
positions throughout the country. 
819
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 Operation Straggle proved an abysmal failure.  The British and the French 
invasion of the Suez Canal occurred mere days before the operation was set to occur.   
PPS leaders were furious.  One enraged leader woke Eveland at his home and chastised 
him for the ―terrible thing you and your government did.‖  How, he continued, ―could 
you have asked us to overthrow our government at the exact moment when Israel started 
a war with an Arab state?‖820  The PPS leadership called off the operation.  But, it was 
too late.  Syrian intelligence had discovered the plot.  The government arrested fifty 
conspirators and put them on trial.  
 In Straggle‘s aftermath the Levant state drifted closer to the USSR.  In November 
it concluded an arms agreement with the communist state.  The Soviets agreed to 
provide the Syrians with more than 20 MIG-15s, 130 T-34 tanks, and 200 APCs.
821
 
In August what one historian has called the ―battle for Syria‖ commenced.  It 
began when the Syrian government announced that it had discovered, and foiled, yet 
another American plot.  Syrian officials alleged that American embassy employees 
approached several officers in the Syrian army and attempted to recruit them to 
assassinate Nasser.  Syrian officials charged that the United States had even secreted ex-
President Shishakli back into the country to demonstrate their seriousness. 
It is difficult to ascertain whether the Syrian allegations are true.  Wilbur Eveland 
asserts that they are.  He claims that the coup was one of several CIA operations in the 
                                                                                                                                                
tribesmen in the eastern portion of Syria.  As this was occurring PPS operatives were to slip across the 
border was and install a new—conservative—government in Damascus.  Eveland, Ropes of Sand, 170.  
For a full recounting of CIA efforts in Syria see: Douglas Little, ―The Cold War and Covert Action: The 
United States and Syria, 1945-1958,‖ Middle East Journal, vol. 44, no. 1 (Winter 1990), 51-75. 
820
 Eveland, Ropes of Sand, 227. 
821
 305
th
 Meeting of the National Security Council, Ann Whitman File, Papers as President, NSC Series, 
Box 8, folder ―305th,‖ DDEL. 
260 
 
region.   During this period, Eveland claims, the agency unleashed Operation SIPHONY 
against Nasser and operations WAPPEN and WAKEFUL against the Syrian 
government.
822
    Eveland recalls being present at a meeting held in Lebanon.  In 
attendance were officers from the CIA, Britain‘s Secret Intelligence Service (SIS or 
MI6), and their Jordanian and Lebanese counterparts.  According to Eveland, in the 
middle of the meeting a SIS officer, ―drunk as a lord,‖ entered, ―took over the meeting‖ 
and revealed that ―teams had been fielded to assassinate Nasser.‖  Then the inebriated 
officer ―rambled on about the bloody Egyptians who‘d planned to turn the Middle East 
over to the commies.‖ Suddenly, Eveland recounts, his voice trailed off and ―he finally 
sank into his chair and passed out.‖823  The plot the Syrians uncovered, Eveland avers, 
was part of WAKEFUL.
824
  Archival evidence, unfortunately, does not corroborate 
Eveland‘s claim or this colorful anecdote.  The relevant files have yet to be declassified. 
Regardless, U.S.-Syrian relations only worsened after the revelation.  The Syrian 
government arrested dozens of military officers.  It also declared three American 
diplomatic personnel, at least one whom was a CIA agent, persona non grata and 
expelled them from the country.  Army units also surrounded the U.S. embassy in 
Damascus. 
825
  And in August the Levant state concluded a technical agreement with the 
USSR.   
These latest developments further distressed officials in Washington.  
―Communists,‖ President Eisenhower lamented ―are taking over‖ Syria and there was a 
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―serious danger that Syria will become a Soviet satellite.826  Others seconded his 
observation.  Syria, Dulles judged, had almost ―reached the status of Soviet satellite.‖827 
Administration officials could not allow this to occur.  If the Levant state became 
a Soviet satellite, Secretary Dulles warned, it would become ―a base for military and 
subversive activities in the Near East designed to destroy‖ other nations‘ independence 
―and subject them to Soviet Communist domination.‖828  Of particular concern were the 
―pro-Western‖ governments in ―Lebanon, Jordan or Iraq.‖  A The Sovietized Syria, 
Dulles assured, would commit ―armed aggression against‖ these American allies.829    
As these quotations reveal administration thinking had remained essentially 
unchanged since its first encountered Nasser and Arab nationalism in 1953.  Arab states 
could not, they believed, interact with the Soviet Union and remain independent.  Any 
Arab interaction with the Soviets would lead to eventual domination.  As the Secretary 
of State explained, the Syrians were falling into ―a dangerous and classic pattern.‖  ―The 
Soviets first promise and extend aid.‖  They then use this aid to position large numbers 
of ―pro-Soviet persons.‖  The Soviets then place the nation under ―the control of 
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International Communism and‖ make it ―a Soviet satellite, whose destinies are directed 
from Moscow.‖830     
Racialized beliefs undergirded such thinking.  Administration officials attributed 
the Syrians‘ unwillingness or inability to perceive this ―reality‖ as a manifestation of 
innate Arab irrationality.  ―The entire basis of the Syrian attitude,‖ a joint CIA, USIA, 
and DOD panel concluded, ―is emotional … rational demonstration[s]‖ generally make 
―little impression‖ on them.831  The Syrian government, the Policy Planning Council 
averred, is ―haunted by fears of foreign‖ subversion ―which are driven by emotion rather 
than guided by reason in determining national interests and objectives.‖832  The 
―Syrians,‖ cautioned the American Ambassador, are ―under emotional pressures‖ and 
―have lost‖ their ―sense of perspective vis-à-vis Soviets.‖  Their ―inferiority complex‖ 
has caused them to seek out Soviet aid.
833
 
To save the Syrians, and the rest of the region, from themselves, administration 
officials encouraged their conservative allies to take action.  Most were more than 
willing to do so.  The Turkish government, in particular, needed little encouragement.  
As early as November of 1956 Turkish officials had warned Washington that the Soviet 
Union was ―systematically‖ seizing ―hold of‖ its neighbor.  Ankara also informed 
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Washington that they considered it their ―sacred duty to take all required steps to‖ 
eradicate this threat to ―Turkey‘s independence and existence.‖834  Soon thereafter 
Turkish forces gathered along the border.
835
  Clashes erupted. 
 While Ankara was eager to act, Administration officials were wary of having the 
Turks intervene alone.  A Turkish intervention would, the Secretary cautioned, produce 
―profound resentment among‖ the ―Syrian people‖ and ―arouse keen opposition in the 
rest of the Arab world.‖836  Bitter memories of Ottoman rule were still too fresh.  
Moreover, as the Secretary warned, any government ―brought into power by Turkish 
military action‖ would be suspect and would likely only fall and be ―replaced by another 
government of the same stamp as‖ the ―present one‖ once Turkish forces withdrew.837   
Administration officials instead wanted one of Syria‘s Arab neighbors to 
intercede.  As Secretary Dulles reasoned, if the ―Iraqis, or Iraqis together with 
Jordanians‖ intervened, the ―unfavorable political repercussions would not be so 
great.‖838  Consequently throughout 1957 administration officials encouraged the Iraqi 
government to invade.  Officials in Baghdad were receptive.  There was, however, a 
complicating factor.  The Iraqis needed a reason to intervene.  During talks in Baghdad 
representatives from the two governments discussed how they could manufacture, as the 
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American Ambassador phrased it, an ―incident‖ to serve as ―‗pretext‘ for an Iraqi 
military invasion.‖839  Iraqi officials proposed instigating a ―Druze uprising.‖  This, they 
believed, would provide them with the ―best and most convincing course.‖840  The U.S. 
encouraged this.  Days prior Secretary Dulles had assured the Iraqis that if a ―plausible 
cause‖ could be manufactured and if Iraq ―disavowed any political objectives, and 
obtained a guarantee from Turkey that they would assist if things went badly‖ then ―the 
administration would support their efforts. 
841
   
While this was occurring Turkish officials continued to offer their assistance.   
Administration officials were appreciative.  But, they were adamant that Turkish forces 
should only provide a supporting role.
842
  They should offer ―moral, political, and 
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logistical‖ assistance to Arab military action.843  They should only enter militarily ―in 
requested reinforcement of Arab defensive action.‖844 
In addition to encouraging the Iraqis and the Turks, the administration also 
lobbied King Saud to act.  At a National Security Staff meeting President Eisenhower 
reminded those present ―that Saud, after his visit here, had called on all Arabs to oppose 
Communism.‖  This memory led the President to conclude that ―we should at once send 
an emissary out to Saud.‖845  On another occasion Secretary Dulles confided that ―we are 
anxious‖ to have the ―King use his political and moral authority to rally opposition in‖ 
the ―area to‖ the ―present Syrian regime‖ and to ―isolate‖ it.846  In August the President 
took action.  He urged the ―King as Guardian Holy Places and bearer‖ of a ―special 
responsibility in‖ the ―Moslem world‖ to ―direct his political and moral influence against 
this alien influence.‖847  In another message the President encouraged ―the King as 
Keeper of the Holy Places of Islam‖ to ―exert his great influence‖ to assure ―that the 
atheistic creed of Communism will not‖ become ―entrenched in key position in the 
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Moslem world.‖848  The President, as he himself stated, ―worked‖ on the King ―hard‖ 
during this period and he appealed to his Secretary of State to do the same, to ―make a 
personal appeal‖ to the Saudi King.849 
The King‘s immediate reaction left much to be desired.  Upon receiving 
Eisenhower‘s first message the King lectured the United States that the crisis could be 
―traced to Western arms export policies.‖  By not agreeing to sell Syria arms the United 
States had pushed the Syrians into the Soviets‘ arms.850  The King also, in a sign of 
solidarity, traveled to Damascus.  The Saudi government, meanwhile, stated publically 
that it had never endorsed the Eisenhower Doctrine.
851
  These actions led administration 
officials to complain that ―Saud is now prepared to blame the U.S. for much of the 
difficulty in Syria.‖852  President Eisenhower also complained during this period that 
King Saud was intervening in an unhelpful way in Lebanon.  ―We had,‖ the President 
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lamented, ―high hopes for King Saud.‖  We believed ―that he would prove to be a force 
for stability and peace in Saudi Arabia‖853   
As the crisis progressed, however, the King‘s actions renewed officials‘ faith in 
him.  Syrian actions eventually prompted the King to turn against the Levant state.  It 
began when Damascus launched a propaganda assault on the King.
854
  King Saud 
retaliated.  He ordered all Syrian assets in the Kingdom frozen.  Soon the Saudi monarch 
was confiding to the administration that he was concerned about ―Syrian developments‖ 
and that he held Nasser ―largely to blame‖ for what was occurring.   He also informed 
the administration that while he did not condone the use of force in Syria he would 
support the use of ―other methods‖ to ―bring about changes.‖855  Secretary Dulles was 
heartened during this period by the fact that the King ―was prepared to spend money‖ to 
exploit internal rivalries within Syria.
856
  Further good news arrives as the crisis wound 
to a close.  The Syrians introduced a complaint before the United Nations.   In response 
King Saud offered to mediate a solution to the dispute.
857
   Administration officials 
appreciated the King‘s efforts, but they did not rely exclusively on them.  As the 
Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs explained, the ―US did not wish to 
count too heavily on King Saud‘s mediation offer,‖ if it did and ―the Arabs turned from 
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it‖ the Syrians‖ would ―be prepare[d] to put in a resolution‖ and this was ―unacceptable 
to us.‖858  The stakes were too high to rely on the King alone. 
Regardless, administration officials appreciated the King‘s offer and were 
heartened by his words and deeds as the Syrian crisis progressed.  The King seemed to 
recognize the danger that Nasser and Syria posed to the region.  He supported American 
initiatives and took an active role in attempting to resolve the crisis.  
In addition to exploiting King Saud‘s religious authority administration officials  
pondered utilizing religion in another way during this period.  At a National Security 
Staff meeting President Eisenhower pronounced that the United States should ―do 
everything possible to stress the ‗holy war‘ aspect‖ of the crisis.859  The President‘s idea, 
however, met with a cool reception.  Secretary Dulles cautioned the President ―that if the 
Arabs‖ did ―have a ‗holy war‘‖ it would likely ―be against Israel.‖  Heeding Dulles‘ 
advice the administration undertook no major effort to encourage a ―holy war,‖ although 
USIA propaganda efforts did labor to portray the ―Syrian regime as introducing 
communism, the enemy of religion, into Near East.‖860   
 As the administration machinated behind the scenes, Nasser took action.  In 
October he landed 1,500 Egyptian troops at Latakia on the Syrian coast.  This effectively 
ended the administration‘s and its allies‘ plans.  It deterred the Iraqis.  Turkish forces 
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remained.
861
  But they too would soon depart.  In October the Syrian lodged a complaint 
before the United Nations.  It alleged that their neighbors were conspiring to intervene in 
its sovereign affairs.  Exposed, Turkish machinations ceased.   Their forces departed 
from the border.  
 In addition to dispatching forces to Syria, Nasser reached out to the United 
States.  During a meeting with the American Ambassador he, the ambassador concluded, 
made it ―obvious‖ that he ―very much wanted to talk and that he is‖ willing to possibly 
―mend his fences with us‖862   The Egyptian leader sent further signals.   In December an 
Egyptian envoy informed the administration that Nasser was ―convinced‖ that the Syrian 
leader was ―a communist and that something must be done about it.‖  Nasser would, he 
informed the administration, assume the ―responsibility‖ of dealing with the Syrian 
leader if the United States kept its ―hands off Syria for a maximum period of three 
months.‖863 
 Discussion ensued in Washington.  The Egyptian leader‘s first approach 
prompted the President to ask Secretary Dulles whether there was ―any percentage in‖ 
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attempting ―to bring back Nasser to our side.‖864  The Secretary of State, however, 
remained skeptical.  He advised Eisenhower against reaching out to Nasser.  The 
administration, he declared, ―did not want in an effort to win good relations with Nasser‖ 
to ―alienate those who had maintained good relations with us.‖  There was a ―danger that 
Nasser would be satisfied with nothing less than‖ for the United States ―to treat him as 
the leader of the Arab world.‖  This would, Dulles advised, ―antagonize King Saud and 
the other Arab countries such as Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq,‖ who ―were somewhat fearful of 
Nasser.‖865  Nasser‘s later offer to intervene in Syria, however, tempted even the reticent 
Dulles.  It might be good, the Secretary of State concluded, to ―avoid impeding Egyptian 
efforts to bring about change‖ in Syria.866  But, this did not mean that Dulles trusted the 
Egyptian leader.  While he welcomed the fact that Nasser ―was not happy about the 
present situation and wanted to improve‖ it, the United States could not, he declared, 
―forget a ‗keystone‘ of our policy‖ the ―leadership of King Saud‖ against Nasser. The 
administration should not, Dulles concluded, take any ―action which would be regarded 
by King Saud as a blow to his leadership.‖867  Instead Dulles wanted to have it both 
ways.  Under the Secretary the administration would labor for the ―immediate future‖ to 
―achieve a degree of degagement‖ with Syria.   Such a policy would allow Nasser to 
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intervene in Syria, undisturbed, as he had requested.  It would also, however, ―permit the 
moderating influences of Saud and others to be most effective.‖868   
Unfortunately for the administration things did not proceed according to plan.  
King Saud achieved little success and Nasser, instead of combating communist influence 
in Syria, absorbed the country.  In February the nations of Syria and Egypt combined to 
form the United Arab Republic (UAR).  This was not, apparently, Nasser‘s idea.869 The 
Syrians took the initiative.  The effort was spearheaded by the Syrian Ba‘athist party.  
The Ba‘athists were at the time in a weak electoral position.  They were losing ground to 
the Communist party.  The only way to check growing Communists influence, many 
believed, was to unite with the popular leader of the Arab nationalist movement.  In 
December the Ba‘athists introduced a bill before parliament which proposed establishing 
a federal union with Egypt.  The communists responded in an unexpected way.  
Cognizant of Nasser‘s popularity, they attempted to better the Ba‘athists.  They called 
for a formal union.
870
 
The next month, without first consulting with the civilian government, members 
of the Syrian military flew to Cairo. There they met with Nasser and requested 
unification.  The offer caught the Egyptian leader by surprise.  He prevaricated.  He 
informed the delegation that he would only consider unification if an official delegation 
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from the civilian government made the request.
871
   There is every indication that the 
Egyptian leader believed this would be the end of the matter.  Several days later, 
however, an official Syrian delegation arrived in Cairo.
872
  Nasser, reluctant, again 
hesitated.  He informed the Syrians that he would accept unification, but only if they met 
several onerous preconditions.  The Syrian military must withdraw from politics.  The 
Syrians needed to dissolve all their political parties and the people of both countries 
would have to approve the measure with a popular referendum.  Nasser apparently did 
not believe that the Syrian government would agree to these conditions.  To his surprise, 
they did and a reluctant Nasser agreed to unification.
873
  After signing the necessary 
paperwork the Syrian President informed Nasser that ―you don‘t know what you‘ve 
getting yourself into … you have taken‖ on ―a people‖ who all ―consider themselves 
politicians, fifty percent of whom think that they are leaders, twenty-five percent of 
whom think they are prophets, and at least ten percent of whom consider‖ themselves 
―divine.‖  The new leader‘s response? ―Why didn‘t you tell me this before I signed the 
agreement?‖874 
Whether the UAR was Nasser‘s idea or not, news of the union disturbed officials 
in Washington.  Nasser, they believed, was expanding his power and they could not, 
they believed, allow this to occur.  Any expansion of Nasser‘s power, administration 
officials continued to believe, represented an expansion of Soviet power.   The UAR, the 
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Secretary of State pronounced, ―would not be domination by Nasser so much as 
domination by the Soviets.‖875    
It was not just Syria, administration officials feared, that was at risk.   The 
formation of the UAR, Dulles warned, created the ―danger that Jordan and Lebanon 
would [also] be absorbed.‖  This would place ―Iraq and Saudi Arabia in peril.‖876  The 
formation of the UAR, a SNIE concluded, threatened to provide Nasser and the Soviets a 
―bridge to Africa and a means of weakening the conservative states‖ there.877   ―The 
whole‖ region, President Eisenhower prophesized, might ―fall into the hands of 
Communism.‖  This, the Secretary of the Treasury warned ―would be catastrophic.‖878  
Loss of the region would deprive America‘s European allies of the oil their economies 
relied upon.
 879
   
These fears prompted officials to contemplate drastic responses.  Concerned 
about King Saud‘s safety in Saudi Arabia, the President inquired whether the U.S. could 
safeguard him with military force.  The Acting Secretary of State, however, counseled 
him that this would depend on whether or not the administration could find a reason to 
invoke the Eisenhower Doctrine.  The President then ordered the State and Defense 
Departments to ―get busy at once‖ examining what it was ―these countries wanted by 
                                                 
875
 Message to King Saud on Egyptian Syrian Union, January 30, 1958, Ann Whitman File, Papers as 
President, International Series, Box 46, folder ―Saudi Arabia, King Saud 58-60,‖ DDEL ; Memorandum 
from Acting Secretary of State Herter to President Eisenhower, FRUS, 1958-60, vol.  12, 36.  
876
 Message to King Saud on Egyptian Syrian Union, January 30, 1958, Ann Whitman File, Papers as 
President, International Series, Box 46, folder ―Saudi Arabia, King Saud 58-60,‖ DDEL.  
877
 Special National Intelligence Estimate, February 20, 1958, FRUS, 1958-60, vol. 12, 41. 
878
 357
th
 Meeting of the National Security Council, Ann Whitman File, Papers as President, NSC Series, 
Box 9, folder ―357th,‖  DDEL.  See also: Memorandum form the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for 
Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Berry) to the Acting Secretary of State, January, 25, 1958, 
FRUS, 1958-60, vol. 13, 410. 
879
 357
th
 Meeting of the National Security Council, Ann Whitman File, Papers as President, NSC Series, 
Box 9, folder ―357th,‖  DDEL. 
274 
 
way of support and assistance‖ and ―what our Government ought to do next.‖880  
Administration officials also elicited proposals from allies in the region.  According to 
Secretary Dulles, the administration was ―glad to support any feasible common plan they 
might be able to devise to thwart or otherwise oppose the union of Egypt and Syria.‖881  
In the end no such plan was forthcoming and the administration—eventually—officially 
recognized the UAR.
882
 
Meanwhile, events continued apace in the region.  In February a hopeful sign, 
when two of the America‘s conservative allies formed their own union.  Iraq and Jordan 
combined to form the Arab Federation.  Officials welcomed this development, but did 
not place much faith in it.
883
  The new union, the Directory of the Office of Near Eastern 
Affair predicted, would only play ―second fiddle‖ to the UAR, because the rest of the 
Arab world viewed it with ―cynicism and suspicion.‖884  In March more news reached 
Washington.  In a sensational press release Syrian officials alleged that King Saud 
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bribed Syrian military officers in an effort to persuade them to assassinate Nasser.  As 
proof they even produced a cashier‘s check drawn on Saudi accounts.885 
This revelation toppled the Saudi monarch.  At home, he was already in trouble.  
The royal family was not pleased with his rule.  His lavish spending was bankrupting the 
Kingdom and the Syrian revelation was the last straw.
 886
  Family members forced Saud 
to relinquish day-to-day control of the Kingdom to his brother, Crown Prince Faisal.  
King Saud remained King in title only. 
In the blink of an eye the administration‘s Middle Eastern strategy lay in ruins.  
Shocked, officials contemplated changing course.  Secretary Dulles initially proposed 
taking outlandish action.  He spoke of helping ―friendly hands‖ acquire the waters of the 
Upper Nile and using them to ―threaten Egypt.‖  Dulles apparently envisioned having 
the Sudanese threaten to divert the Nile‘s waters, thereby depriving Egypt of its 
lifeblood.
887
  Ultimately, however, cooler heads prevailed.  Instead of threatening Egypt 
the administration contemplated reaching out to the UAR.  An assessment written in 
conjunction by the NEA, CIA, and Department of Defense concluded in March that it 
was ―unrealistic to believe‖ that the administration ―could reach a full understanding 
with Nasser.‖  Yet, the authors of the study conceded, the administration should at least 
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try.  It should offer Nasser a ―gradual relaxation‖ of restrictions.888  Still wary, however, 
administration officials did not place all of their hopes into one basket.  In addition to 
reaching out to Nasser the administration would ―stiffen the spines of friendly countries 
in the area‖ and ―encourage them to collaborate in resisting Nasser‘s expansionism‖889 
The administration began implementing the first part of its strategy in late March.  
Secretary Dulles instructed the American ambassador in Cairo to offer ―progressive 
change‖ to Nasser.  The ambassador was to offer Nasser a set of modest inducements, 
including, the sale of ―quasi-military items,‖ munitions, and the unfreezing of existing 
road and communication aid.  If the UAR leader responded favorably to these offers, and 
if he moderated his position in the region, the Secretary authorized the ambassador to 
offer the resumption of CARE aid and the reinstatement of the exchange of persons 
program.  If Cairo reacted favorably to these blandishments and began pursuing a ―more 
friendly and fruitful relationship with‖ the U.S. the ambassador was authorized to offer 
PL480 wheat aid and other assistance.  Finally, if Nasser became ―alive to [the] danger 
of international Communism‖ and if he ―abandoned efforts to undermine pro-Western 
Arab regimes‖ the administration would consider offering the UAR new aid and 
reinstate the military training program.
890
   
In April the ambassador approached Nasser and offered him this first batch of 
inducements.  The Egyptian leader ―welcomed our approach.‖  But, he still did not trust 
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the administration.  In the past the Americans had schemed, he stated, to ―find some way 
of affecting removal of himself.‖  Before he could trust Dulles and Eisenhower he 
wanted some assurance to feel his ―back is safe.‖  Additionally he informed the 
ambassador that after the meeting he would leave to attend a pre-arranged meeting in 
Moscow.
891
  This was not the reaction Dulles had been hoping for.  Administration 
officials contemplated what to do next and as Washington weighed its next course of 
action, the position of another of its conservative allies began to erode.  A civil war 
erupted in Lebanon.   
The roots of the war are complex.  The Lebanese state contained a heterogeneous 
mix of peoples, including Lebanese, Syrians, Greeks, and Palestinians.   They practice 
many faiths, Sunni Islam, Shi‘ite Islam, Maronite Christian, Greek Orthodox, Druze, and 
others.  The Lebanese National Pact of 1943 addressed this diversity.  It established a 
confessional system.  It divided power in the country between these religious or 
confessional groups.  Each group received a share of power representative to its 
percentage of the population.  Maronite Christians, who constituted the majority at the 
time, received the most power.  A Maronite was President.  Sunni Muslims, who 
constituted the second largest group, received the second largest share of power, a Sunni 
was Prime Minister.  And so it went.  The Speaker of the Chamber was Shi‘ite, his 
assistant Greek Orthodox.  Representation in parliament was similarly divided.   The 
National Pact also stated that in foreign affairs Lebanon would remain neutral.  This 
would preserve the peace at home.  A foreign policy which favored either the west or the 
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Arab states would only enflame confessional groups at home.  Lebanese Christians had 
strong ties to the west, while Lebanon‘s Muslims felt a strong bond to the other Arab 
states.
892
   
In 1952, however, Lebanon‘s second President, Camille Chamoun, flouted the 
National Pact.  He adopted a foreign policy which increasingly favored the west.
893
 In 
1953 he accepted 2.5 million dollars in American economic and technical assistance.  By 
the end of 1956 he had accepted over 10 million dollars in economic aid and 2.7 million 
dollars in military grants.  The American government also provided him with money for 
the upcoming election.  The CIA‘s Wilbur Eveland recounts traveling ―regularly to the 
presidential palace with a briefcase full of Lebanese pounds,‖ which Chamoun used to 
purchase influence.
894
   
The United States‘ generosity paid dividends.   Chamoun assured administration 
the United States that ―if it ever came to war with the Soviets‖ his country ―would be 
100 per cent on the side of the West, our harbors would be open to your ships, our 
airfields to your planes.‖895   In 1957 Chamoun was also the only Arab leader to 
publically endorse the Eisenhower Doctrine without reservation.  He informed the 
administration that he supported it ―one hundred percent.‖896  Such an endorsement, and 
Chamoun‘s pro-western leanings, however, did not come without a cost.  Chamoun‘s 
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policies disturbed many.  Many Lebanese feared that the President‘s pro-western policy 
would enflame Lebanese Muslims and endanger the shaky confessional system.  Arab 
nationalists, meanwhile, opposed Chamoun, they wanted to align with Nasser.  Still 
other opposed him because they did not want to align with the forces of western 
imperialism. 
Concerns increased in 1956 after Chamoun used the aforementioned American 
money to rig the election.  His supporters gained control of two thirds of Parliament.  
This frightened  many.  They believed Chamoun would use his new majority to amend 
the constitution so that he could run for a second term.
897
   In response opposition groups 
began to form and in 1957 opponents founded the National Front.  Protestors soon 
clashed with government supporters in the mountains.
898
  Soon a second opposition 
group, the Third Force, formed.  Most of the members of these opposition groups were, 
by and large not, radicals.  They were mostly pro-western Christians and Muslims.  
Many members of the Third Force, for instance, were conservatives who Chamoun had 
excluded from the government following the 1956 election.
899
 
Officials in Washington were aware of the instability Chamoun‘s policies were 
causing.  The American ambassador warned that if the President utilized ―his control of 
[the] Parliament to amend‖ the ―constitution and succeed himself‖ it would ―invite very 
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extensive opposition‖ and ―cause great discord.‖900  Despite these concerns 
administration officials continued to support Chamoun.  There did not seem to be any 
other option.  The only other appealing candidate, General Chehab, the American 
ambassador informed them, showed ―no interest in assuming presidential office‖ and no 
other pro-western Lebanese leader ―could defeat Chamoun.‖901  Yet, administration 
officials were aware that if Chamoun ran for a second term the situation could 
deteriorate very quickly.  Consequently Secretary Dulles ordered the American 
ambassador to ―give Chamoun no reason to assume‖ that ―we will support him if he‖ 
decides to run ―for re-election.‖902  
In May, however, Chamoun informed the administration that he would indeed 
run for reelection.
903
  Just days later violence erupted.  It began after Nasib al-Matni, a 
reporter for a newspaper critical of Chamoun, was gunned down in the streets of Beruit.  
Opposition groups quickly blamed the President.  The United Front organized a nation-
wide strike and demanded the President‘s resignation.  Violent clashes erupted.  Angry 
mobs attacked the Presidential summer palace.  Whole regions of the country slipped 
from Chamoun‘s control.  Autonomous zones sprung up in Beruit, Triploi, Sidon, the 
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Shuf, Ba‘lbak, and in Hirmil.  Wilbur Eveland recalls that one day during this period he 
saw a gasoline filled truck race down a hill towards the Presidential palace.  It exploded 
just short.  When he went to investigate, he saw ―Chamoun up on the roof with his 
hunting gun, looking for someone to emerge.‖904   
On May 13th a panicked Chamon asked the American and British governments 
―to consider‖ the ―possibility of landing armed forces in Lebanon.‖905  The Lebanese 
President‘s request placed the administration in an awkward position.  Officials wanted 
to support Chamoun.  If the U.S. did not, President Eisenhower stated, ―much larger 
problems … would arise.‖  No American ally would take the United States or its 
commitment seriously.
906
   Yet intervening raised all manner of complications.  It would, 
the Secretary warned, create a ―wave of anti-Western feeling‖ throughout the region.  
The UAR might cut the oil pipeline which ran through Syria and close the Suez Canal to 
western traffic.
907
  The administration also had no standing to intercede.  It could not, 
Dulles judged, ―invoke the provisions of the‖ Eisenhower Doctrine.  The doctrine only 
empowered the President to intervene if the forces of international communism, or states 
controlled by international communism, threatened Lebanon.  The administration could 
not, Dulles believed, prove to Congress that ―the United Arab Republic had attacked 
                                                 
904
 Gendzier, Notes from the Minefield, 242-45 ; Eveland, Ropes of Sand, 280. 
905
 Telegram from the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State, May 13, 1958, FRUS, 1958-60, 
vol. 11, 42. 
906
 Memorandum of Conversation, May 13, 1958, FRUS, 1958-60, vol. 11, 46. 
907
 Ibid.  
282 
 
Lebanon and that the United Arab Republic was under the control of international 
communism.‖908   
Instead the administration decided to attempt to deter Chamoun from requesting 
U.S. assistance.
909
  The State Department instructed the American ambassador to inform 
Chamoun that the ―U.S. is prepared upon appropriate request‖ to ―send certain combat 
forces to Lebanon,‖ but, only if certain pre-conditions were met. 910  These included, 
filing a complaint before the United Nations alleging ―interference from without,‖ 
obtaining public support for an American intervention from other Arab states, and 
agreeing to not to ―push his candidacy‖ for reelection.911   
Rather than deterring Chamoun the administration‘s message emboldened him.  
He began laboring to meet its requirements.  He convinced Iraq and Jordan to support 
his claim that UAR agents were machinating the disturbances in his country.  He also 
had his ambassador to the U.N. lodge a complaint alleging that the UAR was fermenting 
unrest in Lebanon.  In response the U.N. adopted a Swedish resolution which established 
an observation group, UNOGIL, to investigate whether ―illegal infiltration of personnel 
or supply of arms or other material across‖ was taking place.912   
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In June UNOGIL arrived in Lebanon.  The mission was supervised by three 
international dignitaries, Galo Plaza, the former President of Ecuador, Rajeshwar Dayal, 
an Indian diplomat, and Odd Bull, a Norwegian Major General, who the press delighted 
in referring to as ―Queer Steer.‖ UNOGIL teams soon began patrolling the border.  They 
could not, however, verify Chamoun‘s accusations.  But this was far from conclusive.  
For security reasons ONOGIL only patrolled the portions of the border which remained 
under Lebanese government control.  This amounted to a mere 18 kilometers of the 324 
kilometer long border.  The group could, and did, ask rebel groups to inspect other 
portions of the border, but these requests were, often, denied.   More frustratingly, 
UNOGIL teams only regularly patrolled during day light hours.  This led Chamoun to 
sneer that the group spent ―their time in social clubs at night‖ instead of patrolling the 
border.
913
 
Despite the group‘s findings Chamoun again asked the administration whether it 
would intervene?
914
  This prompted much discussion.  Policymakers again felt like they 
had no good options.  As the Secretary of State elucidated, if the administration 
responded there would be ―a wave of anti-Western sentiment‖ which would wash ―away 
our friends in Jordan, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia and turn the Lebanese government against 
us‖ and if the administration ―did not respond,‖ Dulles continued, ―we would get the 
same results less abruptly in the Arab countries.‖915  There were also other reasons for 
and against intervening.  Against was the fact that officials had begun to lose confidence 
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in Chamoun.  His military had proved incapable of dealing with the revolt and he 
refused to fire the general who oversaw these dismal efforts.
916
  In favor of interventions 
was how other nations would interpret American inaction.  Secretary Dulles predicted 
that if the United States did not come to Lebanon‘s aid its ―friends and enemies‖ would 
believe that the United States was ―unwilling to come to the aid of its declared ally and 
friend, and that it had capitulated to Nasser.‖917  The ―effect on our friends in the 
countries peripheral to the Arab world,‖ in particular, Dulles continued, ―would be very 
bad‖ as well.  It could cause the United States to lose the ―whole periphery of the Soviet 
Union,‖ along with, Sudan, Libya, Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, Thailand, Vietnam, and 
Taiwan.
918
   
In the end Dulles concluded that the United States had ―little or no choice, even 
though every alternative is ‗wrong.‘‖  The administration ―would have to fulfill our 
commitment‖ to Chamoun.919   ―The losses of doing nothing would be worse than the 
losses from action.‖920  If the Lebanese President requested assistance, the administration 
would provide it.  Still administration officials hoped to avoid this eventuality.  It ―put 
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every possible pressure on the Lebanese to solve this matter themselves.‖921  It also 
encouraged its allies in Jordan and Iraq to assist Chamoun.
922
 
The only thing the administration did not consider doing was allowing Nasser to 
broker a solution and the leader of the UAR did offer to do so.  Via an intermediary 
Nasser  offered to ―use his influence with the opposition leaders‖ to convince them to 
allow Chamoun to serve out his term, if, the administration convinced Chamoun to not 
run for reelection, appointed General Chehab as Prime Minister, and granted amnesty to 
the rebels.
923
  Nasser‘s offer fell on death ears.  Administration officials held Nasser 
responsible for what was occurring.  It was ―very clear,‖ the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated, 
that ―the UAR is arming partisans in Lebanon.‖924  Nasser‘s offer to mediate, Secretary 
Dulles concluded, was only an attempt ―to induce us to join with him in advocating‖ an 
―arrangement which would‖ white-wash his intervention, benefit the opposition, and 
place an American ―seal of respectability upon‖ his attack on the ―legally constituted 
Lebanese authorities.‖925  
In the meantime events in Lebanon come to a head.  The impetus came not from 
the United States or from Nasser, but from Jordan.   In late June, King Hussein 
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uncovered a conspiracy.  Military officers, who opposed the union with Iraq and were 
sympathetic to Nasser and Arab nationalism, were planning to overthrow the 
monarch.
926
  Before reacting the King searched for assistance.  He turned first to the 
United States.  He asked administration officials if they would consider providing 
military assistance if he requested it.
927
  He also appealed for assistance to his Arab 
Federation ally, Iraq.   
The Iraqi government responded first.  It ordered its 20
th
 Infantry brigade to 
deploy and assist the King.  As one historian has written, however, this ―measure taken 
for Hussein‘s preservation‖ instead ―became the means of destroying his would be 
preservers.‖928  Unbeknownst to either the Iraqis or to King Hussein, a Free Officers 
Movement had formed in the Iraqi military.  These disillusioned officers sought to 
overthrow the pro-western Iraqi government.  The order to deploy the 20
th
 Infantry 
brigade provided them with a unique opportunity to do so.  The deployment brought the 
unit within sight of the capital.  The officers did not let this opportunity pass.  As the 
brigade neared the capital sympathetic officers ordered their men to occupy key 
positions in the city, including the royal palace.  Upon arriving at the palace the troops 
opened fire, killing the King and the Crown Prince.  Jubilant crowds mutilated the 
Crown Prince‘s body, drug it through the street, and hung it outside the Defense 
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Ministry.
929
  Across town Iraq‘s pro-western Prime Minster, Nuri al-Said, awoke to the 
sound of gunfire.  He fled.  Later, however, a frenzied mob caught sight of him, 
reportedly disguised as a woman.  What exactly occurred next is unclear.  Either the 
Prime Minster shot himself or members of the crowd did so, regardless Nuri al-Said was 
dead and so too were American hopes for a pro-west Iraq. 
 News of the coup sent shockwaves reverberating throughout the Middle East.  
After receiving word a frenzied Camille Chamoun officially requested ―US military 
intervention in Lebanon within 48 hours.‖930  In Jordan King Hussein assumed control of 
the Arab Union and contemplated marching on Baghdad.
931
  After receiving intelligence 
from the British indicating that the UAR was planning a revolt, he too requested 
American and British intervention.
932
 
American officials‘ reaction bordered on panic.  They feared a Nasserist tidal 
wave was poised to engulf the region.  Nasser, they believed, was directing these 
disturbances from Cairo.  The Jordanian conspiracy, the American ambassador stated, 
                                                 
929
 Meeting at the White House with Congressional Leaders, July 14, 1958, White House Office, Office of 
the Staff Secretary, International Series, Box 12, folder ―Middle East-Lebanon (1),‖ DDEL. 
930
Memorandum of Conference with the President, July 20, 1958, White House Office, Office of the Staff 
Secretary, Subject Series, State Department Subseries, Box 3, folder ―State Department 1958 (May-
August) (4),‖ DDEL ; Telegram from the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State, July 14, 1958, 
FRUS, 1958-60, vol. 11, 208 ; Briefing Notes by the Director of Central Intelligence Dulles, July 14, 1958, 
FRUS, 1958-60, vol.  12, 309 ; Telephone Call to the President, July 18, 1958, Papers of John Foster 
Dulles, Telephone Call Series, Box 12, folder ―Memorandum Telephone Call-White House April 1 ‘58- 
July 31 ‘58 (1),‖ DDEL. 
931
 Memorandum of Conference with the President, July 20, 1958, White House Office, Office of the Staff 
Secretary, Subject Series, State Department Subseries, Box 3, folder ―State Department 1958 (May-
August) (4),‖ DDEL ; Telegram from the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State, July 14, 1958, 
FRUS, 1958-60, 299-301 ; Richie Ovendale, ―Great Britain and the Anglo-American Invasion of Jordan 
and Lebanon in 1958,‖ The International History Review, XVI, no. 2 (May 1994), 291. 
932
 Memorandum of a Conversation with the President, July 16, 1958, FRUS, 1958-60, vol. 11, 308-9 ; 
Telegram from the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State, July 16, 1958, FRUS, 1958-60, vol. 11, 
312-13 
288 
 
―undoubtedly‖ originated from the UAR.933  ―Nasser and the UAR leaders,‖ a Special 
National Intelligence Estimate concluded, were exploiting ―the Lebanese crisis to 
promote the cause of radical pan-Arab unity.‖934  In Iraq ―the real authority behind the 
Government,‖ Dulles stated, was Nasser.935  And the Egyptian leader‘s ambitions, 
officials feared, reached beyond just Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon.  Nasser, the Secretary 
maintained, would not be satisfied until he achieved ―at least a truncation of Israel and 
the overthrow of‖ the ―present governments in Lebanon, Jordan, Morocco, Tunis, Libya, 
the Sudan, Saudi Arabia, etc‖ and replaced them with ―his stooges.‖936  ―Kuwait, the 
brightest star in the U.K. oil galaxy,‖ Dulles feared, was also in the ―balance.‖937  What 
was occurring, Dulles concluded, ―looks like a plot by Nasser to take over the whole 
thing,‖ to take over the entire Middle East.938 
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And there was, administration officials believed, a strong chance he could do so.  
Nasser, they believed, was exploiting the Arab public‘s irrational emotionalism.939  
―Nasser, like Hitler before him,‖ Dulles hyperventilated, ―has the power to excite 
emotions and enthusiasm.‖940  The Egyptian leader was, Eisenhower complained, 
appealing to ―the largely illiterate populations in the region‖ and winning their 
―enthusiastic, even idolatrous, support.‖941  In a meeting with British officials the two 
allied proclaimed that ―Arab mass opinion,‖ has been ―been captured by Nasser‖ who 
has exploiting it to further his ambitions.
 942
  The Egyptian leader has, the Secretary 
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concluded, ―whipped up Pan-Arabism.  Much as Hitler had whipped up Pan-Germanism, 
as a means of promoting an extension of his own power.‖943 
While the UAR leader may have been exploiting Arab irrationality, the real 
beneficiary, administration officials continued to believe, would be the USSR.  Nasser, 
like the people he was manipulating, they maintained, was irrational.   The UAR leader, 
the American ambassador concluded in late 1957, is an ―enigmatic character.‖  He is 
both ―frank and secretive, straightforward and conspiratorial, bold and irresolute, 
generous and petty, liberal and dictatorial, wise and foolish, dedicated and egotistical—a 
veritable Dr. Jeckle and Mr. Hyde.‖944  If the ―inner-sanctum of Nasser‘s thinking could 
be located and illuminated,‖ the ambassador continued, ―it would be found to contain 
more half-formed ideas than well laid plans.‖945  This irrationality, administration 
officials believed, would ultimately allow the Soviets to outwit and subjugate Nasser.  
―The ultimate heir‖ of Nasser‘s conquests, Dulles predicted, would be the USSR.946  The 
Soviets, the Secretary stated, are using ―Nasser to displace the pro-Western elements in 
the Middle East and‖ move ―in on the heels of his downfall and‖ take ―over the area for 
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themselves.‖947  ―The real authority,‖ Dulles concluded, ―behind Nasser‖ was ―the 
USSR.‖948  Nasser, President Eisenhower decisively remarked the day after the Iraqi 
coup, was ―a puppet, even though he probably think know so.‖949 
This racialized thinking prompted the administration to act.  The question was 
how broadly should it act?  Should they deploy troops to ―save‖ Lebanon?  Lebanon and 
Jordan?  Iraq?  Kuwait? Saudi Arabia?  All of the above?
950
   
In Saudi Arabia and Kuwait officials contemplated intervening, even they did not 
have these governments‘ permission.  They entertained such drastic action because they 
could not, they believed, allow these nations and their vast oil reserves to fall to Nasser 
and the Soviets.
951
  In the end, however, the administration chose not to intervene 
immediately.  As the Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs noted, such an action 
would have provoked ―the most adverse political reactions‖ from the local population 
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and from the ruling families.
952
  Instead the administration decided to only intervene if 
these states requested the United States to do so.
953
  They also moved elements of the 7
th
 
fleet to the Persian Gulf to protect the oil fields.
954
  
In Iraq the administration never seriously considered intervening, but it was 
under pressure to do so. The British pressed for western intervention and the Jordanians 
spoke briefly of intervening themselves.  Administration officials, however, had no 
interest in interceding in Iraq.  It, they believed, was a lost cause.  They did, however, 
inform the British that if they wished to proceed they could do so alone.
955
    
British and Jordanian officials also pressured the administration to deploy forces 
to Jordan.  British officials repeatedly pressed for U.S. involvement.
956
  So too did the 
Jordanians, who wished to avoid having to rely on British forces.  They did not, the 
American ambassador relayed, want to suffer the ―curse‖ of a return of ―mandate British 
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troops.‖957  Administration officials, however, decided against taking action in Jordan, 
for several reasons.  Some of these were practical.  As President Eisenhower informed 
his British allies, they could not obtain Congressional approval for action in Jordan.
958
  
In addition, Eisenhower believed, any effort to save Jordan might be ―a ‗beau jeste.‖959  
U.S. involvement would also, the director of the USIA warned, be ―difficult to justify 
before world opinion.‖  King Hussein was ―a monarch with no roots in‖ a country which 
was an ―artificial creation resulting from World War I, with no history.‖  If the United 
States stayed ―on this wicket,‖ he judged, ―the USSR will beat us to death in public 
opinion.‖960  Instead administration officials delegated Jordan‘s fate to the British, 
although, they did pledge to provide them with logistical support.
 961
 
Ultimately the United States would only intervene in Lebanon.  The Levant state 
was different.  It, the Secretary of State noted, contained ―a large segment‖ of people 
who were ―on our side.‖962  It also had ―a very strong community‖ with an ―interest in 
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stability,‖ that had ―commerce and ties with the West.‖963    This did not mean that 
administration officials were without reservations.  The Secretary fretted that it was 
―easy to get ourselves involved‖ in Lebanon, but could well be ―very hard to get out.‖964  
In the end, however, Dulles decided that the United States needed to combat the ―flood‖ 
of Arab nationalism, which was ―running strongly.‖  To do so it needed to ―put up sand 
bags around positions we must protect—the first group being Israel and Lebanon.‖965  
 On July 15
th
 nearly 15,000 U.S. Marines landed on Lebanon‘s coast.  They 
encountered little resistance.  They, one historian has written, ―waded ashore … among 
friendly crowds of late afternoon beach-goers and throngs of peddlers hawking 
everything from hummus to Coca Cola.‖966  The same day British forces landed in 
Jordan, in what Lord Hood called a ―necessary complement to action in Lebanon.‖967 
 U.S. forces remained in Lebanon for three months.  They departed in late 
October.  British forces left Jordan the next month.  These were small victories.  As 1958 
bled into 1959 the administration‘s Middle Eastern strategy lay in ruins.  Nasser‘s 
influence and prestige had reached new heights.  He ruled both Egypt and Syria.  He, 
and his policies, enjoyed unprecedented support amongst the Arab masses.  The 
                                                 
963
 Memorandum of a Conference with the President, July 14, 1958, White House Office, Office of the 
Staff Secretary, Subject Series, State Department Subseries, Box 3, folder ―State Department – 1958 
(May-Aug) (4),‖ DDEL. 
964
 Memorandum of a Conference with the President, July 14, 1958, White House Office, Office of the 
Staff Secretary, Subject Series, State Department Subseries, Box 3, folder ―State Department – 1958 
(May-Aug) (4),‖ DDEL. 
965
 Memorandum of a Conference with President Eisenhower, July 23, 1958, FRUS, 1958-60, vol. 12, 98.  
See also: Memorandum of Conference with the President, July 20, 1958, White House Office, Office of 
the Staff Secretary, Subject Series, State Department Subseries, Box 3, folder ―State Department 1958 
(May-August) (4),‖ DDEL. 
966
 Little, ―His Finest Hour?,‖  27. 
967
 Memorandum of a Conversation, July 15, 1958, John Foster Dulles Papers, JFD Chronological Series, 
Box 16,  DDEL. 
295 
 
conservative governments the Eisenhower administration had wagered on had either 
been  swept away or marginalized.  After U.S. forces departed Lebanon, Camille 
Chamoun ceded power.  The new Lebanese government abandoned the United States 
and again adopted a neutralist foreign policy.  In Iraq the bodies of Nuri al-Said, the 
King, and the Crown Prince lay cold and the new government had close ties to the Iraqi 
Communist Party.  In Jordan King Hussein survived, but was surrounded by unfriendly 
neighbors.  King Saud, the administration‘s miracle man, had been stripped of power, 
reduced to a mere figurehead.  Nasser and Arab nationalism had washed away the 
administration‘s foundation of sand. 
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CHAPTER IX 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Was the Eisenhower administration‘s policy in regards to Arab nationalism an 
effective one?  If one uses the administration‘s own goals as a benchmark, the answer is 
clearly no.  King Saud, despite brief moments of popularity, never matured into an 
effective regional leader.  By 1957 he failed to lead his own country, let alone the rest of 
the Arab world.  Moreover, the administration did not contain Nasser and the Arab 
nationalist movement, far from it.  By 1958 the Egyptian leader had expanded his reach 
to Syria and he and his policies enjoyed unprecedented popularity throughout the region.   
Yet, does this mean that these policies were wrong or a failure?  This answer 
depends upon which criteria you utilize in defining success.  If you place value on 
American economic growth, the administration‘s policies could be defined as a success.  
Eisenhower‘s decision to promote King Saud deepened the extant American 
commitment to the Saudi monarchy.  This continued commitment helped secure for the 
United States a cheap and stable supply of petroleum, which helped propel American 
economic growth throughout much of the rest of the century.  Countless common 
Americans benefitted from this and also from the cheap and abundant gasoline and home 
heating oil the commitment also provided. 
If you place value on moral or ideological consistency in America‘s foreign 
policy, however, the Eisenhower administration‘s policies appear far less successful.  
Eisenhower administration officials aligned the nation with unresponsive, and in many 
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cases, repressive Middle Eastern regimes.  They also opposed a force in Arab 
nationalism which desired nothing more than freedom from foreign interference and to 
create responsive local governments. 
The perspective one adopts also influences the answer one reaches.  When 
viewed from the perspective of American business interests the Eisenhower 
administration‘s policies were prudent and wise.  They secured—relative—political 
stability in the Arab world.  This stability abetted American corporate expansion.  The 
administration‘s policies also appear successful when viewed through the eyes of Arab 
elites.  The administration‘s decisions helped these groups retain their preeminent 
position in society.   
Viewed from other perspectives, however, the policies appear very different.  As 
viewed by reform-minded Arabs, American support of conservative or reactionary 
regimes robbed them of the meaningful sovereignty and the responsive governments 
they desired.  Interrogating the administration‘s policies through the eyes of religious 
conservatives produces a similar negative appraisal.  Many religious conservatives, 
particularly in Saudi Arabia, resented the close American-Saudi partnership that 
President Eisenhower‘s policies helped produced.  They also disliked the growing 
influence of American culture and ideas that this partnership helped catalyze.  
Adjudicating success or failure also depends upon what point in time you render 
your judgment from.  A person rendering an opinion in the late 1990s would likely have 
viewed these policies as quite successful.  During these years the American economy ran 
hot, awash in cheap oil, with gasoline prices south of a dollar a gallon.  Someone 
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viewing these same policies on September 12
th
 2001 might have viewed them very 
differently.  15 of the 19 terrorists who flew airliners into the World Trade Center and 
the Pentagon hailed from Saudi Arabia.  Many of whom cited the United States‘ 
continued support of the Saudi monarchy as a primary reason for their actions.
968
  
Contemporary realities effects how one interrogates the success or failure of past 
policies.  This is no different in 2011 than it was in 1990 or 2001. 
For these reasons I have decided not to deliver a final verdict on the Eisenhower 
administration‘s encounter with Arab nationalism.   Rendering judgment is not why I 
wrote this book.  I wrote it in order to accomplish four goals. 
  In this book I have sought to demonstrate that culture decisively influences the 
making of foreign policy.  As Andrew Rotter has noted, there is still a tendency within 
the field to treat policymakers as ―just policy wonks who shed their‖ cultural beliefs 
―like raincoats at the office door.‖  Nothing, I hope this work has demonstrated, could be 
further from the case.  Cultural beliefs affect everyone.  As anthropologist Clifford 
Geertz has elucidated, human beings are ―incomplete or unfinished animals who 
complete‖ themselves ―through culture.‖969  Human behavior  is ―only very broadly 
controlled by genetic programs or models—intrinsic sources of information.‖  As a 
result the ―particular pattern‖ a human being‘s ―behavior takes is guided predominantly 
by cultural rather than‖ by ―genetic templates.‖970  We are all, in other words, cultural 
animals.  It can be no other way.  As Geertz lectured, human beings without cultural 
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beliefs ―would be unworkable monstrosities with very few useful instincts, fewer 
recognizable sentiments, and no intellect: mental basket cases.‖971  No matter what 
policymakers, or the people who study them, may believe, they are no different.  To 
again quote Andrew Rotter, ―even the sophisticated men and woman at the White House, 
the State Department, and the Pentagon‖ are ―affected by long-standing images of the 
others with whom they‖ deal.972 
I have also sought to establish that culture, state action, and national identity 
coexist in a complex and entangled relationship.  As this work has shown, foreign events 
affect domestic culture and identity formation.  Throughout American history this 
nation‘s encounter with Arab peoples, in both reality and cultural imagination, have 
helped forge a national ―civilized‖ identity.  During the 1940s and 50s the rise of 
totalitarian powers in Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia helped fashion a new 
understanding of religion in American thought and culture.  Conversely, I have shown, 
that culture and national identity shaped America‘s policy abroad.  During the 1950s 
racialized assumptions about Arab peoples compelled the Eisenhower administration 
into opposing Arab nationalism and American beliefs about religion prompted the 
administration to promote King Saud as a regional leader.   
Past works, like Robert Dean‘s Imperial Brotherhood, Thomas Borstelman‘s The 
Cold War and the Color Line, Kristen Hoganson‘s Fighting for American Manhood, 
                                                 
971
 Ibid., 49. 
972
 Rotter, Comrades at Odds, xx.  Some may disagree with this assertion, insisting that human beings 
possess agency, that it is possible to exercise objectivity, that humans can overcome or step outside of 
their culture.  This contention, however, fails to appreciate that the very concepts of ―agency‖ and 
―objectivity‖ are themselves cultural-intellectual productions of the western tradition.  They are beliefs 
which grew out of a culture which assumed the existence of an omnipotent perspective and free will.  
They are, in other words, the cultural-intellectual byproducts of a Christian worldview.   
300 
 
Seth Jacobs‘ America’s Miracle Man in Vietnam, Jason Parker‘s Brother’s Keeper, and 
Andrew Rotter‘s Comrades at Odds, have all demonstrated how American culture 
influenced the making of American foreign policy.   Other works, such as Elaine Tyler 
May‘s Homeward Bound and Paul Boyer‘s By the Bomb’s Early Light, have established 
how American interactions with foreign peoples and governments influenced domestic 
culture.
973
  None of these works, however, has fully captured the richly intertwined 
nature of this relationship between culture, foreign policy, and national identity 
formation.  This work endeavors to do so.  
―Stand Up and Be Counted‖ also seeks to fashion a contribution to the growing 
literature on religion and U.S. foreign policy.  During recent years historians, such as 
Seth Jacobs and William Inboden, have elucidated how American understandings of 
religion influenced U.S. policy towards the Soviet Union and also towards Vietnam.
974
  
No historian has yet, however, successfully demonstrated how domestic beliefs about 
religion effected policy in the Middle East.  Some works have probed the fringes.  
Matthew Jacobs‘ article ―The Peril and Promise of Islam‖ and Nathan Citino‘s From 
Arab Nationalism to OPEC have both demonstrated how Americas‘ views of Islam 
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effected policy.
975
  Yet neither of these works has investigated how these perceptions of 
Islam flowed from Americans‘ larger beliefs about religion. ―Stand Up and Be Counted‖ 
endeavors to change that. 
Finally, this work strives to reveal how the events described in this book continue 
to define the contours of the Islamic world today.  Many of the conservative 
governments the Eisenhower administration chose to support, and which succeeding 
American administrations continued to support, rule today.  The legacy of the Arab 
nationalist movement is equally evident.  Many of the governments and rulers in the 
Middle East can trace their genesis back to the Arab nationalist movement and to the 
forces described in this book. The encounter with Arab nationalism, in short, continues. 
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